GHSA-MV55-58PG-4XGF
GPUStack organization members can bypass Kubernetes API proxy restrictions
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CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Fuente: GitHub
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-MV55-58PG-4XGF divulgada · CVSS 8.8 (GitHub) | |
| Remediación | Parche 2.3.1 | gpustack · 0 d desde divulgación | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
Summary
An authorization flaw in GPUStack's Kubernetes API proxy allows a non-owner member of the organization that owns a Kubernetes cluster to bypass read-only workload restrictions.
The proxy checks whether the current organization owns the cluster but does not verify the caller's organization role. Ordinary organization members are therefore treated as cluster managers, allowing requests outside the intended read-only workload scope to be forwarded using the worker's Kubernetes ServiceAccount permissions.
Affected configurations
Exploitation requires:
- An authenticated user with non-owner membership in the organization that owns the target Kubernetes cluster.
- A reachable worker capable of proxying Kubernetes API requests.
Deployments without such organization memberships are not affected by this specific bypass. Cluster access grants alone, without membership in the owning organization, do not satisfy this prerequisite.
Impact
An attacker can send read and write requests through `/v2/clusters/{id}/proxy/{path}` to Kubernetes API resources outside the intended workload scope. Requests execute with the worker's ServiceAccount permissions and remain subject to Kubernetes RBAC.
Depending on those permissions, exploitation can expose Secrets, allow creation or modification of workloads, and disrupt services by deleting resources. Permission to create workloads can enable execution of attacker-controlled code in the target cluster.
If the worker can read a Secret containing the GPUStack server's JWT signing key, the attacker may also impersonate a platform administrator. This requires the signing-key Secret to be present in the target cluster and accessible to the worker's ServiceAccount.
Affected versions
GPUStack versions >= 2.2.2 and < 2.3.1.
Technical details
In `gpustack/routes/clusters.py`, `cluster_apiserver_proxy` uses `_is_cluster_manageable` to determine whether a caller can access the unrestricted Kubernetes API proxy.
The vulnerable check compares `ctx.current_principal_id` with the cluster's `owner_principal_id` without checking `ctx.org_role`. All members acting in the owning organization share that organization principal ID, so the check succeeds for non-owner members.
As a result, these callers skip `_assert_workload_proxy_scope`, which otherwise restricts non-manager access to read-only requests under the `worker.gpustack.ai` API group within the caller's principal namespace.
Patches
GPUStack 2.3.1 checks both cluster ownership and the caller's organization role before granting organization-based cluster-management access through the proxy.
Non-owner organization members remain restricted to read-only workload API requests within their organization's namespace.
Workarounds
Until upgrading, restrict access to `/v2/clusters/{id}/proxy/*` to trusted platform administrators, or remove untrusted users' memberships in organizations that own Kubernetes clusters.
Restricting the worker's Kubernetes RBAC permissions can reduce the impact but does not correct the GPUStack authorization flaw.
Related advisory
GHSA-3hch-x692-6qj3 https://github.com/gpustack/gpustack/security/advisories/GHSA-3hch-x692-6qj3 covers an earlier Kubernetes API proxy authorization issue addressed in version 2.2.2.
This advisory addresses a separate missing organization-role check in the manager/read-only distinction introduced by that fix.
## Credit
Reported by Kirill Oskin.
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Desglose de métricas
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
pypigpustack |
Corregida | 2.3.1 | 0 d | 2.3.1 no afectada |
2.3.1Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/gpustack/gpustack/security/advisories/GHSA-mv55-58pg-4xgfLas referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
