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Advisory · GitHub · Go · chainguard.dev/sdk

GHSA-WQ26-3J2M-4HVV

Chainguard SDK: AWS SigV4 token replay in auth/aws.VerifyToken — Chainguard-Audience/Chainguard-Identity binding headers not required in SignedHeaders

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CVSS
—
high
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche2 versionesPrimer parche a -134 d de la divulgación
Exposición1 dDesde la divulgación, 18 nov 2026, 4:16 p. m.
Detección19 minDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada +1
Explotación
Remediación
Parche v0.1.107
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
7 jul 26
18 nov 26
20 nov 26
7 jul 26
10 ago 26
13 sept 26
17 oct 26
20 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Remediación Parche v0.1.107 chainguard.dev/sdk · -134 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-WQ26-3J2M-4HVV divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Summary

The `auth/aws` package of the `chainguard.dev/sdk` Go library provides Chainguard's AWS-backed identity federation (an AWS workload proves its identity to Chainguard by signing an AWS STS `GetCallerIdentity` request). Its verifier, `VerifyToken`, reads the `Chainguard-Audience` and `Chainguard-Identity` binding headers from a presented token but does not require them to be covered by the SigV4 signature. AWS STS validates only the headers listed in `SignedHeaders` and ignores all others, so an attacker can take a `GetCallerIdentity` request that a victim signed for a *different* relying party, inject or rewrite those two headers *after* signing (without invalidating the signature), and replay it to any service that authenticates callers with `VerifyToken`. The binding those headers were meant to provide is therefore forgeable — a verifier-side (relying-party) authentication bypass / cross-service token replay.

Background

The package uses the standard "signed `GetCallerIdentity`" pattern — the same approach HashiCorp Vault's AWS auth method and Kubernetes `aws-iam-authenticator` use: the caller signs an AWS STS `GetCallerIdentity` request with its AWS credentials to prove who it is, and presents that signed request as a bearer token. It has two halves:

  • `GenerateToken` (client): builds the `GetCallerIdentity` request, adds the `Chainguard-Audience` and `Chainguard-Identity` headers that bind the proof to a specific Chainguard audience (issuer) and assumable identity, SigV4-signs it, and serializes it into a token.
  • `VerifyToken` (relying party): decodes the token, checks those two binding headers, forwards the request to AWS STS to confirm the caller's real AWS identity (ARN), and returns it so a Chainguard token can be issued for that identity.

The binding headers exist so a proof minted for one audience/identity cannot be reused for another — a defense against cross-service replay — and their security depends entirely on being covered by the SigV4 signature.

Impact

A relying party calling `auth/aws.VerifyToken` can be induced to accept a `GetCallerIdentity` proof that a victim produced for an unrelated purpose — for example a request minted for HashiCorp Vault's AWS auth method, Kubernetes `aws-iam-authenticator`, a different audience, or one captured from logs or a proxy — and to treat it as proof of the victim's AWS identity for an attacker-chosen audience and identity. The signed request is valid within its ~15-minute window. No access to the victim's AWS credentials is required; the attacker only needs a fresh signed `GetCallerIdentity` request from the victim principal.

Code that uses only `auth/aws.GenerateToken` (token generation) is not affected — the generator correctly includes the binding headers in the signature. Only verifiers using `auth/aws.VerifyToken` are affected.

Affected versions

All released versions of `chainguard.dev/sdk` that include `auth/aws.VerifyToken`, up to and including `v0.1.106`.

Patches

Fixed in `chainguard.dev/sdk` v0.1.107 https://github.com/chainguard-dev/sdk/releases/tag/v0.1.107. The fix requires both the `Chainguard-Audience` and `Chainguard-Identity` headers to be present in the request's SigV4 `SignedHeaders` before their values are trusted (mirroring the mitigation HashiCorp Vault applies by requiring `X-Vault-AWS-IAM-Server-ID` to be signed). It additionally adds defense-in-depth checks on the request method, the STS host, and the request timestamp. Upgrade to v0.1.107 or later.

Workarounds

There is no client-side workaround; the fix is in the verifier. Operators of services that verify AWS-backed identities with `VerifyToken` should upgrade as soon as the patched release is available.

References
  • AWS Signature Version 4 — signed headers: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/reference_sigv.html
  • Comparable mitigation: HashiCorp Vault requires the `X-Vault-AWS-IAM-Server-ID` header to appear in `SignedHeaders` before trusting it.
Credits

Reported by Kris Kennaway (Datadog).

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
chainguard.dev/sdk< 0.1.107
0.1.107
v0.2.8
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
gochainguard.dev/sdk
Corregida v0.1.107 -134 d v0.2.8 no afectada
Versiones corregidas0.1.107v0.1.107
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-71861
Otrahttps://github.com/chainguard-dev/sdk/security/advisories/GHSA-wq26-3j2m-4hvv
Otrahttps://github.com/chainguard-dev/sdk/commit/d27997d62aaffe85f905cce4cbe8cdebbd5e24eb
Otrahttps://github.com/chainguard-dev/sdk
Otrahttps://github.com/chainguard-dev/sdk/releases/tag/v0.1.107

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