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Advisory · GitHub · Go · github.com/fabiolb/fabio

GHSA-4HRH-34W3-5WW8

Fabio: Access-control bypass through unnormalized request paths

Texto original en inglés · Ver en español

Parche disponible
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CVSS 3.1
9.1
Crítica
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche2 versionesPrimer parche a -106 d de la divulgación
Exposición1 dDesde la divulgación, 20 nov 2026, 9:51 a. m.
Detección1 minDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaAtender
Priorizar en el próximo ciclo de cambios
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de vector CVSS 3.1 y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, automatizable e impacto técnico total. Hay versiones corregidas disponibles.
Agenda el parche antes del almuerzo, ¿sí?Me tiemblan las patas. Tú encárgate del parche.
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada +1
Explotación
Remediación
Parche v1.7.3
Monitoreo
Detectada
Fuente: GitHub Security Advisories +2
6 ago 26
18 nov 26
20 nov 26
21 nov 26
6 ago 26
2 sept 26
29 sept 26
26 oct 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Remediación Parche v1.7.3 github.com/fabiolb/fabio · -106 d desde divulgación
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-4HRH-34W3-5WW8 divulgada · CVSS 9.1 (GitHub)
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Fuente: GitHub Security Advisories Registro visto por primera vez en GitHub Security Advisories
Monitoreo Fuente: OSV Registro visto por primera vez en OSV
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Summary

Route selection uses the raw un-normalized request path, and the per-route ACL and basic-auth gates hang off that selection, so a dot-segment, encoded-dot, or double-slash variant of a protected path selects a different route, skips both gates, and is forwarded to the backend which normalizes and serves the protected resource. Unauthenticated; complete bypass of the access control the operator configured. Confirmed at HEAD b841544. Direct peers: Traefik CVE-2023-47106, Envoy CVE-2019-9901.

The defect

fabio never normalizes the request path. A repository-wide search for path.Clean returns zero results. Route selection uses the raw path (route/table.go line 487: `if target = t.lookup(h, req.URL.Path, pick, match); target != nil {`). Both access-control gates are properties of the target that lookup returned:

// proxy/http_proxy.go
if t.AccessDeniedHTTP(r) {                      // line 111, per-route allow / deny:ip ACL
    http.Error(w, "access denied", http.StatusForbidden)
    return
}
if !t.Authorized(r, w, p.AuthSchemes) {          // line 116, per-route auth= basic auth
    http.Error(w, "authorization failed", http.StatusUnauthorized)
    return
}

and the same raw path is forwarded verbatim (`Path: r.URL.Path` at line 142). So /./admin/, /%2e/admin/, //admin/ and /x/../admin/ do not match the protected /admin route. They fall through to the catch-all / route, which carries no ACL and no auth, and fabio forwards the un-normalized path to the origin, which normalizes it and serves the protected resource.

Verification

Verified end to end against the real binary at HEAD, not a synthetic unit test. fabio was built and run with static routes against a `python3 -m http.server` origin, driven with curl --path-as-is: on a basic-auth route, /admin/ returned 401 without credentials and 200 with valid credentials (controls correct), while all four crafted paths returned 200 with the protected page and NO credentials; on an ACL route, /admin/ returned 403 and all four crafted variants returned 200.

Precondition, stated honestly: a less restrictive route must reach the same backend so the crafted path has somewhere to fall through to. That is exactly the two-tag urlprefix- shape fabio's own access-control documentation instructs operators to configure. Where no fallback route exists the request 404s instead.

Suggested fix

Normalize the path before route lookup: decode percent-encoded dot segments and apply path.Clean, then match. Whether the normalized or original path is forwarded upstream is a separate decision, but the LOOKUP must run on the normalized form, because the ACL and auth decisions are derived from it. Also lowercase and strip the port and any trailing dot from the request host before host matching. Secondary observations: X-Forwarded-Prefix is passed through from the client on non-strip routes; the gRPC proxy path never calls either authorization gate, so allow=/auth= on a proto=grpc route are silently unenforced.

Dedup note

The obvious residual of CVE-2025-48865 is already taken: CVE-2026-62987 / GHSA-fq95-v8xc-jm3v (published 2026-07-03) covers the Connection-header strip of proxy.header.clientip/tls/requestid, fixed in v1.7.2. Do not re-report that. The finding above is a different and independent defect.

Tooling

AI assistance was used while investigating. The bypass was reproduced against the real fabio binary with a live backend, including the 401-vs-200 and 403-vs-200 controls, and the reporter separately confirmed at HEAD that lookup takes req.URL.Path, that both gates derive from the returned target, that the raw path is forwarded, and that path.Clean appears nowhere in the repository.

The reporter manually verified this finding against the project's source at the location cited above before reporting it; the AI assistance noted above was for the audit and the drafting.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:N
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:U
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:H
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:H
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Score de explotaciónQué tan fácil y probable es que la exploten
10.0/ 10Muy alto
Vector 10.0 (muy fácil) · sin evidencia de explotación.
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
github.com/fabiolb/fabio< 1.7.3
1.7.3
v1.8.0
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
gogithub.com/fabiolb/fabio
Corregida v1.7.3 -106 d v1.8.0 no afectada
Versiones corregidas1.7.3v1.7.3
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-104099
Otrahttps://github.com/fabiolb/fabio/security/advisories/GHSA-4hrh-34w3-5ww8
Otrahttps://github.com/fabiolb/fabio/commit/f00ce1a446a4b7a3bccbefbb7bfe4a5e0e3fd817
Otrahttps://github.com/fabiolb/fabio
Otrahttps://github.com/fabiolb/fabio/releases/tag/v1.7.3
Otrahttps://github.com/fabiolb/fabio/releases/tag/v1.8.0

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