GHSA-X3HF-V55X-JCP6
Access token theft via unvalidated OAuth resource metadata
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N
Fuente: GitHub
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Remediación | Parche v0.27.0 | github.com/obot-platform/obot · -11 d desde divulgación | |
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-X3HF-V55X-JCP6 divulgada · CVSS 8 (GitHub) | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
Summary
When Obot connected to a remote MCP server that requires OAuth, it trusted the `resource` identifier in the server's protected resource metadata without checking that it matched the server. A malicious or compromised remote MCP server could name a different service as the resource, point Obot at an authorization server the victim already uses, and have Obot obtain an access token for that other service. Obot then sent the token to the malicious server with each request, giving the attacker a working token for a service they never touched.
Am I affected?
You are affected if you run Obot >= v0.26.0, <= v0.26.3 and users connect to remote MCP servers that use OAuth. The attack also requires all of the following:
- The remote MCP server is malicious or has been compromised.
- The authorization server the attacker names accepts Obot as a client, through either open client registration or client ID metadata documents, and honors RFC 8707 resource indicators. Many enterprise identity providers support neither, and Obot doesn't send resource indicators to Microsoft Entra ID.
- The victim approves (or has previously approved) the consent prompt from that authorization server.
Details
RFC 9728 requires an OAuth client to reject protected resource metadata whose `resource` value doesn't match the resource it requested. Obot only checked that the field was present, then used the value as the resource indicator in the authorization request and stored the resulting token against the connection to the remote server. The authorization server and requested scopes also came from the remote server, so the attacker chose which authorization server issued the token, which service it was for, and what permissions it requested.
Impact
An attacker could obtain a valid access token, issued to the victim, for another service protected by the same authorization server. The attacker chooses the requested scopes, so the token could grant the full read and write access the victim is able to consent to on that service. The victim sees only a legitimate consent screen from an identity provider they trust.
Mitigation
Upgrade to v0.27.0 or later. Obot now rejects protected resource metadata unless:
- the resource has the same origin as the MCP server URL, and its path is the server's path or a parent of it,
- any query on the resource matches the server URL's query exactly,
- the resource has no fragment, and
- neither URL's path contains anything that servers might normalize differently: a `.` or `..` segment, percent-encoding, `\`, or `;`.
Severity
CVSS v3.1 Score: 8.0/10 (High) — `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N`
Credits
The Obot team would like to thank @Srinivasan-Jayaraman https://github.com/Srinivasan-Jayaraman for responsibly disclosing this issue in accordance with our security policy https://github.com/obot-platform/obot/?tab=security-ov-file.
Desglose de métricas
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
gogithub.com/obot-platform/obot |
Corregida | v0.27.0 | -11 d | v0.28.1 no afectada |
v0.27.0Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/obot-platform/obot/security/advisories/GHSA-x3hf-v55x-jcp6Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
