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Advisory · GitHub · Packagist · poweradmin/poweradmin

GHSA-WPFX-2C2Q-HJQ9

Host header injection via SERVER_NAME fallback poisons the OIDC redirect_uri (incomplete fix of CVE-2026-54588)

Parche disponible
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CVSS 3.1
9.6
Crítica
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche3 versiones4.2.6 · 4.3.5 · 4.4.1
Exposición78 dDesde la divulgación, 3 sept 2026, 11:39 p. m.
Detección76 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir de cerca
Monitorear y programar la remediación
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de vector CVSS 3.1 y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico total. Hay versiones corregidas disponibles.
Tu firewall merece enterarse de esto.No es tan grave… si la atiendes esta semana.
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
4 sept 26
4 nov 26
19 nov 26
21 nov 26
4 sept 26
23 sept 26
13 oct 26
1 nov 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-WPFX-2C2Q-HJQ9 divulgada · CVSS 9.6 (GitHub)
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

## Summary
Poweradmin builds the OIDC `redirect_uri` from `$_SERVER['SERVER_NAME']` when `interface.application_url` is unset (the default). Under the shipped FrankenPHP/Caddy Docker image and Apache with the default `UseCanonicalName Off`, `SERVER_NAME` comes from the client `Host` header, so an attacker can make the IdP send a victim's authorization code to an attacker host.

## Root Cause
The CVE-2026-54588 fix (introduced in v4.2.4 / v4.3.3) swapped `HTTP_HOST` for `$_SERVER['SERVER_NAME']` in the host-fallback path. This sink reads `SERVER_NAME` raw, with no hostname check or allowlist:
- `OidcService::getCallbackUrl()` (`OidcService.php:524`) — builds OIDC `redirect_uri`. Reached pre-auth via `GET /oidc/login` (`OidcLoginController` ctor calls `parent::__construct($request, false)`).

`interface.application_url` defaults to `''` (`settings.defaults.php:149`), so the safe branch is skipped in every sink. There is no global Symfony `trusted_hosts`/`trusted_proxies` guard, and `BaseController`'s host allowlist is `$allowedHosts = []` (disabled).

Deployment host-source (verified): FrankenPHP `cgi.go` sets `$_SERVER['SERVER_NAME']` from `net.SplitHostPort(request.Host)` = the client `Host` header; the shipped `Dockerfile` bakes a hostname-less Caddy site block (`:{$SERVER_PORT:80}`) so nothing pins it. Apache with the documented-default `UseCanonicalName Off` likewise derives SERVER_NAME from the client Host. (Stock nginx from the shipped `nginx.conf.example` pins `server_name your-domain.com` and is NOT affected.)

## Impact
- OIDC (HIGH): poisoned `redirect_uri` delivers the victim's authorization code/token to the attacker under the same loose-IdP-registration threat model under which CVE-2026-54588 was accepted → account takeover.

Proof of Concept

# OIDC redirect_uri poisoning (pre-auth):
GET /oidc/login HTTP/1.1
Host: evil.tld
# FrankenPHP sets $_SERVER['SERVER_NAME']='evil.tld'; getCallbackUrl() skips the unset
# application_url branch and reads SERVER_NAME raw -> redirect_uri=https://evil.tld/oidc/callback
# is sent to the IdP; the victim's auth code is delivered to evil.tld.

## Attack Chain
1. Entry: `GET /oidc/login` (pre-auth; `OidcLoginController` ctor `parent::__construct($request, false)`) with `Host: evil.tld`. Guard: none at ingress.
2. Source: request reaches the official FrankenPHP Docker image. Guard: shipped Caddyfile pins no hostname (`:{$SERVER_PORT:80}`). Bypass proof: FrankenPHP `cgi.go` sets `$_SERVER['SERVER_NAME'] = SplitHostPort(request.Host)` = `evil.tld`.
3. Check: `OidcService::getCallbackUrl()` `:511` `application_url` branch. Guard: use configured URL if set. Bypass proof: `application_url` defaults to `''` (`settings.defaults.php:149`) → branch skipped → falls to `:524`.
4. Sink: `:524` `getServerParam('SERVER_NAME','localhost')` returned verbatim (`Request.php:73-76`), no `isValidHostname`/allowlist → `redirect_uri = https://evil.tld/oidc/callback`, embedded in the IdP authorization request.
5. Impact: IdP delivers the victim's authorization code to the attacker host → account takeover.

## Bypass Evidence
- Seed advisory GHSA-3735-5339-xfwx describes `HTTP_HOST` only; the string `SERVER_NAME` does not appear in it. Its affected ranges (`< 4.2.4` and `>= 4.3.0, < 4.3.3`) are BEFORE the fix; the SERVER_NAME sinks exist FROM the fix version onward (confirmed present on v4.2.4, v4.2.5, v4.3.3, v4.3.4, v4.4.0 via `git show <tag>:<file>`). Inverted version range + different source header + not mentioned in advisory = incomplete-fix bypass, not a duplicate.
- FrankenPHP `cgi.go` SERVER_NAME=`SplitHostPort(r.Host)` confirmed from source; shipped `Dockerfile`/Caddyfile has no host to pin. Apache `UseCanonicalName Off` is the documented default. Each sink reads SERVER_NAME raw (no validation), unlike `DocsController.php:267` which validates and whose comment concedes SERVER_NAME "could still let unexpected values through."

## Affected Versions
`>= 4.2.4` (SERVER_NAME fallback introduced by the CVE fix), spanning the 4.2.x (`>= 4.2.4`), 4.3.x (`>= 4.3.3`), and 4.4.x (`>= 4.4.0`) lines. 4.3.0 to 4.3.2 still carry the older `HTTP_HOST` shape and are covered by GHSA-3735-5339-xfwx / CVE-2026-54588.

## Deployment note
Only FrankenPHP/official-Docker and Apache-default derive SERVER_NAME from the client Host. Stock nginx (shipped `nginx.conf.example`) pins `server_name` to the configured directive and is NOT affected — advisory text must state this to avoid overstating nginx.

---
Reported by zx (Jace) — GitHub: @manus-use

Split note: this advisory originally covered three sinks with the same fallback. Each needed its own change, so the SAML and logout sinks are now tracked separately: GHSA-c25f-hc8c-2jmw (SAML) and GHSA-hgmw-rc66-m59f (logout redirect).

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:N
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:R
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:C
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:H
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:H
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:L
AltoBajoNinguno
Score de explotaciónQué tan fácil y probable es que la exploten
8.3/ 10Alto
Vector 8.3 (muy fácil) · sin evidencia de explotación.
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
poweradmin/poweradmin≥ 4.2.4 < 4.2.6
poweradmin/poweradmin≥ 4.3.3 < 4.3.5
poweradmin/poweradmin≥ 4.4.0 < 4.4.1
4.2.4
4.2.6
4.3.3
4.3.5
4.4.0
4.4.1
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Packagistpoweradmin/poweradmin
Corregida 4.2.6, 4.3.5, 4.4.1 — —
Versiones corregidas4.2.64.3.54.4.1
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/poweradmin/poweradmin/security/advisories/GHSA-wpfx-2c2q-hjq9

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.