GHSA-C9WC-JCR5-8974
IPv6 transition address bypass of SSRF guard in FilteringResolver
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Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Remediación | Parche 3.3.0 | surrealdb · -25 d desde divulgación | |
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-C9WC-JCR5-8974 divulgada | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
IPv6 transition address bypass of SSRF guard in FilteringResolver
Summary
The `is_private_ip` function in `surrealdb/core/src/net/mod.rs` classifies IP addresses for the `FilteringResolver` network capability enforcement. It uses `to_canonical()` to unwrap IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses before checking standard private/special-use ranges. However, `to_canonical()` only handles `::ffff:x.x.x.x` (IPv4-mapped), not NAT64, 6to4, or Teredo transition addresses that also embed IPv4 destinations.
On hosts with NAT64, 6to4, or Teredo connectivity, these transition addresses route to the embedded IPv4 target, bypassing the SSRF guard.
Affected code
`surrealdb/core/src/net/mod.rs`:
fn is_private_ip(ip: IpAddr) -> bool {
match ip.to_canonical() {
IpAddr::V4(v4) => {
v4.is_loopback()
|| v4.is_private()
|| v4.is_link_local()
|| v4.is_broadcast()
|| v4.is_unspecified()
|| (u32::from(v4) & 0xFFC0_0000) == 0x6440_0000 // CGNAT 100.64.0.0/10
}
IpAddr::V6(v6) => {
v6.is_loopback()
|| v6.is_unspecified()
|| (v6.segments()[0] & 0xFE00) == 0xFC00 // ULA
|| (v6.segments()[0] & 0xFFC0) == 0xFE80 // link-local
}
}
}`to_canonical()` converts `::ffff:x.x.x.x` to `x.x.x.x` (IPv4), so IPv4-mapped addresses are correctly checked. But it does NOT unwrap:
| Mechanism | Prefix | RFC | Embedding |
|-----------|--------|-----|-----------|
| NAT64 well-known prefix | `64:ff9b::/96` | RFC 6052 | Last 32 bits = IPv4 |
| 6to4 | `2002::/16` | RFC 3056 | Bits 16-47 = IPv4 |
| Teredo | `2001:0000::/32` | RFC 4380 | Last 32 bits = IPv4 XOR `0xffffffff` |
These remain as IPv6 addresses after `to_canonical()`, and the IPv6 branch only checks loopback, unspecified, ULA, and link-local, none of which match.
Bypass vectors
NAT64 -- targeting localhost 127.0.0.1
64:ff9b::7f00:1`to_canonical()` returns the address unchanged (not IPv4-mapped). The IPv6 branch checks: not loopback, not unspecified, not ULA, not link-local. Returns `false`. On a NAT64-enabled host, this routes to `127.0.0.1`.
6to4 -- targeting cloud metadata 169.254.169.254
2002:a9fe:a9fe::Embeds `169.254.169.254` in bits 16-47. Not caught by any IPv6 check.
Teredo -- targeting 10.0.0.1
2001:0000:4136:e378:8000:63bf:f5ff:fffeLast 32 bits XOR `0xffffffff` = `10.0.0.1`. Not caught.
Attack surface
The `FilteringResolver` is used by SurrealDB's `reqwest`-based HTTP client to enforce network capabilities. Any outbound HTTP request (e.g., from SurrealQL `http::get`/`http::post` functions, webhook deliveries, or OIDC metadata fetches) checks resolved IPs against `is_private_ip`.
Impact
An authenticated user who can trigger outbound HTTP requests (via SurrealQL functions or configuration) can bypass the network capability filter by using transition addresses to reach private/internal IPv4 targets:
- Cloud instance metadata (AWS/GCP/Azure IMDS at 169.254.169.254)
- Internal services on private networks
- Localhost services
Suggested fix
Extract the embedded IPv4 from transition addresses and re-check:
fn is_private_ip(ip: IpAddr) -> bool {
match ip.to_canonical() {
IpAddr::V4(v4) => is_private_ipv4(v4),
IpAddr::V6(v6) => {
v6.is_loopback()
|| v6.is_unspecified()
|| (v6.segments()[0] & 0xFE00) == 0xFC00
|| (v6.segments()[0] & 0xFFC0) == 0xFE80
|| is_private_transition_ipv6(&v6)
}
}
}
fn is_private_transition_ipv6(v6: &Ipv6Addr) -> bool {
let s = v6.segments();
// NAT64 64:ff9b::/96
if s[0] == 0x0064 && s[1] == 0xff9b && s[2] == 0 && s[3] == 0 && s[4] == 0 && s[5] == 0 {
return is_private_ipv4(Ipv4Addr::new((s[6]>>8) as u8, s[6] as u8, (s[7]>>8) as u8, s[7] as u8));
}
// 6to4 2002::/16
if s[0] == 0x2002 {
return is_private_ipv4(Ipv4Addr::new((s[1]>>8) as u8, s[1] as u8, (s[2]>>8) as u8, s[2] as u8));
}
// Teredo 2001:0000::/32
if s[0] == 0x2001 && s[1] == 0x0000 {
return is_private_ipv4(Ipv4Addr::new(((s[6]^0xffff)>>8) as u8, (s[6]^0xffff) as u8, ((s[7]^0xffff)>>8) as u8, (s[7]^0xffff) as u8));
}
false
}Credit
tonghuaroot (https://github.com/tonghuaroot)
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
crates.iosurrealdb |
Corregida | 3.3.0 | -25 d | 4.0.1 no afectada |
3.3.0Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/surrealdb/surrealdb/security/advisories/GHSA-c9wc-jcr5-8974Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
