llamaCVEVulnerability Intelligence
/
Advisory · GitHub · Maven · io.kestra:kestra-core

GHSA-WVQW-J4RF-JHF8

SSRF deny-list bypass via decimal-IP and null-host (underscore authority) in HttpClient egress matcher

Parche disponible
Descargar PNG JSON
CVSS 3.1
4.9
Media
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versión2.0.4
Exposición46 dDesde la divulgación, 6 oct 2026, 3:06 a. m.
Detección43 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir
Remediar en la ventana regular de mantenimiento
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de vector CVSS 3.1 y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico parcial. Hay versiones corregidas disponibles.
Esto no amerita reunión. Un ticket basta.Tranqui, pero que no se quede en el olvido.
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
6 oct 26
19 nov 26
21 nov 26
6 oct 26
17 oct 26
29 oct 26
10 nov 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-WVQW-J4RF-JHF8 divulgada · CVSS 4.9 (GitHub)
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

## Summary
Kestra's opt-in HTTP egress control (`kestra.tasks.http.allowed-list` / `kestra.tasks.http.denied-list`) is enforced by a host-string matcher that performs no IP-literal normalization and no DNS resolution, and fail-opens (returns "not matched") when `java.net.URI.getHost()` returns `null`. A flow author can therefore defeat a *configured* deny-list and reach cloud metadata / internal-only services using either a decimal-encoded IPv4 literal or an authority containing an underscore (which forces `getHost()` to `null`). This is an incomplete-fix residual of the `getHost()`-based matcher (commit `0354ddf8`), not the original SSRF (GHSA-r56g-q4p6-m3p6) which merely introduced the opt-in list.

## Root Cause
The deny/allow list is applied at exactly one chokepoint: `HttpClient.validateUri` -> `isListEntryMatch` (`core/src/main/java/io/kestra/core/http/client/HttpClient.java` ~589-636). The matcher reads `String host = uri.getHost(); if (host == null) return false;` and compares that string against each list entry with no IP normalization and no DNS resolution. The socket target, however, is chosen by a different path: Micronaut `UriBuilder` preserves the host verbatim, `HttpRequest.to()` hands the identical `URI` to `new HttpUriRequestBase(method, uri)`, and Apache HttpClient5 `URIUtils.extractHost` derives the target from the raw authority; the JDK resolver then interprets alternative IP encodings. This guard/connect divergence lets equivalent hosts slip past the deny match while still connecting.

## Impact
A flow author (unauthenticated in the OSS default no-auth posture; low-privilege authenticated flow editor in a hardened deployment) defeats a deployed deny-list and reaches the cloud-metadata endpoint (IAM credentials), localhost, and internal services. `http()` returns the response body to the flow, so fetched data / credentials are exfiltrated as the expression value. This is the opposite of a "disabled control" false positive: the operator explicitly ENABLED an egress control that fails open.

## Proof of Concept
Instance configured with a deny-list containing the cloud metadata address (the 169.254.169.254 link-local IP). Flow expression:

{{ http(uri='http://2852039166/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/') }}

`2852039166` is the 32-bit decimal encoding of the metadata link-local address. `URI.getHost()` returns the string `"2852039166"`, which does not equal the dotted-quad deny entry, so the deny match fails; Apache/JDK still connect to the metadata service and the credentials are returned. Underscore/null-host variant: `http://kestra_internal_db:8080/...` makes `getHost()` return `null`, so `isListEntryMatch` returns false for EVERY deny entry.

## Attack Chain
1. Entry: flow author submits `{{ http(uri='http://2852039166/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/') }}`.
- Guard: `validateUri` deny-list at `HttpClient.java:541`.
- Bypass proof: entries are matched only by `isListEntryMatch`, which reads `uri.getHost()`.
2. Check: `isListEntryMatch(<metadata-ip>, uri)`.
- Guard: string comparison against `getHost()`.
- Bypass proof: `URI.create("http://2852039166/...").getHost()` = `"2852039166"`; that string does not equal the dotted-quad deny entry. (Null-host variant: `getHost()` == null -> returns false at :591 for every entry.)
3. Processing: `UriBuilder.of(uri).build()` preserves host verbatim; `HttpRequest.to()` passes the identical URI to `new HttpUriRequestBase(method, uri)` — no canonicalization.
- Guard: any host canonicalization before connect.
- Bypass proof (Micronaut 4.10.18 + httpclient5 5.6.4): `getAuthority()` -> `2852039166`; `URIUtils.extractHost(uri)` -> `http://2852039166`.
4. Sink: Apache opens the socket to the `URIUtils.extractHost` result; JDK resolver parses the decimal literal.
- Bypass proof: `InetAddress.getByName("2852039166")` resolves to the metadata link-local address (JDK 21, verified).
5. Impact: metadata/IAM credentials returned as the Pebble expression value -> credential exfiltration. Post-redirect `ssrf-guard` re-parses with the same URI and is bypassed identically; no redirect is required.

## Bypass Evidence
- `URI.create("http://2852039166/...").getHost()` = `"2852039166"` (non-null; string compare fails against dotted-quad deny entry).
- `URI.create("http://foo_bar.internal/").getHost()` = `null` -> `isListEntryMatch` returns false at :591 for every entry (no deny-list can ever match an authority containing an underscore).
- Connect side (verified offline, exact shipped libs): `UriBuilder.of(uri).build()` preserves host; `URIUtils.extractHost` yields the raw-authority host; `InetAddress.getByName("2852039166")` resolves to the metadata address.
- Matcher present unchanged on latest release v2.0.2: `git show v2.0.2:core/.../HttpClient.java` -> `isListEntryMatch` at :589-636 with `if (host == null) return false;` and no IP/DNS normalization.

## Affected Versions
`io.kestra:kestra-core` `>= 2.0.1, <= 2.0.2`. The `getHost()` matcher this finding shows to be incomplete was introduced by `0354ddf8` (first shipped in 2.0.1); latest release 2.0.2 still ships it unchanged, including the null-host fail-open. (2.0.0 shipped a weaker raw `startsWith` matcher that the decimal-IP vector also bypasses, but the clean incomplete-fix framing anchors at 2.0.1+.)

## Suggested Fix
Resolve the request host to `InetAddress` and match/deny on the resolved IP with CIDR support (so operators can deny the link-local, loopback, and RFC-1918 ranges), and treat an unparseable / `null` authority as fail-closed for the deny-list.

Severity

- This is not a privilege boundary. Anyone who can author a flow already has code execution on a worker via script tasks and can reach the metadata endpoint directly, with no encoding trick and no HTTP task involved. denied-list has never been a sandbox against a flow author.
- `allowed-list` already fails closed against every vector here: a null host and 2852039166 match no entry, so noneMatch rejects. That is the enforcement boundary. `denied-list` is a guardrail, shipped off by default, and cannot be made complete regardless of this fix: 169.254.169.254.nip.io resolves to the metadata address today with no encoding trick, as does any attacker-controlled A record, plus DNS rebinding between check and connect.
-
Our position: Low, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N, affected >= 2.0.0.

---
Reported by zx (Jace) — GitHub: @manus-use

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:H
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:U
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:H
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:N
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Score de explotaciónQué tan fácil y probable es que la exploten
5.0/ 10Medio
Vector 5.0 (moderada) · sin evidencia de explotación.
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
io.kestra:kestra-core≥ 2.0.0 < 2.0.4
2.0.0
2.0.4
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Mavenio.kestra:kestra-core
Corregida 2.0.4 — —
Versiones corregidas2.0.4
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/kestra-io/kestra/security/advisories/GHSA-wvqw-j4rf-jhf8

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.