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Advisory · GitHub · npm · @angular/core

GHSA-RGJC-H3X7-9MWG

Angular Client Hydration DOM Clobbering & Response-Cache Poisoning

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CVSS
—
high
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche3 versionesPrimer parche a -5 d de la divulgación
Exposición157 dDesde la divulgación, 15 jun 2026, 10:16 a. m.
Detección154 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 20.3.25 +2
Monitoreo
Detectada
10 jun 26
15 jun 26
10 sept 26
17 nov 26
19 nov 26
10 jun 26
21 jul 26
30 ago 26
10 oct 26
19 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Remediación Parche 20.3.25 @angular/core · -5 d desde divulgación
Remediación Parche 21.2.17 @angular/core · -5 d desde divulgación
Remediación Parche 22.0.1 @angular/core · -5 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-RGJC-H3X7-9MWG divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

To optimize client-side bootstrap in Server-Side Rendered (SSR) environments, Angular supports Hydration via `provideClientHydration()`. During SSR, Angular serializes the application's runtime state (such as cached `HttpClient` responses) and outputs it into the HTML stream as a `<script>` tag with a predictable identifier:

<script type="application/json" id="ng-state">
    {"some-api-url": {"body": ...}}
</script>
````

During client bootstrap, Angular recovers this state by looking up the element via `document.getElementById('ng-state')` and parsing its text content.

Because the DOM element lookup for the state container is predictable and relies solely on the ID selector (`ng-state`), it is susceptible to **DOM Clobbering**.

If the application binds untrusted user input or CMS content to element properties such as `id` (e.g., `<div [id]="userInput">` or `<a id="ng-state">`) *before* the genuine `<script>` tag is parsed by the browser, the attacker-controlled element takes precedence in the DOM lookup.

During hydration, when Angular calls `document.getElementById('ng-state')`, the browser returns the attacker's clobbered element. Angular then attempts to parse the text content or attributes of this clobbered element as JSON.

### Impact

By clobbering the state element, the attacker can inject a custom JSON payload into Angular's `TransferState` cache. The most critical exploitation vector is poisoning the **HTTP Transfer Cache**.

1. The attacker injects a clobbered `ng-state` element containing custom JSON.  
2. The JSON maps a key (representing a target API endpoint URL) to a malicious payload of the attacker's choice.  
3. During client-side initialization, Angular's `HttpClient` checks `TransferState` before making requests. Finding the poisoned key, `HttpClient` returns the forged response instantly instead of requesting the genuine backend API.

Depending on how the application processes and renders the affected API response, this can lead to:

* **DOM-based Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)** if poisoned fields are rendered using unsafe bindings.  
* **Privilege Escalation** by spoofing user info or session details retrieved from poisoned API payloads.  
* **UI Hijacking** and redirection by spoofing configuration endpoints.

### Patched Versions

* 22.0.1  
* 21.2.17  
* 20.3.25

### Workarounds

If you cannot immediately update to a patched Angular version, apply the following workarounds:

#### A. Avoid Dynamic/User-Controlled IDs

Avoid binding raw user-supplied values or dynamic CMS IDs directly to element attributes. If dynamic IDs are required, sanitize them or prepend a static safe prefix:

```html
<!-- Vulnerable Pattern -->
<div [id]="userControlledInput">...</div>

<!-- Mitigated Pattern -->
<div [id]="'safe-prefix-' + userControlledInput">...</div>
B. Configure a Custom Application ID

Declaring a unique, non-predictable `APP_ID` changes the ID suffix of the state element, making it harder for attackers to predict and target:

// app.config.ts

import { APP_ID } from '@angular/core';
import { provideClientHydration } from '@angular/platform-browser';

export const appConfig = {
  providers: [
    { provide: APP_ID, useValue: 'unique-obfuscated-app-id' },
    provideClientHydration()
  ]
};

This changes the state element lookup ID from `ng-state` to `unique-obfuscated-app-id-state`.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
@angular/core≤ 19.2.25
@angular/core≥ 20.0.0-next.0 < 20.3.25
@angular/core≥ 21.0.0-next.0 < 21.2.17
@angular/core≥ 22.0.0-next.0 < 22.0.1
19.2.25
20.0.0-next.0
20.3.25
21.0.0-next.0
21.2.17
22.0.0-next.0
22.0.1
22.2.6
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
npm@angular/core
Corregida 20.3.25, 21.2.17, 22.0.1 -5 d · -5 d · -5 d 22.2.6 no afectada
Versiones corregidas20.3.2521.2.1722.0.1
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54267
Otrahttps://github.com/angular/angular/security/advisories/GHSA-rgjc-h3x7-9mwg
Otrahttps://github.com/angular/angular/pull/69064
Otrahttps://github.com/angular/angular/commit/6bde84fa8e6a5770b54040fbbc9bf10d5d0386fa
Otrahttps://github.com/angular/angular

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