GHSA-WQ4W-VWVQ-Q3X9
Nginx UI: Standalone short tokens survive administrative revocation in cache and authenticate again after account re-enable
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-WQ4W-VWVQ-Q3X9 divulgada | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice |
### Summary
Standalone short tokens issued for WebSocket and explicit-token authentication can survive administrative revocation in cache. If the same account is later re-enabled before the cache entry expires, the deleted short token becomes valid again.
### Details
`GenerateShortToken()` creates an `AuthToken` row that contains only `ShortToken` and no long `Token`. `DeleteUserTokens()` removes database rows, but when clearing caches it only invalidates entries where `authToken.Token != ""`. This leaves standalone short-token cache entries behind. `GetTokenUserByShortToken()` checks that cache first and then loads the user by ID, so the stale short token becomes usable again if the account status is restored to `true`.
Relevant code paths:
- [internal/user/user.go](/home/kali/Desktop/bounty/nginx-ui/internal/user/user.go:43)
- [internal/user/user.go](/home/kali/Desktop/bounty/nginx-ui/internal/user/user.go:118)
- [internal/user/user.go](/home/kali/Desktop/bounty/nginx-ui/internal/user/user.go:204)
- [api/user/short_token.go](/home/kali/Desktop/bounty/nginx-ui/api/user/short_token.go:13)
- [internal/middleware/middleware.go](/home/kali/Desktop/bounty/nginx-ui/internal/middleware/middleware.go:82)
### PoC
This was verfied locally in an isolated environment with a temporary package-level harness that exercised the real token issuance, revocation, cache, and re-authentication paths.
What the executed test did:
1. Created an enabled user in a temporary SQLite database.
2. Called the real `GenerateShortToken(user.ID)` function to issue a standalone short token.
3. Verified that the token authenticated successfully and was present in the short-token cache.
4. Disabled the user and called the real `DeleteUserTokens(user.ID)` function.
5. Verified that the database token rows were removed.
6. Verified that the short-token cache entry still existed after `DeleteUserTokens`.
7. Re-enabled the same user.
8. Reused the previously deleted short token via the real `GetTokenUserByShortToken()` path and observed successful authentication.
Observed result from the actual local verification:
- The database token rows were removed during revocation.
- The short-token cache entry remained present.
- Re-enabling the user restored successful authentication through the stale short token.
### Impact
Any deployment using standalone short tokens is affected. If a short token is stolen, administrative disable/delete-token handling may not fully revoke it. Re-enabling the account within the cache lifetime restores access for the stale token to any HTTP or WebSocket routes that accept short-token authentication.
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
gogithub.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI |
Sin parche | — | — | v1.9.9 afectada |
commit 23d1934Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-84321https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/security/advisories/GHSA-wq4w-vwvq-q3x9https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/commit/23d1934099b05b2a01589b48129dc3d3159d91c2https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-uihttps://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/releases/tag/v2.4.1Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
