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Advisory · GitHub · Maven · org.omnifaces:omnifaces

GHSA-WG34-2PGP-VX43

@RateLimit can be bypassed with a client-supplied X-Forwarded-For header and its counter map is unbounded

Parche disponible
Descargar PNG JSON
CVSS 3.1
6.5
Media
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versiónPrimer parche el mismo día de la divulgación
Exposición12 dDesde la divulgación, 7 nov 2026, 12:00 p. m.
Detección11 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 5.5.7
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
7 nov 26
19 nov 26
20 nov 26
7 nov 26
10 nov 26
14 nov 26
17 nov 26
20 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-WG34-2PGP-VX43 divulgada · CVSS 6.5 (GitHub)
Remediación Parche 5.5.7 org.omnifaces:omnifaces · 0 d desde divulgación
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Impact

`@RateLimit` without `clientId`, and `RateLimiter#checkRateLimit(HttpServletRequest, ...)`, keyed the rate limit on `Servlets#getRemoteAddr()`. That method trusts the `Forwarded`, `X-Forwarded-For` and `X-Real-IP` request headers, which the client controls. A client could send a different value on every request, get a fresh counter every time, and so never hit the limit.

Every new key also stayed in the counter map for one time window. The map was scanned in full on every request. A client which varies the header could therefore grow the map without bound and make each request slower. The cost is quadratic in the number of requests per time window.

A check with a short time window also removed the counters of a longer time window, which reset their limit.

Patches

Fixed in 5.5.7:

  • The rate limit key is now `HttpServletRequest#getRemoteAddr()`. Proxy headers are not consulted.
  • An IPv6 address is keyed by its `/64` network prefix. An IPv4-mapped address, or one in the NAT64 well-known prefix `64:ff9b::/96`, is keyed by its embedded IPv4 address.
  • Each counter expires by its own time window. A periodic task removes expired counters, so requests no longer scan the map.
  • The number of tracked request counters is capped by the new `org.omnifaces.RATE_LIMITER_MAX_TRACKED_COUNTERS` context param, which defaults to 100000. When the cap is reached, a request which needs a new counter is rejected.

When the application runs behind a reverse proxy, configure the servlet container to resolve the client IP address from trusted proxies only. Examples are Tomcat's `RemoteIpValve`, WildFly/Undertow's `proxy-address-forwarding` and Payara/GlassFish's `auth-pass-through-enabled`. Otherwise all clients share the IP address of the proxy and therefore one rate limit.

Workarounds

Pass an explicit client ID based on `HttpServletRequest#getRemoteAddr()` to `RateLimiter#checkRateLimit(String, ...)`, instead of relying on `@RateLimit` without `clientId`. Alternatively, let the reverse proxy remove or overwrite the `Forwarded`, `X-Forwarded-For` and `X-Real-IP` headers. The second option prevents the bypass only. The counter map is still scanned on every request.

Not affected

`Servlets#getRemoteAddr()` and `Faces#getRemoteAddr()` keep reading proxy headers. Their javadoc now warns against using them for security decisions. The IP address logged by `FacesRequestLogger`, `FacesExceptionFilter`, `FullAjaxExceptionHandler` and `ScriptErrorServlet` therefore stays client-supplied. That value is for information only and drives no security decision.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:N
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:U
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:N
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:L
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:L
AltoBajoNinguno
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
org.omnifaces:omnifaces≥ 5.0 ≤ 5.5.6
5.0
5.5.6
5.5.7
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
mavenorg.omnifaces:omnifaces
Corregida 5.5.7 0 d 5.5.7 no afectada
Versiones corregidas5.5.7
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/omnifaces/omnifaces/security/advisories/GHSA-wg34-2pgp-vx43

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