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Advisory · GitHub · PyPI · mareforma

GHSA-XFQ4-8HF9-5H43

Mareforma: transparency_logged trusts the unsigned rekor block

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CVSS
—
medium
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versión0.3.8
Exposición21 hDesde la divulgación, 19 nov 2026, 11:05 a. m.
Detección14 minDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada +1
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
11:05 a. m.
07:55 a. m.
11:05 a. m.
04:17 p. m.
09:30 p. m.
02:42 a. m.
07:55 a. m.
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-XFQ4-8HF9-5H43 divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

What's wrong

During restore, `transparency_logged` is recomputed as `1 if (toml_logged is not False and bundle_has_rekor) else 0`, where `bundle_has_rekor` comes only from a `rekor.uuid` field inside `signature_bundle`. That derivation is wrong in both directions.

First, the rekor block is metadata attached after signing (`attach_rekor_entry` in `mareforma/signing/rekor.py` leaves the payload and signatures untouched), so it is not covered by the Ed25519 signature. A hand-edited `claims.toml` can add `"rekor": {"uuid": "x"}` to any claim's bundle and forge the "publicly witnessed by Rekor" state. The claim signature still verifies, and restore never cross-checks the block against `[rekor_inclusions]` or the log. Tampering with `claims.toml` is the exact threat model restore defends against; `_verify_claim_signatures_on_restore` checks only payload and signatures.

Second, a signed claim in a graph that never used Rekor is written with `transparency_logged=1` (the column default when Rekor is disabled) but restores as 0 because its bundle has no rekor block. The convergence gate requires `transparency_logged = 1`, so post-restore peers can no longer converge to REPLICATED. With no `rekor_url` configured, `refresh_unsigned()` is a no-op and the flag stays 0 forever. Observed on the honest path: signed non-Rekor claim restores from `transparency_logged=1` to 0, and a subsequent peer stays at PRELIMINARY instead of converging.

Severity and impact

High. An attacker who edits `claims.toml` can mark claims Rekor-witnessed and REPLICATED-eligible without them ever having been logged. Meanwhile the common honest configuration (signed, no Rekor) has its trust state silently degraded by every catastrophic-loss restore, with no recovery path.

Location

  • `mareforma/db/restore.py:376` reads `toml_logged` from the TOML and probes the bundle for a `rekor.uuid`
  • `mareforma/db/restore.py:385` computes `resolved_transparency` from the unsigned rekor block alone
  • `mareforma/db/core.py:1401` the REPLICATED convergence gate requires `c.transparency_logged = 1`

Fix direction

Do not derive `transparency_logged` from an unsigned envelope field. When a rekor block is present, require a matching, cryptographically verified `[rekor_inclusions]` entry (via `verify_rekor_inclusion` against the pinned log public key) whose hashedrekord `spec.data.hash` equals the SHA-256 of the claim's signed payload before setting 1; otherwise set 0.

When the claim is signed and neither the bundle nor the graph carries Rekor coordinates, restore the write-time value: the TOML omits `transparency_logged` unless it was 0, so treat an absent flag plus no rekor bundle as 1 (the column default for non-Rekor writes).

Do red/green TDD: add a regression test that fails on `main`, then make it pass.

Quality bar

SOLID, DRY, KISS. Clean, readable, well-tested code. No new errors, warnings, or test failures; the full suite stays green on all supported Python versions.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
mareforma≥ 0.3.0 < 0.3.8
0.3.0
0.3.8
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
PyPImareforma
Corregida 0.3.8 — —
Versiones corregidas0.3.8
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-71534
Otrahttps://github.com/mareforma/mareforma/security/advisories/GHSA-xfq4-8hf9-5h43
Otrahttps://github.com/mareforma/mareforma/pull/58
Otrahttps://github.com/mareforma/mareforma/commit/cccbf4eafd3c34b20b1686f12c0cad76c87566ae
Otrahttps://github.com/mareforma/mareforma
Otrahttps://github.com/mareforma/mareforma/releases/tag/v0.3.8

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