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Advisory · GitHub · RubyGems · nokogiri

GHSA-WFPW-MMFH-QQ69

Nokogiri: Possible Use-After-Free in XInclude Processing

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CVSS
—
low
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versiónPrimer parche a -1 d de la divulgación
Exposición153 dDesde la divulgación, 19 jun 2026, 11:37 a. m.
Detección150 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 1.19.4
Monitoreo
Detectada
18 jun 26
19 jun 26
10 sept 26
17 nov 26
19 nov 26
18 jun 26
27 jul 26
3 sept 26
12 oct 26
19 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Remediación Parche 1.19.4 nokogiri · -1 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-WFPW-MMFH-QQ69 divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Summary

XInclude substitution performed by `Nokogiri::XML::Node#do_xinclude` replaced each `<xi:include>` in place, freeing the include node along with its children (such as `<xi:fallback>` and its descendants) and any namespaces declared on them. If an application had already exposed one of those nodes or namespaces to Ruby, the corresponding Ruby object was left pointing at freed memory. Using the object could result in invalid reads or writes to memory.

Nokogiri 1.19.4 substitutes each `<xi:include>` on a defensive copy by default, so the structures libxml2 frees are never the ones bound to live Ruby objects.

Only the CRuby implementation is affected; JRuby is not affected.

Severity

The Nokogiri maintainers have evaluated this as low severity. Reaching it requires an unusual API-usage pattern that does not arise during normal use. The application must parse a document without XInclude, traverse into an `<xi:include>` subtree to expose its nodes or namespaces to Ruby, and only then invoke XInclude processing. The common case, requesting XInclude at parse time, operates on a freshly parsed document whose nodes are not yet exposed to Ruby and is not affected. Nokogiri 1.19.4 makes this pattern safe by default and requires no change to application code.

Mitigation

Upgrade to Nokogiri 1.19.4 or later.

As a workaround for earlier versions, perform XInclude substitution at parse time (with the `xinclude` parse option) rather than calling `#do_xinclude` on a document that has already been traversed. A freshly parsed document has no nodes exposed to Ruby, so the substitution is safe.

Credit

This issue was responsibly reported by Zheng Yu from depthfirst.com.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
nokogiri< 1.19.4
1.19.4
1.19.7
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
rubygemsnokogiri
Corregida 1.19.4 -1 d 1.19.7 no afectada
Versiones corregidas1.19.4
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Otrahttps://github.com/sparklemotion/nokogiri/security/advisories/GHSA-wfpw-mmfh-qq69
Otrahttps://github.com/sparklemotion/nokogiri

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