CVE-2026-126609
Progressive Robot hMailServer improper certificate validation in PostgreSQL connections
A low-privileged attacker on the network can get the mail server to trust a rogue certificate authority for PostgreSQL.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Fuente: CNA
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | CVE-2026-126609 divulgada · CVSS 7.5 (CNA) | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Fuente: NIST NVD | Registro visto por primera vez en NIST NVD | |
| Monitoreo | Fuente: ENISA EUVD | Registro visto por primera vez en ENISA EUVD | |
| Monitoreo | Fuente: OSV | Registro visto por primera vez en OSV | |
| Divulgación | Evaluación SSVC | CISA-ADP · explotación ninguna | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
hMailServer from Progressive Robot Ltd can be made to trust an attacker's certificate authority when it connects to its PostgreSQL database, because of how a root certificate file name is read on Windows. An attacker with low privileges who can reach the network can exploit this, and the vulnerable setup is not the default configuration.
Descripción original del registro (GitLab)
Progressive Robot hMailServer 6.2.25 through 6.3.7 on Windows, with a PostgreSQL database, the connection's sslmode require, verify-ca or verify-full, and a root certificate file named by PostgreSQLSslRootCert (from 6.2.25) or, with TlsMode=verify-full and neither PostgreSQL key set, by TlsCaFile (from 6.3.4), hands the file's name to libpq as bytes in the system's ANSI code page (up to 6.3.5 as Latin-1 bytes, which on code page 1252 are the code page's own for U+00A0 to U+00FF), and libpq looks for the file by those bytes and then hands the same bytes to OpenSSL, whose file opening on Windows reads a name as UTF-8 first and opens the file at that reading when one is there. When every byte of the name outside ASCII also reads as UTF-8 - for example U+00C3 U+00A9, the bytes C3 A9 on code page 1252, which are U+00E9 in UTF-8 - the database server's certificate was checked against the file at that other name whenever one was there, which allows a local attacker who can create that file but cannot change the configured one, as any user can by default beside a file an administrator keeps under ProgramData, or beside a folder directly under the system drive's root whose permissions the administrator restricted, and who can intercept the connection to the database server or stand in for it, to have hMailServer trust a certificate authority of the attacker's own and read and modify the traffic between hMailServer and its database, the database password included; the file alone, holding no authority that issued the database server's certificate, stops hMailServer from connecting to its database. The same applies in 6.3.4 through 6.3.7 to TlsCaFile when an Oracle MySQL client library has been put in place of the bundled MariaDB Connector/C, since that client opens the file through OpenSSL in the same way; the bundled MariaDB Connector/C opens the file in the code page and is not affected, and neither are the Linux builds. The configuration is not the default: by default no root certificate file is named.
Condiciones y alcance
Desglose de métricas
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
hMailServer |
Corregida | 6.3.8 | — | — |
6.3.8Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://gitlab.com/hmailserver/hmailserver/-/work_items/114https://gitlab.com/hmailserver/hmailserver/-/releases/v6.3.8Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
