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GHSA-WG58-MHWV-35PQ

copyPad/movePad destinationID allows the ueberdb key delimiter ':' , bypassing the force=false overwrite guard and corrupting another pad's revision records

Sin parche publicado
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CVSS 3.1
3.8
Baja
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
ParcheSin parcheEl fabricante no ha publicado corrección
Exposición23 dDesde la divulgación, 27 oct 2026, 8:03 a. m.
Detección22 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
27 oct 26
18 nov 26
20 nov 26
27 oct 26
2 nov 26
8 nov 26
14 nov 26
20 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-WG58-MHWV-35PQ divulgada · CVSS 3.8 (GitHub)
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Etherpad: `copyPad`/`movePad` `destinationID` permits the ueberdb key delimiter `:`, bypassing the `force=false` overwrite guard and clobbering another pad's internal records

Target: `ether/etherpad-lite` (TypeScript, Node.js), HEAD `0cd01fce` (v3.3.2).
Class: CWE-138 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements (the ueberdb key-namespace delimiter `:`) in a pad identifier + CWE-20 improper input validation, leading to a silent overwrite-guard bypass and cross-pad data corruption.
Impact: an HTTP-API caller can supply a `destinationID` like `victim:revs:0` to `copyPad`/`movePad`/`copyPadWithoutHistory`. The embedded `:` (a) bypasses the `force=false` "destination already exists" protection and (b) writes into a different pad's internal `pad:<id>:revs:<n>` / `:chat:<n>` sub-records, corrupting that pad's revision history (time-slider, historical export, `getRevisionChangeset`, `pad.check()` break) — persistently. The pad's current head text survives, so the corruption is silent.
Channel: GitHub PVR on `ether/etherpad-lite` (open). Finder credit.

Summary

Etherpad stores every pad record in ueberdb under colon-delimited keys: `pad:<padId>` (head),
`pad:<padId>:revs:<n>` (per-revision), `pad:<padId>:chat:<n>` (chat). The pad-id validator, however,
does not forbid the `:` delimiter:

// src/node/db/PadManager.ts  (isValidPadId, ~202)
const padIdRegex = /^(g.[a-zA-Z0-9]{16}\$)?[^$]+$/;   // forbids '$' only — ':' is allowed

The HTTP API sanitizes the `padID`/`padName` fields (`APIHandler.ts:222-230` runs `sanitizePadId`,
which maps `:`→`_`), but the copy/move family takes its destination via the `destinationID` field
(`APIHandler.ts` version map: `copyPad`/`movePad`/`copyPadWithoutHistory` use `sourceID`/`destinationID`,
not `padID`/`padName`), so `destinationID` is never sanitized and a `:` survives into the engine.

`Pad.copy()` (`src/node/db/Pad.ts:~634`) guards against overwriting an existing destination via
`removePadIfForceIsTrueAndAlreadyExist(destinationID, force)`, which calls
`padManager.doesPadExist(destinationID)`. But `doesPadExist` (`PadManager.ts:~156`) decides existence by
reading the record's top-level `atext` field:

const value = await db.get(`pad:${padId}`);
return value != null && value.atext != null;

A revision record (`pad:victim:revs:0`) stores its atext under `meta`, not at the top level, so
`doesPadExist('victim:revs:0')` returns false even though the record exists. The guard is therefore
silently bypassed (even with `force=false`), and `copyRecord` executes
`db.set('pad:victim:revs:0', <source head object>)` — overwriting the victim pad's revision-0 snapshot
with an object that has no valid changeset/meta.

Runtime PoC (RUNTIME-PROVEN against a live instance)

Etherpad v3.3.2, default dirtyDB, `authenticationMethod: apikey`. Full transcript in
`req-resp/poc-run.txt`, re-runnable via `repro.sh` (reads the apikey from `APIKEY.txt`/env, never
hardcoded; uses unique pad names so it is idempotent):

pads: victim=victim_6925921c src=src_6925921c
victim rev0 BEFORE          : Z:1>p*0+p$TOP-SECRET-victim-content
CONTROL  copy src->victim          (force=false): {code:1, "destinationID already exists"}      <-- guard fires normally
EXPLOIT  copy src->victim:revs:0    (force=false): {code:0, "ok"}                                <-- guard BYPASSED by ':'
victim rev0 AFTER          : None                                                               <-- victim rev-0 record corrupted
victim head still loads    : {text: "TOP-SECRET-victim-content\n"}                              <-- silent (head intact)

The control proves the `force=false` existence guard normally rejects a duplicate destination; the
exploit shows the same call with a `:`-bearing `destinationID` succeeds and destroys the victim pad's
revision-0 changeset (`getRevisionChangeset(victim,0)` now returns `null` instead of the original
changeset). `movePad` behaves identically and additionally deletes the source; `copyPadWithoutHistory`
shares the unsanitized `destinationID`.

Severity

`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L` = 4.2 (Medium).
- `PR:H` — reaching the unsanitized `destinationID` requires the global API key (or an OAuth-admin token); ordinary end-user surfaces (web `/p/`, socket `CLIENT_READY`, `createPad`/`createGroupPad`) all sanitize the `:` away, so this is not reachable by an unauthenticated/low-priv user.
- `I:L` / `A:L` — persistent corruption of an arbitrary pad's revision history and a partial DoS of that pad's history features (time-slider, historical export, `getRevisionChangeset`, `pad.check`); the pad's current head content is unaffected. `C:N` — no read-back.

Honest framing. The API-key holder is a trusted actor who can already `deletePad`/`setText` any pad, so this is not a privilege-boundary break. What makes it a genuine, fixable defect rather than expected admin power: (1) `force=false` is a documented safety contract (“do not overwrite an existing destination”) that this silently violates; (2) the write lands in a different pad's internal namespace than the one named, via a delimiter the id validator should never have allowed; (3) it is a latent footgun for any integration that forwards a user-controlled value into the documented `destinationID` parameter. The fix is small and unambiguous.

Suggested fix

Forbid the ueberdb delimiter `:` in `isValidPadId` (and/or run `sanitizePadId` on `sourceID`/`destinationID`
in `APIHandler` exactly as for `padID`/`padName`), and make `doesPadExist` robust (e.g. check key
presence, not just a top-level `atext`) so the overwrite guard cannot be bypassed by sub-namespace keys.

Dup-gate

Distinct from all 8 published advisories: none touch `copyPad`/`movePad`, `isValidPadId`'s `:` handling,
the ueberdb key namespace, or the `doesPadExist`/`force` guard. (GHSA-2jwf is import/export temp paths;
GHSA-w3g3 is `.etherpad` import RCE; the rest are XSS / admin-header / token / OAuth-claim issues.) FRESH.

## Evidence
- `repro.sh` — deterministic, idempotent PoC (reads apikey from env/APIKEY.txt).
- `req-resp/poc-run.txt` — captured run: control (guard fires) vs exploit (guard bypassed + rev-0 corrupted).

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:H
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:U
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:N
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:L
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:L
AltoBajoNinguno
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
ep_etherpad-lite≤ 3.3.2
1.8.14
3.3.2
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
npmep_etherpad-lite
Sin parche — — 1.8.14 afectada
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/ether/etherpad/security/advisories/GHSA-wg58-mhwv-35pq

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.