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Advisory · GitHub · crates.io · surrealdb

GHSA-84W9-87HM-MXQX

Denial of Service via non-ASCII header values in embedded JavaScript

Texto original en inglés · Ver en español

Parche disponible
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CVSS 3.1
6.5
Media
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versiónPrimer parche a -4 d de la divulgación
Exposición54 dDesde la divulgación, 28 sept 2026, 6:15 a. m.
Detección53 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir
Remediar en la ventana regular de mantenimiento
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de vector CVSS 3.1 y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico parcial. Hay versiones corregidas disponibles.
Hoy toca orden, no heroísmo.Hoy toca mantenimiento, no heroísmo.
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 3.3.0
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
24 sept 26
28 sept 26
20 nov 26
21 nov 26
24 sept 26
9 oct 26
23 oct 26
7 nov 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Remediación Parche 3.3.0 surrealdb · -4 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-84W9-87HM-MXQX divulgada · CVSS 6.5 (GitHub)
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

An embedded JavaScript function could crash a SurrealDB server by reading a header value that contained a non-ASCII character.

The `Headers` class available to scripts, which `fetch()` uses for requests and responses and which a script can also construct directly, converted each header value to a string on the assumption that it was plain ASCII, and panicked when it was not. HTTP allows other bytes in header values, so such a value could come from a remote server's response (for example a UTF-8 file name in `Content-Disposition`) or from a value the script set itself. SurrealDB's release builds, including the official binaries and Docker images, abort on a panic, so reading such a value with `get()`, `entries()`, `values()` or `getSetCookie()` terminated the whole server process rather than failing the query.

Impact

Only servers with embedded scripting enabled are affected. Scripting is disabled by default and is enabled with `--allow-scripting` (or `--allow-all`).

What an attacker can do:

  • Crash the server with a single query, as any user allowed to run queries (a record user is enough, and so is a guest where guest access is enabled), by reading back a non-ASCII value from a `Headers` object the script creates itself. No outbound network access is involved, so restricting `--allow-net` does not prevent this.
  • Where a script reads the headers of a `fetch()` response, crash the server from any endpoint that script is allowed to reach, by returning a header that contains non-ASCII bytes. This can also happen without an attacker, because such values occur in ordinary responses.
  • Deny service to every namespace and database on the instance until the server is restarted.

What it can't do:

  • Affect servers with scripting disabled, which is the default.
  • Read or modify data; this is an availability issue only.
Patches

The `Headers` accessors no longer assume a value is plain ASCII. A value made only of visible ASCII is returned exactly as before; any other value is decoded as UTF-8, with invalid byte sequences replaced by U+FFFD, so reading a header always returns a string. The JavaScript API is unchanged.

  • Versions 3.3.0 and later are not affected by this issue.
Workarounds

Users unable to patch should consider the following workarounds:

  • Leave embedded scripting disabled (the default). If you start the server with `--allow-all`, add `--deny-scripting`.
  • If you need scripting, limit who can write scripts: keep guest access disabled, and use `--deny-arbitrary-query` (where available) for user groups that should not run their own queries.
  • Where stored scripts call `fetch()`, restrict `--allow-net` to endpoints you trust, and avoid reading response headers from endpoints you do not control.
  • Run SurrealDB under an orchestrator or process manager that restarts it automatically on exit (e.g. Kubernetes, systemd `Restart=on-failure`, or a Docker restart policy). This limits downtime but does not prevent the crash.
References
  • SurrealQL Documentation — Embedded scripting functions https://surrealdb.com/docs/surrealql/functions/script
  • SurrealDB Documentation — Capabilities https://surrealdb.com/docs/surrealdb/security/capabilities
  • `fix(script): stop response Headers accessors panicking on non-ASCII values` (included in SurrealDB 3.3.0)
Acknowledgements

Thank you to gigioneggiando https://github.com/gigioneggiando for reporting this issue.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:L
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:U
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:N
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:N
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:H
AltoBajoNinguno
Score de explotaciónQué tan fácil y probable es que la exploten
8.3/ 10Alto
Vector 8.3 (muy fácil) · sin evidencia de explotación.
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
surrealdb< 3.3.0
3.3.0
4.0.1
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
crates.iosurrealdb
Corregida 3.3.0 -4 d 4.0.1 no afectada
Versiones corregidas3.3.0
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/surrealdb/surrealdb/security/advisories/GHSA-84w9-87hm-mxqx

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.