GHSA-X26X-7F4V-CQX7
snark-verifier: Halo 2 aggregation circuit mishandles point-at-infinity proof elements
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Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Remediación | Parche 0.2.6 | snark-verifier · -133 d desde divulgación | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-X26X-7F4V-CQX7 divulgada | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Fuente: GitHub Security Advisories | Registro visto por primera vez en GitHub Security Advisories | |
| Monitoreo | Fuente: OSV | Registro visto por primera vez en OSV | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
### Summary
The Halo 2 aggregation circuit could mishandle proof elements encoded as the point at infinity.
When an assigned proof point appeared in an MSM term with constant scalar one, the Halo 2 loader used a scalar-one shortcut that passed the assigned point directly into the EC sum helper. The EC sum implementation used by that path assumed its inputs were non-identity points, while assigned proof points could represent the encoded identity `(0, 0)`.
### Details
`EcPointLoader::multi_scalar_multiplication` partitions MSM terms by scalar and base type. For `(Value::Constant(ONE), Value::Assigned(_))`, the loader placed the assigned base into the non-scaled variable-base list and later passed those points to `sum_with_const`.
The default Halo 2 shim delegates `sum_with_const` to halo2-lib `EccChip::sum`. In affected versions, that sum helper used incomplete affine addition and assumed that every input point was non-identity. A prover-controlled proof point encoded as `(0, 0)` could therefore enter the final aggregation sum through the scalar-one shortcut and affect the MSM or accumulator computation.
The issue was fixed in halo2-lib by updating `EccChip::sum` to treat encoded identity inputs as no-ops and to return `(0, 0)` when the total sum is the identity. This removes the non-identity input precondition from callers such as the Halo 2 aggregation loader.
### Impact
Recursive aggregation circuits using the Halo 2 loader could compute an MSM or accumulator with an identity proof element in a path whose implementation assumed non-identity inputs. This breaks the expected handling of point-at-infinity proof elements in aggregation.
Practical exploitability depends on the surrounding aggregation and final-decider checks, so this is rated medium severity.
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
crates.iosnark-verifier |
Corregida | 0.2.6 | -133 d | 0.2.8 no afectada |
0.2.6Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-62337https://github.com/axiom-crypto/snark-verifier/security/advisories/GHSA-x26x-7f4v-cqx7https://github.com/axiom-crypto/halo2-lib/commit/f53be0939e2accf0dd7672b1a4abe80af73dadf3https://github.com/axiom-crypto/snark-verifier/commit/364e82654c746b063aff528d8cb660890908278ahttps://github.com/axiom-crypto/snark-verifier/commit/bbfcc721d714bea0d44a27c8fc6c4736e73ca853https://crates.io/crates/snark-verifier/0.2.6https://github.com/axiom-crypto/snark-verifierhttps://github.com/axiom-crypto/snark-verifier/releases/tag/v0.2.5Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
