GHSA-3VW5-J55X-486H
Record users can read another tenant's records through RETURN … FETCH
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CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Fuente: GitHub
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Remediación | Parche 3.3.0 | surrealdb · -4 d desde divulgación | |
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-3VW5-J55X-486H divulgada · CVSS 6.5 (GitHub) | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
A record user scoped to one namespace/database could read a record in another namespace/database on the same instance by naming it in a `RETURN … FETCH`.
A record user could select a foreign namespace/database, but ordinary table scans then refused them, because those scans checked a record user's scope. Resolving a record id through `FETCH` did not apply that check. So a record user who knew the id of a record in another tenant could read it:
USE NS ns_b DB db_b;
RETURN { one: post:secret } FETCH one; -- returns post:secret from ns_b/db_bTable-level and field-level `PERMISSIONS` on the fetched record were still applied, so a record in a `PERMISSIONS FULL` table was returned in full.
The same root cause was reported through several paths, each published as its own advisory and all fixed in 3.3.0:
- GHSA-2v9j-645m-pcrq
https://github.com/surrealdb/surrealdb/security/advisories/GHSA-2v9j-645m-pcrq: the `USE` statement - GHSA-vx2p-7hhm-wv62
https://github.com/surrealdb/surrealdb/security/advisories/GHSA-vx2p-7hhm-wv62: the `Surreal-NS` / `Surreal-DB` headers with Basic authentication - GHSA-w5v9-jc5f-5rmc
https://github.com/surrealdb/surrealdb/security/advisories/GHSA-w5v9-jc5f-5rmc: the headers and the RPC `use` method, for system users
Impact
What an attacker can do:
- As a record user of one tenant, read a record in another tenant on the same instance, given its record id. This works when the record's table and field `PERMISSIONS` allow it to be read, such as `PERMISSIONS FULL`.
What it can't do:
- Discover record ids. `FETCH` resolves an id the caller names; it does not scan or list the foreign table.
- Reach any tenant without valid credentials for some namespace/database on the instance. This is not an unauthenticated bypass.
- Read or write a table whose relevant `PERMISSIONS` clause denies the operation, including `PERMISSIONS NONE` (the `DEFINE TABLE` default).
- Pass IAM-gated operations such as `INFO FOR DB`, or change roles.
- Affect single-tenant deployments, or callers that already hold instance-wide (root) scope.
Patches
A request can no longer select a namespace/database outside the caller's authenticated level. The check applies to the `USE` statement, the RPC `use` method, and HTTP sessions built from the `Surreal-NS` / `Surreal-DB` headers. Root can select any namespace/database, and a namespace user any database in their namespace. Database and record users can select only their own namespace/database. Anonymous callers remain governed by table `PERMISSIONS`.
The query-time scope checks now apply to every scoped principal, not only record users. They also cover record fetches and the document write pipeline, so a read or write in a foreign tenant is refused however the session reached it.
- Versions 3.3.0 and later are not affected by this issue.
Workarounds
Users unable to patch should consider the following workarounds:
- On shared instances, use separate deployments, not namespace/database boundaries, to isolate tenants. Until you upgrade, issue namespace-, database-, and record-level credentials only to parties trusted with every tenant on the instance.
- Prefer a `PERMISSIONS WHERE` clause that checks the caller's identity, such as `$auth` or a token claim, over `PERMISSIONS FULL`. This reduces exposure but does not restore the boundary.
References
- SurrealQL Documentation — USE
https://surrealdb.com/docs/surrealql/statements/use - SurrealQL Documentation — DEFINE TABLE … PERMISSIONS
https://surrealdb.com/docs/surrealql/statements/define/table - SurrealDB Documentation — Security and authentication
https://surrealdb.com/docs/surrealdb/security/authentication - `fix(core): enforce tenant boundary on USE / process_use` (included in SurrealDB 3.3.0)
- `fix(server): confine Surreal-NS/Surreal-DB header context to the auth level` (included in SurrealDB 3.3.0)
- `fix(core): confine record users to their own tenant on the write path` (included in SurrealDB 3.3.0)
- `fix(doc): re-verify record-auth namespace/database scope in the document pipeline` (included in SurrealDB 3.3.0)
Acknowledgements
Thank you to rexpository https://github.com/rexpository for reporting this issue.
Desglose de métricas
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
crates.iosurrealdb |
Corregida | 3.3.0 | -4 d | 4.0.1 no afectada |
3.3.0Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/surrealdb/surrealdb/security/advisories/GHSA-3vw5-j55x-486hLas referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
