GHSA-XPRX-C7JF-CP6G
Clockwork profiler data readable by unauthenticated visitors behind a same-host reverse proxy (Grav 1.7)
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-XPRX-C7JF-CP6G divulgada | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
Summary
On the Grav 1.7 line, the Clockwork profiler endpoint (`/__clockwork/`) lets any request whose TCP peer is `127.0.0.1` or `::1` read stored profiler records without a token. When Grav sits behind an HTTP reverse proxy on the same server (nginx or Caddy in front of Apache, Varnish, a local tunnel agent, and similar), every visitor arrives from the proxy's loopback address, so an unauthenticated visitor can read the profiles of other visitors' requests. This is the 1.7 counterpart of GHSA-v8fx-pc9p-934x, which fixed the same check on 2.x in 2.1.7.
Affected versions
Grav 1.7.53.3 through 1.7.53.5, when the debugger is enabled with the Clockwork provider (the default provider once the debugger is on). 1.7.53.2 and earlier are covered by GHSA-q3ff-cj6v-rr5g, where the endpoint had no check at all. Grav 2.0.22 through 2.1.6 are covered by GHSA-v8fx-pc9p-934x.
Details
The `/__clockwork/` endpoint is answered during bootstrap, before sessions and accounts exist, so it cannot authorize against a Grav user. 1.7.53.3 gated it with `system.debugger.token`: a request presenting that token as `X-Clockwork-Auth` is accepted. Any other request, including one with a missing or wrong token, then falls back to accepting the caller when `REMOTE_ADDR` is a loopback address.
`REMOTE_ADDR` is the address of the web server's TCP peer, not of the client. Behind a same-host HTTP reverse proxy the peer is always the proxy, so the fallback accepts every remote visitor. Configuring a token does not help, because a request without it still reaches the fallback.
Verified on a stock 1.7.53.5 `grav-admin` install with only `debugger.enabled: true` set: a request with no cookies and no token from a loopback peer received the stored record of an administrator's login request, including the plaintext username and password from the login form, along with the full system and plugin configuration. The same request from a non-loopback peer received 403. With a token configured, loopback requests with no token or a wrong token were still served.
Impact
An unauthenticated visitor, on a site that runs the Clockwork debugger behind a reverse proxy on the same server, can read other visitors' profiled requests: submitted form fields, including administrator login passwords unless `debugger.censored` is on, and the full system and plugin configuration, which can contain mail, API and other service credentials. Session cookies and `Authorization` / `X-API-Token` headers are already removed from stored records. Sites reached directly by the web server (no same-host proxy), or with the debugger off, are not exposed.
Patches
Fixed in Grav 1.7.53.6. Every read of profiler data now requires the configured `system.debugger.token`, presented as `X-Clockwork-Auth` (or the hashed token the Clockwork browser extension gets from `/__clockwork/auth`), whatever address the request comes from. With no token configured, profiler data cannot be read at all. Operators who cannot upgrade right away should turn the debugger off on any site reachable from the internet.
Credits
Reported by @xfscott.
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Packagistgetgrav/grav |
Corregida | 1.7.53.6 | — | — |
1.7.53.6Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/getgrav/grav/security/advisories/GHSA-xprx-c7jf-cp6gLas referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
