CVE-2026-118515
Symfony Serializer server file access via serializer uploads
A remote, unauthenticated attacker can make the application treat any server file PHP can read as an upload.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Fuente: CNA
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | CVE-2026-118515 divulgada · CVSS 8.4 (CNA) | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Fuente: NIST NVD | Registro visto por primera vez en NIST NVD | |
| Monitoreo | Fuente: ENISA EUVD | Registro visto por primera vez en ENISA EUVD | |
| Divulgación | Evaluación SSVC | CISA-ADP · explotación ninguna | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Fuente: OSV | Registro visto por primera vez en OSV | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
Symfony's Serializer component can be tricked into building UploadedFile objects from client-supplied data, including a file path, so an attacker can make the application treat any file readable by PHP on the server as an upload. An attacker can do this remotely, without logging in, by sending a crafted JSON or form request body, and the impact depends on what the application does with the file, such as exposing its contents or moving it.
Symfony before 5.4.56, 6.x before 6.4.50, 7.x before 7.4.23 and 8.x before 8.1.11 are affected. Fixed in those releases, but a serializer without DataUriNormalizer ahead of the object normalizer is not protected.
Descripción original del registro (Checkmarx)
The Symfony Serializer component DataUriNormalizer handles only the exact types SplFileInfo, SplFileObject, and File, so for a property typed with a subclass such as UploadedFile, ObjectNormalizer instantiates the object through its constructor from attacker-controlled data, including the file path. This allows an arbitrary file on the server to be treated as an uploaded file in Symfony versions prior to 5.4.56, 6.x prior to 6.4.50, 7.x prior to 7.4.23, and 8.x prior to 8.1.11. A request body such as {"image": {"path": "/path/to/project/.env.local", "originalName": "a.png", "test": true}} makes the application handle any file on the server as an upload, without the file being sent. With test: true, UploadedFile::isValid() skips is_uploaded_file() and move() falls back to rename(). Assert\File does not prevent this because it validates the file at the attacker-chosen path, which exists on the server. Any code that deserializes untrusted data into a type that holds such a property is affected. That includes #[MapRequestPayload] on a DTO with an UploadedFile property, which is how uploads are mapped in Symfony 8.1; a single unauthenticated request with a JSON or form body is enough. Depending on what the application does with the upload, this can expose any file readable by PHP (for instance, when uploads are stored and served back), move any such file when move() is called, and reveal whether a path exists. A serializer built without DataUriNormalizer ahead of the object normalizer is not protected by the fix; the serializer configured by FrameworkBundle is.
Condiciones y alcance
Desglose de métricas
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
symfony/serializer |
Corregida | 5.4.56, 6.4.50, 7.4.23, 8.1.11 | — | — |
5.4.566.4.507.4.238.1.11Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/symfony/symfony/security/advisories/GHSA-h38r-xrmh-cwhrhttps://github.com/symfony/symfony/commit/72ece5bb3084e8233325166357f85c8c0650ee86https://github.com/symfony/symfony/commit/c459104eb18ebda31e112c5490970da3f30bd668Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
