GHSA-WVQW-J4RF-JHF8
SSRF deny-list bypass via decimal-IP and null-host (underscore authority) in HttpClient egress matcher
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Fuente: GitHub
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-WVQW-J4RF-JHF8 divulgada · CVSS 4.9 (GitHub) | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
## Summary
Kestra's opt-in HTTP egress control (`kestra.tasks.http.allowed-list` / `kestra.tasks.http.denied-list`) is enforced by a host-string matcher that performs no IP-literal normalization and no DNS resolution, and fail-opens (returns "not matched") when `java.net.URI.getHost()` returns `null`. A flow author can therefore defeat a *configured* deny-list and reach cloud metadata / internal-only services using either a decimal-encoded IPv4 literal or an authority containing an underscore (which forces `getHost()` to `null`). This is an incomplete-fix residual of the `getHost()`-based matcher (commit `0354ddf8`), not the original SSRF (GHSA-r56g-q4p6-m3p6) which merely introduced the opt-in list.
## Root Cause
The deny/allow list is applied at exactly one chokepoint: `HttpClient.validateUri` -> `isListEntryMatch` (`core/src/main/java/io/kestra/core/http/client/HttpClient.java` ~589-636). The matcher reads `String host = uri.getHost(); if (host == null) return false;` and compares that string against each list entry with no IP normalization and no DNS resolution. The socket target, however, is chosen by a different path: Micronaut `UriBuilder` preserves the host verbatim, `HttpRequest.to()` hands the identical `URI` to `new HttpUriRequestBase(method, uri)`, and Apache HttpClient5 `URIUtils.extractHost` derives the target from the raw authority; the JDK resolver then interprets alternative IP encodings. This guard/connect divergence lets equivalent hosts slip past the deny match while still connecting.
## Impact
A flow author (unauthenticated in the OSS default no-auth posture; low-privilege authenticated flow editor in a hardened deployment) defeats a deployed deny-list and reaches the cloud-metadata endpoint (IAM credentials), localhost, and internal services. `http()` returns the response body to the flow, so fetched data / credentials are exfiltrated as the expression value. This is the opposite of a "disabled control" false positive: the operator explicitly ENABLED an egress control that fails open.
## Proof of Concept
Instance configured with a deny-list containing the cloud metadata address (the 169.254.169.254 link-local IP). Flow expression:
{{ http(uri='http://2852039166/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/') }}`2852039166` is the 32-bit decimal encoding of the metadata link-local address. `URI.getHost()` returns the string `"2852039166"`, which does not equal the dotted-quad deny entry, so the deny match fails; Apache/JDK still connect to the metadata service and the credentials are returned. Underscore/null-host variant: `http://kestra_internal_db:8080/...` makes `getHost()` return `null`, so `isListEntryMatch` returns false for EVERY deny entry.
## Attack Chain
1. Entry: flow author submits `{{ http(uri='http://2852039166/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/') }}`.
- Guard: `validateUri` deny-list at `HttpClient.java:541`.
- Bypass proof: entries are matched only by `isListEntryMatch`, which reads `uri.getHost()`.
2. Check: `isListEntryMatch(<metadata-ip>, uri)`.
- Guard: string comparison against `getHost()`.
- Bypass proof: `URI.create("http://2852039166/...").getHost()` = `"2852039166"`; that string does not equal the dotted-quad deny entry. (Null-host variant: `getHost()` == null -> returns false at :591 for every entry.)
3. Processing: `UriBuilder.of(uri).build()` preserves host verbatim; `HttpRequest.to()` passes the identical URI to `new HttpUriRequestBase(method, uri)` — no canonicalization.
- Guard: any host canonicalization before connect.
- Bypass proof (Micronaut 4.10.18 + httpclient5 5.6.4): `getAuthority()` -> `2852039166`; `URIUtils.extractHost(uri)` -> `http://2852039166`.
4. Sink: Apache opens the socket to the `URIUtils.extractHost` result; JDK resolver parses the decimal literal.
- Bypass proof: `InetAddress.getByName("2852039166")` resolves to the metadata link-local address (JDK 21, verified).
5. Impact: metadata/IAM credentials returned as the Pebble expression value -> credential exfiltration. Post-redirect `ssrf-guard` re-parses with the same URI and is bypassed identically; no redirect is required.
## Bypass Evidence
- `URI.create("http://2852039166/...").getHost()` = `"2852039166"` (non-null; string compare fails against dotted-quad deny entry).
- `URI.create("http://foo_bar.internal/").getHost()` = `null` -> `isListEntryMatch` returns false at :591 for every entry (no deny-list can ever match an authority containing an underscore).
- Connect side (verified offline, exact shipped libs): `UriBuilder.of(uri).build()` preserves host; `URIUtils.extractHost` yields the raw-authority host; `InetAddress.getByName("2852039166")` resolves to the metadata address.
- Matcher present unchanged on latest release v2.0.2: `git show v2.0.2:core/.../HttpClient.java` -> `isListEntryMatch` at :589-636 with `if (host == null) return false;` and no IP/DNS normalization.
## Affected Versions
`io.kestra:kestra-core` `>= 2.0.1, <= 2.0.2`. The `getHost()` matcher this finding shows to be incomplete was introduced by `0354ddf8` (first shipped in 2.0.1); latest release 2.0.2 still ships it unchanged, including the null-host fail-open. (2.0.0 shipped a weaker raw `startsWith` matcher that the decimal-IP vector also bypasses, but the clean incomplete-fix framing anchors at 2.0.1+.)
## Suggested Fix
Resolve the request host to `InetAddress` and match/deny on the resolved IP with CIDR support (so operators can deny the link-local, loopback, and RFC-1918 ranges), and treat an unparseable / `null` authority as fail-closed for the deny-list.
Severity
- This is not a privilege boundary. Anyone who can author a flow already has code execution on a worker via script tasks and can reach the metadata endpoint directly, with no encoding trick and no HTTP task involved. denied-list has never been a sandbox against a flow author.
- `allowed-list` already fails closed against every vector here: a null host and 2852039166 match no entry, so noneMatch rejects. That is the enforcement boundary. `denied-list` is a guardrail, shipped off by default, and cannot be made complete regardless of this fix: 169.254.169.254.nip.io resolves to the metadata address today with no encoding trick, as does any attacker-controlled A record, plus DNS rebinding between check and connect.
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Our position: Low, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N, affected >= 2.0.0.
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Reported by zx (Jace) — GitHub: @manus-use
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Desglose de métricas
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Mavenio.kestra:kestra-core |
Corregida | 2.0.4 | — | — |
2.0.4Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/kestra-io/kestra/security/advisories/GHSA-wvqw-j4rf-jhf8Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
