GHSA-4C2F-96CF-F5FC
OpenID4VP: X.509 chain validation accepts a forged certificate that reuses a trusted anchor's Subject DN without verifying its signature
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-4C2F-96CF-F5FC divulgada | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
Summary
`ChainBuilder` (the private RFC 5280 validator behind `TrustEvaluator` and the public credential-parsing API) terminated chain building on Subject Distinguished Name string equality rather than on cryptographic closure to a trust anchor. A certificate whose Subject DN string matched a trusted anchor's Subject DN was accepted as the chain terminus with no signature verification against the anchor's public key.
An attacker who mints a self-signed certificate and copies a trusted anchor's Subject DN string onto it can therefore have that certificate — and any credential signed with its private key — accepted as issued under a trusted authority.
Impact
A relying party using `@openeudi/openid4vp` to verify OpenID4VP presentations (mdoc / SD-JWT VC) could be induced to accept a forged credential as genuine, defeating the trust-anchor model. In an eIDAS / EUDI age- or identity-verification deployment this permits impersonation of a trusted issuer.
Exploitable through the public verification path: `TrustEvaluator.evaluate()` returns a successful result (and, due to a secondary fallback, attributes the forged leaf to a real anchor's metadata), so downstream callers see a trusted outcome.
Details
`src/trust/ChainBuilder.ts`, `tryBuild()`:
while (current.subject !== anchor.subject) { /* verify & climb */ }
// loop exits when current.subject === anchor.subject
return chain; // returned WITHOUT verifying `current` against the anchorThe signature-verified closure path (`if (!issuer)` -> `verifySignature(current, anchor)`) is correct, but the `while` guard provides a second, unverified exit: when a supplied certificate (the leaf, or an attacker-supplied intermediate) has a Subject DN string equal to the anchor's, the loop body never runs, no `verifySignature` call is made, and the chain is returned as valid. The per-certificate checks that do run (validity, algorithm, keyUsage) all operate on the attacker-controlled certificate and do not bind it to the anchor.
Secondary contributing weakness (`src/trust/TrustEvaluator.ts`): the anchor selected for the result was matched by `serialNumber` and fell back to `anchors[0]` when no match was found, so the forged leaf was reported alongside a genuine anchor's `trustedAuthorityIds` / provenance.
Proof of Concept
// Attacker mints a self-signed cert reusing a trusted anchor's Subject DN.
const impostor = selfSigned({ subject: trustedAnchor.subject /* string */ });
// Vulnerable: resolves to a valid chain [impostor] with no signature check.
await new ChainBuilder().build(impostor, [trustedAnchor]);Patch
`ChainBuilder.tryBuild()` now requires the terminating certificate to be byte-identical to the trust anchor (DER `rawData` comparison) when the loop exits on DN equality; otherwise it throws `CertificateChainError` with `reason: "signature"`. Cryptographic closure via `verifySignature(current, anchor)` remains the only other accepted termination. As defense-in-depth, `TrustEvaluator` now selects the terminating anchor by DER byte-identity and throws instead of silently falling back to the first candidate. Fixed in `0.8.1`.
Workarounds
None. Upgrade to `0.8.1`.
Credits
Reported by Reza Shokri — Quellkern e.U. (https://augenmass.tech), GitHub @devdotbo https://github.com/devdotbo. Thanks for the thorough report, the self-contained reproduction, and coordinated disclosure.
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
npm@openeudi/openid4vp |
Corregida | 0.8.1 | — | — |
0.8.1Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-75522https://github.com/openeudi/openid4vp/security/advisories/GHSA-4c2f-96cf-f5fchttps://github.com/openeudi/openid4vp/pull/25https://github.com/openeudi/openid4vp/commit/a3ffd435aadd61aff1f75ec4b2e1a0f44ffabf16https://github.com/openeudi/openid4vphttps://github.com/openeudi/openid4vp/releases/tag/v0.8.1Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
