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Advisory · GitHub · PyPI · modoboa

GHSA-FF32-FCP5-2G3W

Cross-tenant mail disruption via domain alias name collision

Texto original en inglés · Ver en español

Parche disponible
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CVSS 3.1
6.7
Media
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:H Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versiónPrimer parche a -22 d de la divulgación
Exposición21 dDesde la divulgación, 31 oct 2026, 3:55 a. m.
Detección19 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir
Remediar en la ventana regular de mantenimiento
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de vector CVSS 3.1 y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico parcial. Hay versiones corregidas disponibles.
Ni pánico ni ignorarla: término medio.Bien priorizada, bien dormida.
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 2.11.1
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
9 oct 26
31 oct 26
19 nov 26
21 nov 26
9 oct 26
20 oct 26
31 oct 26
11 nov 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Remediación Parche 2.11.1 modoboa · -22 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-FF32-FCP5-2G3W divulgada · CVSS 6.7 (GitHub)
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Summary

DomainAliasSerializer.validate_name() lowercases the submitted name, but does
not reject a name already used by a Domain. The serializer verifies
access to the alias target, not to the domain whose name is being claimed.
The same serializer is used by /api/v1/domainaliases/ and
/api/v2/domainaliases/, and the check is also missing on updates.

The DomainAlias CSV-import path already performs this cross-model check:
DomainAlias.from_csv() rejects a name already used by either a Domain or a
DomainAlias with Conflict. The reverse Domain CSV-import path is not symmetric:
Domain.from_csv() currently checks only Domain. Exact duplicate DomainAlias
names are normally handled by DRF's uniqueness validation; the missing boundary
is primarily the collision between DomainAlias.name and Domain.name after
normalization.

Details

I reproduced this on master at 984c276c1 (2026-10-03). Static inspection found
the core issue and the Alias signal behavior in every released 2.x tag from
2.0.0 through 2.11.0. The Amavis-specific signal behavior described below is
present from 2.5.0 through 2.11.0.

This does not require access to the victim domain. A normal member of the
DomainAdmins group cannot create domain aliases by default; the demonstrated
attacker is a member of the Resellers group with administrative access to one
controlled target domain and sufficient reseller and target-domain capacity
when administrative limits are enabled. An already-owned alias is enough for
the update variant described below; updating it does not recheck quota.

Proof of concept

With Amavis disabled, using the test fixture created by populate_database()
(which includes test.com and test2.com, with mailboxes on both domains):

  1. Create a user in the Resellers group.
  2. Give the user access only to test.com with Domain.add_admin() and give
  3. Authenticate as that user and, in a separate clean test run for each API

POST /api/v1/domainaliases/
{"name": "test2.com", "target": <test.com pk>}

POST /api/v2/domainaliases/
{"name": "test2.com", "target": <test.com pk>}

With Amavis disabled, each endpoint returns 201 in its clean test run. The
database then contains both the legitimate Domain(name="test2.com") and the
attacker-controlled DomainAlias(name="test2.com", target="test.com"). The
post-save handler also creates the internal alias @test2.com -> @test.com.

With the Amavis extension enabled, direct creation instead fails synchronously:
the post-save handler hits the unique constraint for Amavis' users.email, the
request returns HTTP 500, and the default-database writes are rolled back. This
is not a reliable mitigation: the API accepts creation under an unused name
followed by a rename to the victim domain:

POST /api/v1/domainaliases/
{"name": "parked.example", "target": <test.com pk>}
PATCH /api/v1/domainaliases/<pk>/
{"name": "test2.com"}

The PATCH returns 200 with Amavis enabled and creates the same cross-model
domain-name collision. The v2 route behaves the same way. Because rename does
not synchronize generated records, this path leaves the internal alias and
Amavis row under parked.example; it does not create @test2.com -> @test.com.
The redirect demonstrated below therefore applies to the direct-create
configuration, while the rename path establishes the disruption and deletion
effects described later.

Impact

I verified the direct-create case, with Amavis disabled, using Postfix 3.10.13
configured as described in doc-ng/installation/postfix.md:

virtual_mailbox_domains = proxy:sqlite:/etc/postfix/sql-domains.cf
virtual_alias_domains = proxy:sqlite:/etc/postfix/sql-domain-aliases.cf
virtual_alias_maps = proxy:sqlite:/etc/postfix/sql-aliases.cf

I used the SQLite equivalents of the queries in
modoboa/admin/postfix_maps.py and an attacker-controlled catch-all
@test.com -> user@test.com to make the rewrite observable.

After the collision, test2.com is returned as both a virtual mailbox domain
and a virtual alias domain. Postfix logs:

do not list domain test2.com in BOTH virtual_alias_domains and virtual_mailbox_domains

It treats the victim as an alias domain. The previously valid victim mailboxes
in the fixture no longer resolve:

<user@test2.com>: User unknown in virtual alias table
<admin@test2.com>: User unknown in virtual alias table

Addresses that fall through to the domain-wide alias lookup are rewritten
through the generated internal alias and routed into the reseller's domain:

<user@test.com> (expanded from <nobody@test2.com>): virtual-delivered

I checked the maps with postmap -q and verified routing with sendmail -bv. In a
separate SMTP recipient-verification test, I excluded the client from
mynetworks, enabled reject_unverified_recipient, and used a successful sink
transport. Postfix rejected an existing victim mailbox with 550 while accepting
an attacker-mapped victim address with 250, so that setting does not prevent
the demonstrated impact. The supplied main Postfix harness uses
virtual_transport=error:virtual-delivered as a routing sentinel instead of
LMTP, so it demonstrates selection of the attacker-controlled target rather
than final mailbox storage.

Update and deletion side effects

The model signal handlers make the update path more problematic:

  • The post-save handler creates the generated @domain alias only when the
  • The post-delete handler deletes every Alias whose address equals
  • The Amavis pre-delete handler likewise deletes Users("@CURRENT_NAME"), even

This produces two distinct persistent side effects:

  • Where direct creation succeeds, renaming the colliding DomainAlias away from
  • After adding a victim-owned external @test2.com catch-all, the reseller can

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:H
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:U
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:L
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:H
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:H
AltoBajoNinguno
Score de explotaciónQué tan fácil y probable es que la exploten
5.0/ 10Medio
Vector 5.0 (moderada) · sin evidencia de explotación.
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
modoboa≥ 1.5.0 < 2.11.1
1.5.0
2.11.1
2.13.0
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
pypimodoboa
Corregida 2.11.1 -22 d 2.13.0 no afectada
Versiones corregidas2.11.1
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/modoboa/modoboa/security/advisories/GHSA-ff32-fcp5-2g3w

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.