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Advisory · GitHub · Packagist · azuracast/azuracast

GHSA-X5G5-H4R5-QXVF

AzuraCast: any authenticated user can delete other stations' relay associations and forge relay now-playing data

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CVSS
—
low
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
ParcheSin parcheEl fabricante no ha publicado corrección
Exposición11 dDesde la divulgación, 8 nov 2026, 9:24 p. m.
Detección9 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
9 nov 26
18 nov 26
20 nov 26
9 nov 26
11 nov 26
14 nov 26
17 nov 26
20 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-X5G5-H4R5-QXVF divulgada
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Summary

Any authenticated user can delete other stations' relay associations and forge relay now-playing data via POST /internal/relays.

Details

## Summary
The internal relay registration endpoint (POST /internal/relays, RelaysController::updateAction) is protected only by a login requirement. Given a caller-supplied relay base_url, it loads that (global, cross-station) Relay record, overwrites its name and public visibility from the request body, and then reconciles the relay's station associations: it snapshots ALL existing StationRemote rows for the relay across every station, processes only the stations the caller is allowed to manage, and deletes every remaining row — which is exactly the set of associations belonging to stations the caller does NOT manage. It finally writes caller-supplied now-playing data into the relay's public cache. In a multi-station deployment, any low-privilege authenticated account (for example a single station's DJ/streamer account) can therefore wipe the relay configuration of every other station sharing that relay, rename/relabel the relay itself, and spoof the now-playing metadata displayed on public pages.

## Affected
AzuraCast current release (verified on the main branch as of 2026-11-08), multi-station installations using AzuraRelay remotes.

## Details (backend/src/Controller/Api/Internal/RelaysController.php, routes in backend/config/routes/api_internal.php)
- The route carries RequireLogin only; no administrative or per-station permission is required. (Neighboring internal endpoints in the same route group use RequireInternalConnection; this one does not.)
- updateAction() selects the Relay by the request body's base_url (creating it if absent), then assigns $relay->name and $relay->is_visible_on_public_pages directly from the body (~lines 129-144) — no authorization check on the relay, which is shared by all stations using it.
- Existing remotes are collected for all stations (~149-153). The reconciliation loop iterates only getManageableStations() — stations where the caller holds StationPermissions::Broadcasting — and unsets those remotes from the snapshot (~156-185).
- The cleanup loop (~187-193) removes and flushes every remote left in the snapshot: the associations of stations the caller cannot manage.
- The action also calls azuraRelayCache->setForRelay($relay, $body['nowplaying']) (~195), letting the caller publish arbitrary now-playing data for the relay.

## Impact
Cross-tenant destruction of other stations' broadcast relay configuration (availability/integrity), unauthorized modification of a shared relay's public identity, and spoofing of public now-playing information. CWE-862 / CWE-863.

## Verification status
Code-verified against the current main-branch source: the route definition, the relay selection and overwrite, the manageable-station filter, and the delete-everything-unprocessed cleanup were all read in full. Not executed against a running instance.

## Credit
Quinn Grant (GitHub: leograntquinn-crypto), reported via GitHub Security Advisory.

Proof of concept
  1. Log in to a multi-station AzuraCast instance with any account (no administrative rights needed). 2. POST /internal/relays with base_url set to a relay used by other stations, an arbitrary name, and a nowplaying payload of your choice. 3. Observe: the relay is renamed, every StationRemote association belonging to stations you do not manage is deleted, and the relay's public now-playing cache now serves your supplied data.
Impact

Cross-tenant destruction of other stations' broadcast relay configuration, unauthorized modification of a shared relay's public identity, and spoofing of public now-playing information. CWE-862 / CWE-863.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
azuracast/azuracast≤ 0.24.0
0.24.0
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Packagistazuracast/azuracast
Sin parche — — —
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/AzuraCast/AzuraCast/security/advisories/GHSA-x5g5-h4r5-qxvf

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