GHSA-X277-3WCG-G9R2
Atomic Server: Stored XSS via uploaded files served inline (same-origin) on `/download` → account takeover
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-X277-3WCG-G9R2 divulgada | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
Summary
Files uploaded via `POST /upload` are served back by `GET /download/{path}` using `actix_files::NamedFile`. For `text/html` and `image/svg+xml`, actix-files (0.6.6) sets `Content-Disposition: inline`, so the browser renders the file instead of downloading it. The `/download` route sets no `Content-Security-Policy`, no `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`, and no forced `attachment` (CSP exists only on the SPA route), and files are served from the same origin as the app UI. An authenticated Agent uploads `evil.html` containing `<script>`; when a victim opens the link, the script executes in the app origin. Because the `atomic_session` cookie is set via `document.cookie` (not HttpOnly) and the Agent's Ed25519 private key is stored in same-origin IndexedDB (`browser/data-browser/src/helpers/agentStorage.ts`), the script exfiltrates the private key → permanent account takeover.
Affected component
- `server/src/handlers/upload.rs` — stores the file; mimetype guessed from extension.
- `server/src/handlers/download.rs:65` — `NamedFile::open(...).into_response(req)` with no CSP/nosniff/attachment; CSP is only set in `server/src/handlers/single_page_app.rs`.
Steps to Reproduce
Environment: `joepmeneer/atomic-server:develop`, `http://localhost:9883`. Attacker is any Agent with write on a folder.
- Upload an HTML file (multipart, with signed auth headers):
POST /upload?parent=http://localhost:9883 HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:9883
x-atomic-public-key: <pubkey>
x-atomic-agent: http://localhost:9883/agents/<pubkey>
x-atomic-timestamp: <ms>
x-atomic-signature: <ed25519("http://localhost:9883/upload?parent=http://localhost:9883 <ms>")>
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----poc
------poc
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="assets"; filename="xss.html"
Content-Type: text/html
<html><body><script>alert(document.domain)</script>STORED-XSS-PROOF</body></html>
------poc--Response `200` returns a `downloadURL`, e.g. `http://localhost:9883/download/files/<ts>-xss.html`.
- Inspect how the server serves it:
$ curl -D - http://localhost:9883/download/files/<ts>-xss.html
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
content-type: text/html; charset=utf-8
content-disposition: inline; filename="<ts>-xss.html"
# (no Content-Security-Policy, no X-Content-Type-Options)`text/html` + `inline` + no CSP/nosniff + same origin → the browser executes the uploaded HTML/JS in the app origin. `image/svg+xml` behaves identically.
- The attacker sends the link to a victim. On open, the script runs same-origin and reads `document.cookie` (session is not HttpOnly) and the Ed25519 private key from IndexedDB → signs Commits as the victim indefinitely.
Expected: user files served with `Content-Disposition: attachment` + `nosniff`, or from an isolated origin.
Actual: served `inline`, `text/html`, same origin, no CSP/nosniff → stored XSS executes.
*(Confirmed at the HTTP layer in the lab: content-type, disposition, missing CSP/nosniff, same origin, and the intact `<script>` body. In-browser execution and IndexedDB key theft follow directly from these response headers.)*
Impact
Stored XSS in the app origin → theft of the victim's session cookie (not HttpOnly) and Ed25519 private key from IndexedDB → permanent account takeover (not limited by the 10-second token window). If the victim is an admin/root Agent, this is server takeover.
Remediation
- On `/download`, force `Content-Disposition: attachment` for user files, add `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`, and a `sandbox` CSP.
- Serve user-uploaded files from a separate origin/subdomain.
- Set `HttpOnly` + `Secure` on the session cookie; do not persist the private key in JS-readable storage.
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
crates.ioatomic-server |
Sin parche | — | — | 0.40.1 afectada |
Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-69155https://github.com/ontola/atomic-server/security/advisories/GHSA-x277-3wcg-g9r2https://github.com/ontola/atomic-server/commit/457c1dc9af4cd00d2aec89720718e504a49f392dhttps://github.com/ontola/atomic-server/commit/8a8badfd3099765e62ccf6f92dc78a408a11106fhttps://github.com/ontola/atomic-serverhttps://github.com/ontola/atomic-server/releases/tag/v0.40.3Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
