GHSA-M4JG-6W3Q-GM86
** `ApprovalInbox` GET read routes remain unauthenticated and wildcard-CORS after the GHSA-mxjx-28vx-xjjj fix — queued high-risk action content disclosed even when a `secret` is set
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-M4JG-6W3Q-GM86 divulgada | |
| Remediación | Parche 5.13.4 | network-ai · 0 d desde divulgación | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
Advisory draft (responsible disclosure to maintainer)
Title: `ApprovalInbox` GET read routes remain unauthenticated and wildcard-CORS after the GHSA-mxjx-28vx-xjjj fix — queued high-risk action content disclosed even when a `secret` is set
Affected: `network-ai` >= 5.12.2, <= 5.13.3 (`lib/approval-inbox.ts`)
CWE: CWE-862 (Missing Authorization), CWE-352 (CSRF / wildcard CORS)
Relationship: incomplete fix for GHSA-mxjx-28vx-xjjj
Summary
Thank you for the v5.12.2 hardening of `ApprovalInbox`. The new `secret` /
`checkAuth()` is sound, but it is wired into only the two POST mutating routes
(`/approve`, `/deny`). The advisory's Recommended fix #1 ("verify it … on the
list/stats/SSE routes") and #2 ("Remove the hardcoded `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *`")
were not implemented, so an operator who follows the new guidance and constructs
`new ApprovalInbox({ secret })` still exposes, with no authentication:
- `GET /approvals/?status=all` and `GET /approvals/:id` — full `ApprovalEntry.request`
- `GET /approvals/stats`; `GET /approvals/sse` — a live stream of all of the above;
- all of these carry the still-hardcoded `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *`, so any
This is the same disclosure the original report flagged ("Read pending requests →
disclosure of queued action details: command strings, file paths, justifications").
Reproduction (published 5.13.3, mitigation applied)
npm i network-ai@5.13.3
node poc.mjs # constructs ApprovalInbox({ secret }), one benign high-risk requestObserved:
- `POST /approvals/:id/approve` with no Bearer → 401 (correctly gated).
- `GET /approvals/?status=all` with no Bearer → 200, leaks the request `target`
and `justification`.
- `GET` response `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *`.
- `GET /approvals/<bogus>` → 404 (negative control).
No destructive action was executed; a benign sentinel marker was used as the gated
command.
Recommended fix
- Apply `checkAuth()` (read-scoped if desired) to `GET /`, `/stats`, `/sse`, `/:id`,
- Remove the hardcoded `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` (handler + `addSSEClient`);
Disclosure
Via GitHub private security advisory (Jovancoding/Network-AI → Security → Report a
vulnerability), per SECURITY.md.
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
npmnetwork-ai |
Corregida | 5.13.4 | 0 d | 6.0.1 no afectada |
5.13.4Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/security/advisories/GHSA-m4jg-6w3q-gm86Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
