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Advisory · GitHub · PyPI · nltk

GHSA-X99W-6FGC-PMFW

NLTK: Allowlisted pickle loaders still permit code execution in current source

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CVSS
—
critical
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versión3.10.3
Exposición72 dDesde la divulgación, 8 sept 2026, 11:42 a. m.
Detección69 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada +1
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada
8 sept 26
17 nov 26
19 nov 26
8 sept 26
26 sept 26
14 oct 26
1 nov 26
19 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-X99W-6FGC-PMFW divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Summary

The current source tree still allows arbitrary code execution during supposedly safer allowlisted pickle loading. The allowlist trusts whole module namespaces instead of exact safe globals, so crafted pickles can invoke dangerous in-namespace callables through pickle REDUCE.

Details
  • Vulnerability type: Remote code execution via unsafe deserialization
  • Affected component: `nltk.picklesec.allowlisted_pickle_load`, `nltk.tokenize.punkt.punkt_pickle_load`, `nltk.parse.transitionparser.TransitionParser.parse`
  • Affected versions: Current source `v3.10.0-rc2`; published `3.9.4` was not the claim target for this bypass.
  • Patched versions: Not yet patched
  • Root cause: Module-prefix allowlists include dangerous callables such as `nltk.tokenize.repp.ReppTokenizer._execute` and `numpy.f2py.crackfortran.myeval`.

`punkt_pickle_load()` allowlists both `nltk.tokenize.punkt` and the whole `nltk.tokenize` namespace, which exposes `ReppTokenizer._execute()` and its `subprocess.Popen(...)` sink during unpickling. `TransitionParser.parse()` uses `allowlisted_pickle_load(..., allowed_modules=("numpy", "scipy", "sklearn"))`, which permits `numpy.f2py.crackfortran.myeval()` and its attacker-controlled `eval(...)` path. I confirmed both gadgets create marker files before the caller returns or later aborts on type misuse.

PoC

Preconditions
- The application loads an attacker-controlled tokenizer or model artifact through these public loaders.

Steps
1. Create a pickle whose REDUCE callable is `ReppTokenizer._execute` and point its command to a harmless marker-file write.
2. Pass that payload to `punkt_pickle_load(BytesIO(payload))` and observe the marker file is created during unpickling.
3. Create a second pickle whose REDUCE callable is `numpy.f2py.crackfortran.myeval` and load it through `TransitionParser.parse()`.
4. Observe the second marker file is created before `TransitionParser.parse()` later fails on the returned object type.

Minimal reproducible excerpt

{'punkt_marker': 'PUNKT_RCE', 'transitionparser_marker': 'TP_RCE'}
Impact

Any caller that trusts these current allowlisted loaders can still execute attacker-controlled commands while loading model or tokenizer artifacts. This defeats the protection mechanism that replaced unrestricted pickle loading and creates a dangerous false sense of safety.

Remediation

Replace broad module-prefix allowlists with exact `(module, qualname)` pairs for the few safe classes or functions genuinely required. Do not allow entire namespaces such as `nltk.tokenize` or `numpy`, and keep post-load type validation only as a secondary defense.

Resources
  • https://github.com/nltk/nltk/blob/v3.10.0-rc2/nltk/tokenize/punkt.py#L120-L134
  • https://github.com/nltk/nltk/blob/v3.10.0-rc2/nltk/tokenize/repp.py#L111-L115
  • https://github.com/nltk/nltk/blob/v3.10.0-rc2/nltk/parse/transitionparser.py#L26-L30
  • https://github.com/nltk/nltk/blob/v3.10.0-rc2/nltk/parse/transitionparser.py#L565-L571

---

Fix + attack demonstration (verified)

+ tightened callers
`find_class` now, before the allowlists:
1. Rejects any dotted `name` → closes 4489 with zero legit impact.
2. Denies dangerous modules (`os`, `subprocess`, `sys`, `builtins`, `numpy.f2py`, `nltk.tokenize.repp`, …) even under a broad `allowed_modules` — a defense-in-depth backstop so a future too-broad allowlist can't silently reopen RCE.
3. `builtins` denied wholesale; safe primitives (`int`, `str`, …) must be named exactly via `allowed_globals`.

Callers tightened: punkt drops the broad `nltk.tokenize` (keeps `nltk.tokenize.punkt` + exact `collections.defaultdict`/`builtins.int`); transitionparser keeps numpy/scipy/sklearn (array unpickling needs their submodules) with the new guards blocking the gadgets.

## Full pickle-sink audit
Every deserialization sink in the tree was reviewed: no raw `pickle.load` anywhere, and no joblib/numpy/torch/dill/yaml/marshal loaders. `data.load` + `wordnet_app` use `RestrictedUnpickler` (blocks all globals — safe); the remaining `pickle_load` sites (`chartparser_app`, `tbl/demo`) load user-selected or self-written files and keep their warning.

Attack demonstration (captured; fork clone)

=== EXPLOITS blocked ===
  4489 sklearn.os.system (dotted)      -> BLOCKED
  x99w numpy.f2py.crackfortran.myeval  -> BLOCKED
  x99w nltk.tokenize.repp._execute     -> BLOCKED
  backstop os.system (os allowlisted)  -> BLOCKED
  backstop builtins.eval (exact global)-> BLOCKED
=== LEGIT loads still work ===
  punkt round-trip via punkt_pickle_load -> OK
  builtins.int (safe primitive)          -> OK

## Tests
`test_pickle_allowlist_security.py` — added 5 regressions (dotted traversal, both namespace gadgets, denied-module backstop, legit round-trip). Suite: 122 passed / 9 skipped (sklearn-dependent) across pickle/punkt/transition/tokenize. pre-commit (black/isort/ruff) clean.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
nltk< 3.10.3
3.10.3
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
PyPInltk
Corregida 3.10.3 — —
Versiones corregidas3.10.3
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-79657
Otrahttps://github.com/nltk/nltk/security/advisories/GHSA-x99w-6fgc-pmfw
Otrahttps://github.com/nltk/nltk/commit/c3e37113742a1ebeeb4f2ca58941f320f98805ea
Otrahttps://github.com/nltk/nltk
Otrahttps://github.com/nltk/nltk/releases/tag/v3.10.3
Otrahttps://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/nltk/PYSEC-2026-3735.yaml
Otrahttps://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/nltk-before-3.10.3-remote-code-execution-via-unsafe-pickle-deserialization

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.