GHSA-XWV3-2MV2-W33X
Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure - Trilby Media / Grav CMS
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Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-XWV3-2MV2-W33X divulgada | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
I’m a vulnerability analyst at VulnCheck https://www.vulncheck.com/, an exploit intelligence company and research CVE Numbering Authority (CNA), where I'm one of several folks who manage our coordinated vulnerability disclosure (CVD) program.
An external security researcher recently reported https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/report a potential vulnerability impacting Trilby Media / Grav CMS.
VulnCheck follows a 120-day disclosure policy https://www.vulncheck.com/vulnerability-disclosure-policy, meaning we afford vendors/maintainers up to 120 days from the time of receiving the report to address the issues before publication of CVE records and third-party advisories. For these vulnerabilities, the 120-day deadline falls on November 6, 2026.
The following CVE ID have been provisionally reserved for reference purposes. Reservation does not constitute publication - the IDs will remain in a non-public RESERVED state with no technical details visible in the CVE database until we have aligned on CVE-eligibility, disclosure details, and a timeline, or until the 120-day coordinated disclosure window closes.
CVE-2026-57852 - Authentication Bypass via Null Short-Circuit in Grav CMS Scheduler Webhook Token Check
The researcher has provided us with a comprehensive technical report, which we have attached below. Let us know if you have any questions for us about the CVD process or for the researcher regarding the reported vulnerabilities.
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Authentication Bypass via Null Short-Circuit in Grav CMS Scheduler Webhook Token Check
Package: Trilby Media / Grav CMS
CWE-303 (Incorrect Implementation of Authentication Algorithm). CVSS 3.1 AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H = 8.1 HIGH.
Affected Files
Scheduler.php:1075 — Scheduler::processWebhookTrigger() token check:
php if ($this->webhookToken && $token !== $this->webhookToken) {
return ['success' => false, 'message' => 'Invalid token'];
}
// When webhookToken=null: short-circuit, auth check skipped
// All scheduled jobs execute
Root Cause
Scheduler::processWebhookTrigger() guards the webhook endpoint with a compound condition that short-circuits when webhookToken is null. PHP evaluates null && ... to false, so if no token is configured (the default state when the administrator has not set one), the entire authorization branch is skipped and the function proceeds to execute every configured scheduled job. The correct intent is "if no token is configured, reject the request" or "if any token is configured, require a matching value"; the current implementation instead treats an unconfigured token as "accept all callers."
PoC
Step 1, verify webhook is enabled but no token configured (default install):
GET /grav-admin/ajax.json/task:callWebhook
Check that webhookEnabled=true and webhookToken=null in the scheduler config.
Step 2, trigger all scheduled jobs without any token:
POST /grav-admin/ajax.json/task:callWebhook
# No Authorization header, no token parameter
Response:
json{"status": "success", "message": "Jobs executed"}
Step 3, if a custom scheduled job runs a shell command (a common Grav scheduler use case), the shell command executes with web server process permissions, yielding remote code execution.
Step 4, dynamic test (PHP simulation confirmed):
$ php /tmp/test_grav.php
Token=null (default), No token provided:
Result: Jobs executed (auth bypassed!)
Status: [!!!] BYPASSED
Token='secret123', Wrong token provided:
Result: Invalid token
Status: [OK] Properly blocked
[!!!] CONFIRMED: null webhookToken bypasses ALL authentication.
Impact
An unauthenticated remote attacker who can reach a Grav CMS instance's scheduler webhook endpoint on a default installation (where no webhookToken has been set) can execute every scheduled job configured on the instance by sending a single unauthenticated POST to /grav-admin/ajax.json/task:callWebhook. When any scheduled job is configured to run a shell command (a documented and common Grav scheduler use case for backups, log rotation, cache clearing, and site maintenance), the same request achieves remote code execution under the web server process user, with corresponding read, write, and process access to the Grav filesystem, configuration, credentials, and any adjacent services the process can reach. The vulnerability is present in the default administrative state (no token configured) rather than requiring a specific misconfiguration, so every Grav deployment that has enabled the scheduler webhook without explicitly setting a webhookToken is exposed. Grav operators who have set a token are unaffected, and Grav operators who have disabled the webhook entirely are unaffected.
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Packagistgetgrav/grav |
Corregida | 2.0.9 | — | — |
Packagistgetgrav/grav-plugin-scheduler-webhook |
Corregida | 1.1.3 | — | — |
1.1.32.0.9Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/getgrav/grav/security/advisories/GHSA-xwv3-2mv2-w33xLas referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
